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Nuclear Terrorism Threats Nuclear Security Background Nuclear Security Summit 2012 Seoul Summit.

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Presentation on theme: "Nuclear Terrorism Threats Nuclear Security Background Nuclear Security Summit 2012 Seoul Summit."— Presentation transcript:

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2 Nuclear Terrorism Threats Nuclear Security Background Nuclear Security Summit 2012 Seoul Summit

3 “Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means.” “Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors … may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear,...,weapons and their means of delivery, Recognizing the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, …,weapons and their means of delivery.” “Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors … may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear,...,weapons and their means of delivery, Recognizing the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, …,weapons and their means of delivery.” IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei UNSC Resolution 1540(2004) 2010 Washington NSS Communiqué “Nuclear terrorism is No. 1. security threat right now. If they get it, they will use it. (2008 IAEA Annual Conference)

4 Deaths: 2,843 (New York City Official Statistics)

5 - Causes : Conflict between Hindus and Islam Fundamentalists - Deaths: 190 (2006); 160 (2008); 21 (2011)

6 Death: Unknown Zone: 20km No-entry Zone 20~30 km Warning Zone

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8 Terrorists’ plans and attempts to make and/or acquire nuclear bomb and its material Civilian HEU and separated Pu stock become major targets of thefts and sabotage. Global Fissile Material Stock(2010) HEU(ton)Separated Pu(ton) Military1,600250 Civilian10250 Total1600500 - HEU 25 kg or Pu 8 kg Per Nuclear Explosive Device - 1993~2008, 421 Losses or Thefts of Radiological Material, 18 Losses or Thefts of HEU/Pu Losses (IAEA) - 130 HEU reactor

9 De Prevention, detection of and response - to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts, - involving nuclear material, other radiological substances or their associated facilities Targets - Nuclear material (Washington Summit) - Radiological material, nuclear facilities (Seoul Summit)

10 12 NPT’s 3 Pillars: Disarmament, Nonproliferation, PUNE IAEA’s 3S: Safeguards, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security Obama’s 3 Elements for a Nuclear Weapons Free World : Nuclear disarmament, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Security

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12 Nuclear Security Nuclear Security Nuclear & Radiological Security Nuclear & Radiological Security Prevention, detection of and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or others malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radiological substances or their associated facilities (IAEA) Nuclear terrorism with improvised nuclear device(IND) Radiological terrorism with radiological dispersal device(RDD) 3S: Nonproliferation, Nuclear Security, Nuclear Safety 3S: Nonproliferation, Nuclear Security, Nuclear Safety Physical protection Vs. Nuclear security Physical protection Vs. Nuclear security State vs. non-state actor Intentional vs. unintentional Border control, export/technology control, nuclear forensics, response, consequence mitigation, etc

13 Nuclear security Non-state actors NonproliferationNonproliferation States Nuclear security Nuclear safety Intentional Natural, technical Nuclear security Radiological security Nuclear terrorism, IND Nuclear security Physical protection border control, export control, nuclear forensics, information security, etc Material protection, fence, guards ACTOR CAUSE MEANS MEASURES Radiological terrorism, RDD

14 about 30 cases of terrorism with over 100 deaths since 2000 The era of political instability and mass-killing terrorismTerrorists seeking nuclear materials and weapons HEU 25 kg or Pu 8 kg Per Nuclear Explosive Device Hundreds cases of losses or thefts of radiological Material, over 20 cases of losses or thefts of HEU/Pu since the 90s HEU 25 kg or Pu 8 kg Per Nuclear Explosive Device Hundreds cases of losses or thefts of radiological Material, over 20 cases of losses or thefts of HEU/Pu since the 90s Over 2,000 tons of global fissile material stock (IPFM Report) To secure all vulnerable nuclear material in 4 years To hold Global Summit on Nuclear Security in 2010 Endorsed by UNSC Res. 1887(2009.9) To secure all vulnerable nuclear material in 4 years To hold Global Summit on Nuclear Security in 2010 Endorsed by UNSC Res. 1887(2009.9) President Obama’s call for NSS (2009.4.5)Fukushima Nuclear Accident (2011.3)

