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Regulation of dark trading: A tale of intended and unintended consequences Sean Foley (University of Sydney) Tālis J. Putniņš (UTS, SSE-R) CIFR Investment.

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Presentation on theme: "Regulation of dark trading: A tale of intended and unintended consequences Sean Foley (University of Sydney) Tālis J. Putniņš (UTS, SSE-R) CIFR Investment."— Presentation transcript:

1 Regulation of dark trading: A tale of intended and unintended consequences Sean Foley (University of Sydney) Tālis J. Putniņš (UTS, SSE-R) CIFR Investment Management and Markets Conference 24 May 2016

2 Dark trading is high on regulatory agenda Why? – Rapid growth in US/Canada/Europe/Australia – Could be bad for markets … mixed evidence – Complaints by exchanges and market participants Many regulators have expressed concerns and made proposals, but are yet to implement Only two have implemented regulation to date – Canada, Oct 2012; Australia, May 2013 – We examine what we can learn from these two cases

3 The regulation Dark trades are required to provide a minimum level of price improvement over the best lit quotes – One full tick, or midpoint (1/2 tick improvement) – Previously: negligible/no price improvement in CA/AUS Objectives? – Decrease dark market share – Increase dark trade sizes – Improve Liquidity – Improve price discovery – Improve Fairness

4 Two types of dark trading Two-sidedOne-sided Three differences 1.Execution probabilities 2.Information revelation 3.Profitability of dark market making Resting dark SELLs Resting dark BUYs NBBO

5 Execution probability for impatient orders Resting dark SELLs Resting dark BUYs NBBO Impatient BUY Impatient SELL Impatient BUY

6 Execution probability for impatient orders One-sided (but not two-sided) dark markets cause order imbalance spillovers to lit market  One-sided dark venue executes some of the balanced but none of the unbalanced order flow Balanced order flow subsidizes costs of executing unbalanced (e.g., inventory risk, adverse selection)  A smaller volume of balanced order flow  higher charge per unit of balanced order flow to cover costs of imbalance (Zhu,2014)  One-sided dark venue can increase lit spreads (Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000) One-sided more harmful to liquidity than two-sided SELLs BUYs IMBALANCE BALANCED One-sided dark venue executes Lit venue gets

7 Information revelation Resting dark SELLs Resting dark BUYs NBBO 2. Recent executions 3. Probing orders One-sided reveals dark order imbalance  provides information about trading intentions: 1. Resting in the dark

8 Profitability of dark market making Positive dark spread Zero dark spread  Dark market making can be profitable in two-sided dark markets (but not one-sided)  This encourages competition amongst lit market makers (Boulatov and George, 2015) Resting dark SELLs Resting dark BUYs NBBO

9 But what does this “tale of two types” have to do with the regulation?

10 Answer: Regulation forced substitution between the two types UnconstrainedConstrained Before After

11 So – What happened?

12 Large and instant decline in dark volume CA: 9.7%  7.9%. AU: 17.6%  10.9%.

13 Dark trading forced almost entirely to mid Midpoint: CA 33%  97%, AU 45%  84%

14 No increase in the size of dark trades And in fact, a decrease in AU (due to lower block size threshold)

15 Decrease (increase) in dark (lit) same-broker trades (internalization) Internalization was a way of saving exchange fees and ‘cream- skimming’ uninformed order flow

16 No increase in lit liquidity provision (both) Lit limit orders to volume, lit depth to volume

17 Increase in spreads in both countries e.g., Quoted: CA ↑0.6 bps from 12 bps; AU ↑5.3 bps from 44 bps Robust to FE, control variables, and control market (diff-in-diff)

18 Why did spreads increase? Tale of intended and unintended consequences becomes A tale of two types …

19 Forced substitution was away from the ‘good stuff’, towards the ‘nasty stuff’ Midpoint: CA 33%  97%, AU 45%  84%

20 Plausible, But is that really what increased spreads? If it is, we would expect: 1.Stocks that experience more “substitution” (from two-sided to one-sided) should have a larger increase in spreads 2.The pre/post widening of spreads should be more pronounced for stocks that were tick size constrained

21 Test #1 of why spreads increased

22 Test #2 of why spreads increased Test: Partition stocks into two groups based on proportion of time they are tick constrained in the pre-regulation period Finding: tick constrained stocks have greater deterioration in spreads than unconstrained stocks – In Canada, only most tick-constrained stocks see spreads increase

23 Conclusions Intended consequences: – Significantly reduced dark trading – Dark trades give much more price improvement (almost all dark is at the mid) – Less dark internalization Unintended consequences – No increase in dark trade sizes – No increase in lit liquidity provision – Wider spreads Reason? – Forced substitution from beneficial two-sided to harmful one-sided dark trading Suggestions? – Move to a finer pricing grid if we have minimum price improvement


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