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Index Based Livestock Insurance Protecting pastoralists against mortality losses due to severe forage scarcity Andrew Mude The Future of Pastoralism in.

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Presentation on theme: "Index Based Livestock Insurance Protecting pastoralists against mortality losses due to severe forage scarcity Andrew Mude The Future of Pastoralism in."— Presentation transcript:

1 Index Based Livestock Insurance Protecting pastoralists against mortality losses due to severe forage scarcity Andrew Mude The Future of Pastoralism in Africa Addis Ababa, March 21-23, 2011

2 Setting the Context Pastoralist Risk Management CRSP (PARIMA): Among its many lessons we learn that…. …..Pastoralists are very vulnerable to widespread forage scarcity …. livestock mortality due to forage scarcity is by far the biggest risk. Borena ZoneMarsabit District Causes of Livestock Mortality

3 Responding to Risk Basically there are two ways to deal with risk: 1.Reduce the impact of Risk Mitigation (ex-ante): Transhumance, Diversification, etc. Management(ex-post): Traditional system of support (not very effective for shared risks), productive safety nets, restocking etc. 2.Risk transfer Shifting the burden of that risk to a different entity – for a fee. This basic idea behind INSURANCE.

4  Sustainable insurance can: Prevent downward slide of vulnerable populations Stabilize expectations & crowd-in investment and accumulation by poor populations Induce financial deepening by crowding-in credit supply and demand  But can insurance be sustainably offered in remote infrastructure deficient areas and to smallholders?  Conventional (individual) insurance unlikely to work, especially among pastoralists: Transactions costs Moral hazard/adverse selection The Case for Index Insurance

5  Index insurance avoids problems that make individual insurance unprofitable for small, remote clients: No transactions costs of measuring individual losses Preserves effort incentives (no moral hazard) as no single individual can influence index. Adverse selection does not matter as payouts do not depend on the riskiness of those who buy the insurance Available on near real-time basis: faster response than conventional humanitarian relief  Index insurance can, in principle, be used to create an effective safety net to alter poverty dynamics and help address broad-scale shocks in pastoral areas. The Case for Index Insurance

6  Prerequisites and Challenges of Sustainable Index Insurance: 1.DEFINING THE RISK Area-based product  the risk must be covariate in nature Risk must be quantifiable and predictable Risk must be ‘indexable’ 2.IDENTIFYING THE INDEX Index is a single-valued, specific measure associated with insured- risk upon which payment decisions are made Must be: i) Easy to Measure, ii) Precise Indicator of Insurable Risk, iiI) Cannot be Easily Manipulated iv) Consistently Available From Theory to Practice

7 DATA Livestock Mortality NDVI Response Function Index Predicted Livestock Mortality 3.DESIGNING THE INDEX Need to model a relationship between the risk to be insured and the index  The Response Function The challenge of data availability From Theory to Practice

8 4.TESTING INDEX PERFORMACE Minimizing “BASIS Risk”: How well does the index correspond to the outcome it is measuring? How well does the index correspond to individual outcomes? From Theory to Practice

9 5.CONTRACT FEATURES: SPATIAL COVERAGE How wide a geographic area can a single index-cover? –What is the spatial precision range of the response function? –At what level of resolution is the necessary data available? –Administrational considerations Two Separate NDVI-Livestock Mortality Response Functions Five Separate Index Coverage Regions From Theory to Practice

10 5.CONTRACT FEATURES: TEMPORAL COVERAGE Over what time span should an index cover? –Function of the production system/risk profile being modelled –Administrational considerations From Theory to Practice

11 5.CONTRACT FEATURES: RISK COVERAGE AND PRICING Need to select an index strike point to trigger indemnity? –Trade off: Higher Strike  Lower Risk Coverage  Lower Cost –Conditional or Unconditional? –Payoff structure: Linear, Segmented, All or nothing, No claims bonus? ations Contract ClusterConsumer Price Upper Marsabit5.5% Lower Marsabit3.25% From Theory to Practice

12 6.INNOVATIONS INCENTIVES Catalyzing the Market Enabling Regulation Engaging Stakeholders Private vs. Public, or Partnership? From Theory to Practice

13 7.ESTABLISH INFORMED EFFECTIVE DEMAND Insurance is a difficult product to sell Insurance is a foreign concept to relatively uninformed target Initial significant investment in extension and marketing Simulation games with real information and incentives From Theory to Practice

14 8.LOW COST DELIVERY Identify mechanism to deliver product to client What sales delivery platform? What information delivery platform? 9.IMPACT ASSESSMENT Does Index-Insurance deliver the social and economic benefits it promises? Need a rigorous research design to allow quantification and attribution of impacts? M&E to guide scale-up From Theory to Practice

15 Thank you For more information please visit: www.ilri.org/ibli/

16 PREMIUM RATE CONTRACTS SOLD CATTLE NO. INSURED SHEEP/ GOATS NO. INSURED CAMELS NO. INSURED TOTAL VALUE OF INSURED LIVESTOCK (USD) TO VALUE OF COLLECTED PREMIUMS (USD) UPPER5.5%55637111,081185347,62019,119 LOWER3.25%1,42335374,745154845,46027,477 TOTAL1,979390815,8263391,193,08046,597 Contract Sales for Marsabit for the 2010

17 Index Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) New innovation in insurance avoids problems that make traditional insurance unprofitable for small, remote clients: Policy holders paid based on external “index” that triggers payments to all insured clients Suited for risks affecting a large number of people simultaneously and for which a suitable index exists. –No transactions costs of measuring individual losses –Preserves effort incentives (no moral hazard) as no single individual can influence index. –Adverse selection does not matter as payouts do not depend on the riskiness of those who buy the insurance –Problem of “basis” risk

18 Potential Benefits of IBLI IBLI is designed to compensate client holders from livestock losses due to severe and prolonged forage scarcity. We hypothesize that such sustainable insurance can help minimize the social and economic costs of risks in the following ways? 1.Stabilizing expectations & crowding-in investment and accumulation by poor populations 2.Preventing downward slide of vulnerable populations 3.Inducing financial deepening by crowding-in credit supply and demand

19 Piloting in Marsabit and Borena 1.FEASIBILITY STUDY 2.CONTRACT DESIGN 3.PRODUCT DELIVERY 4.IMPACT ASSESSMENT 4-pronged effort to develop, implement and evaluate IBLI

20 Feasibility Study Basic prerequisites to feasibility need to be made: 1.Is the relevant data available? 2.Are necessary stakeholders interested and committed (government, regulators, insurance companies, client representatives) 3.Is this something the community will embrace and desire? 4.Is the community willing to pay for the product?


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