15 Nunn-Lugar Program, Sen. Obama To prevent nuclear weapons, material, technology from transferring 20 billions USD during 2002-12 10 To prevent proliferation by non-state actors Chaired by President Obama To support Obama’s Prague Speech and his 4 year nuclear security goals

16 TitlesYearContentsCPPNM 1987 - 핵물질 방호의 유일 구속 협정 - 2005 년 개정 : 종전 " 국제수송 중인 핵물질 " 에서 일체 국내 핵물질ㆍ시설로 대상 확장 - 2/3 비준 후 개정협정 발효 예정 UNSCR 1540 2004 - 비국가행위자에 대한 비확산 입법화 요구 - 효과적인 수출통제, 자금통제 체제 구축 - 1540 위원회 운영 ICSANT 2005 - 러시아 발의 (98), 유엔총회 결의 채택 (05.4), 발효 (07.7) - ' 핵테러행위 ' 정의, 처벌 의무화 GICNT 2006 - 미 - 러가 창립 및 공동의장국 - 다자 파트너십 ( 회원국 82, 옵저버 4) - 2011.6 대전 총회 개최 INFCIRC 225 Rev. 5 2011 - IAEA 의 핵물질ㆍ시설에 대한 물리적 방호 지침 - 9.11 이후 핵방호 환경 반영 개정 중 11

17 First summit on nuclear security with all significant nuclear- related states Common understanding of nuclear terrorism threats To strengthen international and domestic nuclear security regime and IAEA nuclear security function National commitments Partnership among government- business-NGO and emphasis of nuclear security culture

18 50 leaders sharing threats perception, agreeing on nuclear security actions HEU/PU elimination and consolidation. Chile, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, etc.; Shut-down or conversion of HEU reactors: Russia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Vietnam Ratification of CPPNM 2005 Amendment and ICSANT Extension of the UNSC Res. 1540 Committee, G8 Global Partnership program; membership increase of GICNT: Strengthening IAEA NS function: IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, IAEA INFCIRC 225/rev.5(physical protection guideline document) Nuclear security training centers of excellences

19 Nuclear Security Summit March 26(M)~27(T), 2012, Seoul 47 Heads of States + plus 4 Representatives of IOs (UN, IAEA, EU, INTERPOL) Nuclear Security Symposium March 23(F), 2012 Hosted by KINAC and IFANS Technical exhibition, Booths Nuclear Industry Summit March 23(F), 2012 Hosted by KHNP Technical Tour

20 1 st Buenos Aires (Nov 3~4, 2011) 2 nd Finland (Oct. 2011) 3 rd India (Jan. 2012) 4 th Seoul (Mar. 2012) Sherpa Meeting Sous-Sherpa Meeting 1 st Vienna (Mar. 2011) 2 nd Seoul (Jun. 2011) - For national commitments or ‘housegifts’ “Seoul Communiqué”

21 50 NS measures in 11 areas (Work Plan) 9 Issues led by friends of Chairs : HEU, information security, ratification, forensics, illicit trafficking, culture, radiological security, coordination National implementation report HEU-LEU reactor conversion : subject to financing, technology, efficiency of isotopes production Korea’s contribution of HEU-LEU fuel conversion technology

22 Consequences of the Fukushima nuclear accident Debates : Widening vs. Deepening - Widening ; dilution or wider global support/engagement - Deepening ; focused or US-centric (nuclear terrorism only) Invitation to Kim, but his visit questionable Whether and/or how to discuss NK nuclear issues : NK nuclear issue as nuclear security and safety issues

23 mutually reinforcing and complementary conflicts: transparency vs. confidentiality Ban Ki Moon Matthew Bunn Reports

