1. INMM Nuclear Security and Physical Protection Technical Division

2. 2 Safeguards and Security Program Audits & Inspections Site-specific VAs Program Management Procedures Training Testing & Evaluations Laws & Codes Policies & Directives

3. ASSESS Model JTS Model SAVI Model Adversary Sequence Diagrams EASI Model Analysis/ Evaluation Analyze PPS Design Redesign PPS Final PPS Design Design PPS Determine PPS Objectives Facility Characterization Threat Definition Target Identification Physical Protection Systems DetectionDelayResponse Exterior Sensors Access Delay Response Force Interior SensorsResponse Force Communications Alarm Assessment Alarm Communi-cation & Display Entry Control Design & Evaluation Process of a PPS

4. Characterize the facility in terms of: Site boundary Buildings (construction and HVAC systems) Room locations Access points Processes within the facility Operating conditions (working hours, off-hours, potential emergencies) Existing physical protection features Safety considerations Types and numbers of employees Facility Characterization

5. Using all information sources determine attributes of: Outsiders (no authorized access): protestors (demonstrators, activists, extremists), terrorists, criminals Insiders (authorized access): betrayal, revenge, abnormal behavior Collusion: cooperation between Outsiders and Insiders Threat Definition

6. Determine the possible targets for the following actions: Sabotage: identify vital areas to protect Theft of material or information: identify location of materials to protect Target Identification

7. Example: Consequence Factor ( C ) Table Undesired EventMeasure of Consequence Very High 1.0 High 0.8 Medium 0.6 Medium Low 0.4 Low 0.2 Very Low 0.1 Loss of Mission Loss of Nuclear Material Radioactive Environmental Damage Public Relations Impact Weapons Program % change of acceptance attitude in the state Loss of a nuclear weapon1 Weapon-- -20%-15%-10%-1%-- Chemical or Environmental Damage Number of deaths >3000 deaths 3000 - 5 deaths 5 - 1 death <1 death -- Exposure to person at site boundary for 2 hours after the sabotage event >250 Rem 250 - 125 Rem 125 - 100 Rem 100 - 50 Rem 50 - 25 Rem <25 Rem Time out of service Cost to recover or loss >2 years2 yrs-14 days<1 dayMinutes--14 days-1 day $500M-$100M$1M-$100K<$100K--$100M-$50M>$500 M High Enriched U >20% Enriched U 10% - 20% Fresh Fuel Assemblies <10% Pu >5 Kg - - 2 Kg - 500 g 5 Kg -1 Kg >10 Kg >10 Assays 2 Kg - 500 g 1 Kg - 15 g 10 Kg - 1 Kg >10 Assays 500 g - 15 g 15 g - 1 g 1 Kg - 1 g - 15 g - 1 g < 1 g - - - - -

8. System functions that must all be present Detection: Indicates the start of the adversary act Delay: Only after detection is delay effective; delay retards the adversary to give the response force time to respond Response: Can come from onsite guards or off- site police or military personnel Design of Physical Protection Systems

9. Adversary Task Time vs PPS Time Requirements Begin Action First Alarm Time Task Complete System Detect System Respond Alarm Assessed Adversary Interrupted T0T0 TATA TITI TCTC System Delay Adversary Task Time PPS Time Required

10. Pick the Worst Path For The Site Building Door Sensors Gate Fence VITAL AREA

11. Determine Probability of Interruption Along that Path Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption Delay (in Seconds) TaskDescriptionP(Detection)LocationMeanStandard Deviation 1Cut Fence0E10.3 2Run to Building0E0.20.06 3Open Door0.9E20.6 4Run to Vital Area0E0.50.15 5Open Door0.9E51.5 6Sabotage Target0E10.3 7 8 Probability of Alarm Communication Response Force Time (in Seconds) Mean Standard Deviation 0.9 5 1.5 7 8 Probability of Interruption 0.61

12. How do we know if security measures are good enough? Use “Consequence Weighted Conditional Risk” Risk ( R ) = P A * [1- (P I *P N )] * C Probability of Interruption (P I ) Probability of Neutralization (P N ) Consequence Value ( C ) Probability of Adversary Attack (P A ) Conditional Risk (R C ) = 1 * [1- (P I *P N )] * C Risk Analysis

13. As a result of the analysis: Identify vulnerabilities in the PPS Redesign system to correct noted vulnerabilities Re-evaluate to verify vulnerability is corrected Redesign or Upgrade of PPS

14. System Integration DETECTIONDELAYRESPONSE SYSTEM CONCEPT UPGRADED SYSTEM CURRENT SYSTEM TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS Threats Site Characteristics Vulnerabilities Safety Cost Operational Budget Protection Level Performance Communication Entry Control Assessment Intrusion Detection Active Barriers Passive Barriers Guards Numbers Equipment Tactics Training Balanced Supportable Acceptable Cost Effective