1. LECTURE 13 GAME THEORY GAME THEORY A.INTRODUCTION B. According to Huizinger human culture cannot be fully comprehended unless we realize that human beings ply games from childhood through old age in all dimensions of life love to making war.

2. LECTURE 13.1 According to Schelling game theory is concerned with situations- games of strategy in contrast to games of skill or game of chance in which the best course of action for each participant depends on what he expects the other participants. E. it is assumed that players will seek to maximize their gains or to minimize their losers- thus micro economics principles of utility maximization and disutility minimization

3. LECTURE 13.2 Thus if people in a certain situation wish to WIN that is to accomplish an objective which the other part seeks to deny them we can sort out the intellectual process by which they calculate what kind of action, is the most likely to be advantageous to them, assuming that they believe their opponents also to be rational calculators like themselves equally interested in second guessing and trying to outwit the opponent.

4. LECTURE 13.3 G. zero sum can be identified when the pay offs in the matrix added together equal to zero. H. The Zero-sum game is the game of pure conflict, there is no cooperation on offer at all the motives displayed are totally antagonistic. I. Again on one side is seen as a loss by the opponent.

5. 13.4 The minimax is a very useful rule to guide to follow and a stable solution will be reached. This is stable because neither player can have incentive to prefer another strategy. K. The situational characteristics that game moves are supposed to be made without prior knowledge of what the other side has done appears to be real handicap when a more co- ordinate and cooperative strategy is sought

6. 13.5 1. The prisoner’s dilemna 2. Chicken- the payoffs in the chicken game there seem to imply that behaving in a deliberately risky, if not reckless, way can be rewarded if the other side ground. 3. Deadlock- most basic and unrepentant form of conflict. No noble ground, interest are diametrically opposed, zero-sum conflicts

7. 13.6 ) Both sides have an ambiguously preferred strategy that involves harming the other side b) Although both sides preferred outcome is the other side stopping from engaging in the conflict while they continue (i.e. kill them without being killed in exchange), if they cant have that they prefer continuing the conflict over halting it. c) Although deadlock can become another game overtime, and then may be subject to cooperation, so long as preference are truly deadlock preferences, there is no solution d) Examples: ancient hatreds, ethnic violence, and conflicts over values

8. 13.7 Collaboration- hard because although states have incentives to agree, even after states agree on how to cooperate, there are still strong incentives to agree, even after states agree on how to cooperate, there are still strong incentives to defect (tragedy of the commons, prisoner’s dilemna)

9. 13.8 There are costs to both or all players of cooperating depends on all others contributing, so it makes little sense to contribute if nobody else does (since the goal wont be accomplished, but it also makes little sense to contribute if everybody else does since the goal will be accomplished even if you don’t contribute and you can serve the cost of compliance

10. 13.9 ) Both or all sides in the problem prefer mutual cooperation to mutual cheating but both prefer even more their own unilateral cheating c) Game assumes symmetry in the positions of the actor- both are assumed as polluters, which may not be the case. d) Examples: arms control, trade, and many environmental problems particularly over harvest of a resource.

11. 13.10 5 coordination- easy because all states have incentives to agree and once states agree on how to cooperate, there are no incentives to defect. E.g. use of English language in airline pilots a) Two possible equilibriums, one of which benefits one side and one that benefits the other but where both prefer cooperation to non-cooperation. E.g. satellite slot allocations, navigation rights, language for air traffic controllers

12. 13.11 6. PERSuasion problems- really hard because some states have no incentives to agree and even if they agree, they still have incentives and ability to defect a) Both strong and weak states benefit from cooperation but strong state is willing to provide all the benefits without help but prefers the weaker states contribute

13. 13.12 Weaker states have “a strong incentive to free ride, knowing that public goods… will never the less be provided” Martin 1992. c) Burden sharing with respect to security in Europe during cold war (arguably burden sharing in Iraq war.

14. 13.13 Upstream/down stream problem. a) Upstream states receive no direct benefits from cooperation and probably incurs costs to cooperate. Willing to cooperate if receive side payment that outweigh these costs. b.very strong incentives for upstream states to renege on their commitments after agreements are reached c) Examples: French reduction of pollution of Rhine river, Canadian control of dams in Columbia, nuclear weapons programs of weak states

15. 13.14 8. Assurance problems- all states want to collaborate and believe they will be better off if they do, but they lack perfect information and so may fail to coordinate their behavior by accident and because of excessive lack of trust. a) Problem is one of imperfect information not one of incentive

16. 13.15. Critique 1. The theory is purely formal, quantitative set of precepts thus retaining purity but in the process has little relevance as an ideology or metaphor for containing real world situations. 2. Attempt to apply theory to real life situations is met with limitation.