1. ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE MINING (ASM) GOVERNANCE AND CUSTOMARY TENURE INSTITUTIONS: PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES IN GUINEA Kate Marple-Cantrell and Heather Huntington, Ph.D. The Cloudburst Group

2. LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE RESEARCH AT USAID USAID’s research agenda helps fill tenure and resource governance evidence gaps, especially in context of customary land rights How well do new innovations or approaches work? Which interventions can/should be scaled up? How are benefits achieved? How do programs differently affect different types of beneficiaries? Build evidence base on inter-related agriculture, climate change, economic policy, governance, women’s empowerment and land conflict issues USAID supporting 8 impact evaluations of land/forest tenure programs in Africa Ethiopia: Pastoral and farmland rights certification programs (3 IEs) Guinea: Community land and artisanal diamond rights certification Liberia: Community land rights protection program (Namati/SDI) Tanzania: Farmland rights certification program Zambia: Agroforestry and land certification pilot, REDD+ pilot (2 IEs) Innovative approaches and standards for land sector research and impact evaluation work Mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative)  Context, whether/why Standardized data collection instruments  Generalizable findings Geospatial integration (site selection, contextual understanding)

3. Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is an important means of income generation for individuals living in resource-rich, developing countries (Hilson 2009). Artisanal mining of diamonds throughout Sub- Saharan Africa often occurs within a complex land tenure system typified by overlapping statutory and customary regimes (Freudenberger et al. 2015). INTRODUCTION Land tenure issues in context of artisanal and small-scale mining

4. STUDY CONTEXT ASM in Guinea Forecariah and Kindia Prefectures in Guinea’s Guinée-Maritime region Guinea is an important producer of alluvial, artisanal diamonds, ranking 12th in the world in 2011 with just over 300,000 carats exported.

5. KPCS is an international certification scheme designed to prevent conflict diamonds from entering legitimate trade on world markets. Formal parceling is subject to the following limitations and challenges: Lack of local knowledge and awareness of the local population; Lack of state capacity to manage and monitor the parcels; Absence of geological data to inform parceling; and Unaffordable permit costs for local communities (2.5 million Guinean Francs (GNF)/ US $357 per parcel). KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME (KPCS)

6. USAID’S PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ARTISANAL DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT II (PRADD II) PROJECT Objectives Support diamond-producing States’ compliance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) Improve artisanal miners’ livelihoods and support vulnerable communities. Activities: Formalization of customary surface rights; Demarcation of reserved zones for ASM and parceling; Improve local livelihoods; Raise awareness of relevant policies and laws.

7. RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS 1.Clarify the complex tenure regime that governs artisanal mining of diamonds in Guinea Provide insight to understand when statutory versus customary systems are applied and enforced 2.Investigate whether and how customary institutions heighten social gains and mitigate the social and environmental impacts of mining Explore whether and how ASM formalization can bolster the well- being of miners and communities

8. MOTIVATION METHODOLOGY

9. DATA Data source – Baseline data (2014) from quasi- experimental, prospective IE of PRADD II project 58 villages, covering 11 artisanal mining sites, in Forecariah prefecture (Treatment) 61 villages, covering 12 artisanal mining sites, in Kindia prefecture (Control) Quantitative data – 2,165 households surveyed in 104 communities 916 artisanal miners and masters 108 Customary Land Owners (CLOs) Qualitative data – 35 focus groups from 18 different communities 11 women-only focus groups, 10 youth focus groups, and 14 general groups of adults. TREATMENT AND CONTROL AREAS Source: Chirico, et.al. 2012.

10. RESEARCH QUESTIONS How are customary versus statutory tenure systems applied for use, access, and management rights to mining sites? (Descriptive) Household data ASM data CLO data Qualitative data How do customary tenure institutions influence the social and environmental effects of mining? (Logistic regression – two sets of models) Household data ASM data

11. VARIABLES Dependent Variables (HH and ASM models) Use of smarter mining techniques Refill pits Replant trees Restore stream License benefit (ASM level model only) Independent Variables ( HH models) Demographic (education, migration, ethnicity, age) Socio-econ status (mining exp., assets, mining dep.) Perceived land tenure security Land governance (rules, enforcement, decision-makers) Prefecture Independent Variables ( ASM models) Demographic (education, migration, yrs mining exp.) Socio-econ status (position, asset index, livelihoods) Rules Perceptions of benefits from formalization Prefecture

12. MOTIVATION FINDINGS 1 Tenure systems for ASM use, access, and management

13. LOW UPTAKE OF FORMAL SYSTEM Customary Land Owners (CLOs) most often organize, control, and monitor artisanal diamond mining. Miners predominantly rely on authorization from the CLO (90%, 794) to mine a site. Cost of plots from CLO is cheaper than government license ($4.55- 6.50 versus $50.00)

14. EXPLANATIONS OF LOW UPTAKE Formal sector challenges – Complicated administrative process 62% of miners agree that there is bribery involved in obtaining the license Local control advantages - Customary system effectively distributes land - Nearly all respondents believe that their community land rules are fair (98%) - Community members trust that their land is secure (93%) Land conflicts are rare

15. COSTS & BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM Perceived social costs of mining: 63% of households indicate that the influence of ASM on their community is negative Mining conflicts: 27% of miners reported a conflict at their mining site in the last two years. Environmental degradation: Only 18% (169) of miners report they ‘always’ or ‘frequently’ refill mining pits. Community benefits and transparency: Only 11% of HH respondents report a single meeting in the past year about land rights, land allocation, or land conflict 54% of HH respondents said that no one can ever appeal a ruling by a CLO

16. MOTIVATION FINDINGS 1I Customary tenure and ASM’s social/environmental effects

17. CHARACTERISTICS SIGNIFICANTLY ASSOCIATED WITH ASM OUTCOMES Use of smarter mining techniques – yrs of mining (1.04***), alternative livelihoods (1.52**), migration (.68*), digger/washer (1.67**), formal permit (.85***) Refill pits - formal permit (1.07*), rules (8.21***) License benefits – yrs of mining (1.03***), education (1.31*), alternative livelihoods (1.38*), rules (1.69***) Replant trees – education (2.08***), alternative livelihoods (.47***), prefecture (.52*), rules (7.55***) Restore stream - education (1.70*), prefecture (.44*), rules (7.60***) Results are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***)

18. CHARACTERISTICS SIGNIFICANTLY ASSOCIATED WITH HOUSEHOLD OUTCOMES Mining as a viable livelihood – ethnicity(.72**), digger/washer(.56***), fair rules(1.38**), CLO enforcement (1.39**), Elder enforcement (.77*) education (.76)** Social effects of mining – education (1.25*), tenure security(.74***), CLO enforcement (1.45**), elder enforcement (2.11***), customary rules (1.89***), mining livelihoods( 11.75***) Environmental effects of mining – prefecture (.24*** ), CLO enforcement (1.53**) Restoration of mined out sites – prefecture (3.30***), education (1.66***), CLO enforcement (2.05***), elder enforcement (1.54***), mining livelihoods (18.60***) Results are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***)

19. KEY MESSAGES Internal and external forces driving the transition towards ASM formalization Low uptake of ASM formalization; strong customary institutions govern ASM Customary system influences the social and environmental effects of ASM Customary system displays formal system weaknesses with respect to enforcement, representation, and environmental outcomes Potential for hybrid regime?

20. MOTIVATION THANK YOU www.usaidlandtenure.net/data