1. Characteristics of Service, Structure of Networks, and Forms of Inter- Local Cooperation in Service Production: Evidence from Florida Manoj Shrestha Askew School of Public Administration & Policy Florida State University 10/31/2005 Presentation Outline Context Research question Framework Empirical fit Conclusion

2. Context Institutions cooperate Institutional Collective Action Networks Forms of Inter-Local Cooperation Inter-local (horizontal) cooperation – expanding but less explored area

3. Research question What drives such forms of inter-local cooperation? Transaction characteristics of service (Williamson, 1981) Asset Specificity (AS) Metering Difficulty (MD) Is there a association between the service characteristics and the forms of inter-local cooperation?

4. What problems service characteristics generate? Critical Resource Cost AS Investment Requirement (fund, equipment, skills) Risks Economies of scale Externalities Surplus capacity Investment hold-up Monopoly cost (back-up provision cost) MD Exclusion costly Enforcement cost Monitoring cost AS and MD differ by service (or its component activities)

5. Four combinations LowHigh Low Asset specificity Metering difficulty Bilateral One/few central provider Longer term Bilateral More than one/few provider Shorter term Multilateral (joint) One/few central provider Longer term Multilateral More than one/ few provider Shorter term? Network centralization Network density 1 2 3 1 2 3

6. Framework of relationship Public goods/service Service characteristics Different collective action problems Different network structures Asset specificity Difficulty in metering Critical resource cost Exclusion/ enforcement/ monitoring cost Network centralization Network density

7. Expected association Two hypotheses: AS Network centralization MD Network density

8. What is the empirical fit?: Evidence from Florida Case study of Florida – Pinellas County 25 general purpose governments A set of diverse eight services Data ILAs (DCA, Florida & city websites) AS and MD measures (Brown and Potoski, 2003) Network measures Undirected relationships Network centralization and network density (UCINET)

9. Evidence from Pinellas County, Florida Table 1: Distribution of ILAs and Ties by service ServiceNo of ILAs No of ties - LG onlyMean ILAMean Ties Fire prevention371341.485.36 Crime prevention242070.968.28 Sanitary sewer45541.82.16 Parks/recreation29181.160.72 Potable water24420.961.68 Solid waste9480.361.92 Traffic signal32361.281.44 Street/road58302.321.2 25856910.3222.76

10. Evidence from Pinellas County, Florida Table 2: Service characteristics and network measures by service Service Asset specifici ty Network centralizat ion Metering difficulty Network density Fire prevention3.8061.78%3.240.220 Crime prevention3.3766.85%3.600.340 Sanitary sewer4.0962.68%2.360.090 Parks/recreation2.9437.50%2.610.030 Potable water3.9464.86%2.440.070 Solid waste3.33100.00%2.120.080 Traffic signal2.9175.00%2.240.060 Street/road2.6461.23%2.400.048 Correlation0.0830.909

11. Graph

12. Conclusion, Limitations, and Extensions Conclusion Structure of service networks strategic choice of actors response to the problems associated with transaction of a service Limitations One county study/data limitations Not considered other factors that affect actor’s choice Future study Focus on combined dimensions of AS and MD structural evolution of networks over time and space Impact of networks on policy outcomes