24 Ad hoc vs. institutionalization Issue widening: radiological security, nuclear safety, PUNE Integration of 2S, 3S Eg. Northeast Asian Nuclear Security and Safety Zone : monitoring, early warning, exerts exchange and cooperation program Training centers in the NEA Consolidation and Coordination of various agreements and initiatives Nuclear security standards

25 A reliable partner to carry the US mission of nuclear security A responsible and important member of the international society and the international security and nonproliferation regime A non-western, non-former Communist, non-NAM state with 'bridging diplomacy‘ capability Model country of nonproliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear security Korea’s Readiness to contribute to world peace and security

26 Date : March 23 (Fri.), 2012 9:00~18:00 Venue : Grand Hilton Hotel, Seoul, Korea Participants: About 230 (130 foreign) from NGOs, Academia, IOs, Media, etc. Organizers - KINAC (Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control) - IFANS (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)

27 Envisioning - Vision 2020 and Roadmap Empowering and Networking - Individuals, NGOs, Corporations, IOs Participating and Partnering - Private-State-International Partnership Sharing - Information, Values, Vision, Practices

28 Innovating Global Nuclear Security Governance Opening Remarks, Keynote Speech 4 Sessions(90 minutes each), 16 Presentations Lunch, Dinner(hosted by Prime Minister) Exhibition - Technical Demonstration(KINAC, DoD etc.) - IOs, NGOs Information booth(IAEA, INTERPOL, FMWG etc.) Technical Tour(TBD): March 24(Sat.)

29 Global Nuclear Material Stock and Risks Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats Progress Since the 2010 Washington Summit Are we Secure and Safe Now? ※ IPFM, INTERPOL, FMWG, UN, IAEA, NTI, etc. Session 1. Nuclear Terrorism Threats and Nuclear Security Status Session 2. Key Nuclear Security Challenges and Solutions HEU Minimization Radiological Security Role of IAEA International and Regional Cooperation, etc. Subtitle: “Innovating Global Nuclear Security Governance”

30 Interface between Nuclear Security and Safety Measures for Enhancing Nuclear Security and Safety Future Plans Session 3. Nuclear Security and Safety Session 4. Global Nuclear Security Governance Beyond 2014 2020 Vision and Goals Coordination and Collaboration among NS Actors Coordination and Consolidation of NS Norms Revisiting Principles of Nuclear Security

31 Limits of traditional state-, treaty-centered approach Integrative, Holistic and Collaborative Approach - Diversified Norms: treaties, initiatives, national laws, principles, guidelines, code of conduct, best practice, compliance program - Multiple Actors: States, GIO, NGIO, NGOs, companies, labs, schools, individuals Interrelation of Issues - 3 pillars of NPT + nuclear security, 3S, 2S - Sovereignty vs. International Responsibility - Security and Economy

32 - Nuclear Materials Tracking System - RFID/Smart Monitoring System - ITDB Real-time Information Processing System Technical Demonstration Information Booths - IAEA, INTERPOL, UN, etc. - FMWG, NTI, Stanley Foundation, etc. (TBC)

33 Seoul 2012 Nuclear Industry Summit The role of the nuclear industry in enhancing nuclear security & safety [Subtitle] [Program] March 23, 7:30-8:30 Networking Breakfast & Registration 8:30-12:20 Opening Ceremony (KHNP, KAIF, Korean Prime Minister) Keynote Address Presentations - International Organization Activities related to Nuclear Security - Nuclear Security Best Practices - Topical Presentations from Working Groups 12:20-14:00Luncheon (hosted by Korean Minister of Knowledge Economy) 14:00-16:00 Panel Discussion Adoption of Communique (CEO, KHNP) Closing Remarks (President, KAERI) 18:00-20:00Dinner (hosted by Korean Prime Minister) March 24, 8-21Technical Tour

34 NSS Homepage: www.seoulnss.go.krwww.seoulnss.go.kr SNSS Homapage : www.2012snss.orgwww.2012snss.org


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