1. Winning the Next War 1 Winning the Next War: Institutionalizing Lessons Learned from Today’s Regional Conflicts The American Institute of Engineers Conference on Irregular Warfare Washington, DC 28 April 2009 William D. Wunderle Political Military Planner for Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority J-5, The Joint Staff

2. Winning the Next War 2 Agenda Introduction From Conventional War to Counterinsurgency Developing Indigenous Security Forces Towards a “Whole of Government” Approach Conclusion - Older and Wiser The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Henry A. Kissinger The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Henry A. Kissinger Briefing derived from, Winning the Next War: Institutionalizing Lessons Learned from Today’s Regional Conflicts, with Maj Gabriel Lajeunesse, The Journal of International Security Affairs, Number 15, Fall 2008

3. Winning the Next War 3 Introduction The United States has conducted irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns since its inception. – Yet, America’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency has been more ad hoc than institutionalized. Today, the United States continues to fight “The Long War” at the same time it is engaged in related operations in what will likely be the longest U.S. conflict since the American Revolution. Key areas of emphasis include: – Defeating terrorist networks – Defending the homeland in depth – Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads – Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction.

4. Winning the Next War 4 We Are Fighting “The Next War” Today The “future” fight against global terrorism is ongoing, and will continue to be a top concern for U.S. military and policymakers. – The July 2008 National Defense Strategy recognizes that the United States is in the midst of fighting the “next war” and places the Long War against extremism as the top priority of the U.S. military. – 11 March 2009, U.S. Joint Forces Command Irregular Warfare Vision states that “Commanders must balance the capability to wage conventional war and the ability to adapt rapidly and effectively to meeet the full spectrum of other demands.” To win in this struggle, we must institutionalize lessons learned in order to avoid costly mistakes in unconventional conflicts on the horizon.

5. Winning the Next War 5 Conventional War to Counterinsurgency Cultural competence and adaptation are prerequisites for achieving success in any military operation, and particularly so in counterinsurgency operations. Organizing, Training, and Equipping for Unconventional warfare. – Force Structure – Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces – Foreign Area Officers – Responding to Improvised Explosive Devices – Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance – Balancing Force Protection and Risk – Military Transition Teams – Internal Security Forces and the Rule of Law

6. Winning the Next War 6 A “Whole of Government” Approach Insurgencies are not defeated by military might alone. – We must have capacity to improve lives and governance. – We need an interagency that is prepared to operate in austere environments. – Once basic security is established, food, water, money, jobs, law and order, economic assistance, and jobs must follow. We must continue to emphasize the need for the entire government to be prepared to fight global terrorism and related small-scale conflicts. – This requires the full integration of all instruments of national power, the cooperation and participation of friends and allies, and the support of the American people. Security gains must be quickly followed by humanitarian assistance, economic assistance, delivery of essential services, and other types of aid, if those gains are to be consolidated and built upon.

7. Winning the Next War 7 Older and Wiser The trend-line is clear. – In the future, the United States military is more likely to undertake missions requiring irregular warfare capabilities, as opposed to traditional large-scale ground combat operations. The U.S. military now understands that it cannot deal with Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran in isolation. Iran’s malign influence in the region must be dealt with. These are just a few of the major lessons learned— lessons that the military is still learning. … in a world of finite knowledge and limited resources, where we have to make choices and set priorities, it makes sense to lean toward the most likely and lethal scenarios for our military… above potential conventional challenges from China and Russia. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, May 13, 2008 … in a world of finite knowledge and limited resources, where we have to make choices and set priorities, it makes sense to lean toward the most likely and lethal scenarios for our military… above potential conventional challenges from China and Russia. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, May 13, 2008

8. Winning the Next War 8 Conclusion Over the next decade, we do not envision the emergence of a peer competitor in military force capability. – Asymmetric warfare and counterinsurgency operations will dominate America’s conflicts for years to come. – Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and violent extreme organizations remain the threats of greatest concern. Combating WMD requires the full integration of U.S. military and interagency efforts. Future challenges and conflicts will require the efficient and effective employment of counterinsurgency, intelligence, information operations (IO), and security assistance enablers. It is necessary to codify, fund, and sustain Security Assistance as a long-term requirement. The acceleration of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) procurement is critical to success. Will the U.S. government make the necessary adjustments to truly learn from these experiences?