1. Class 6 – Emerging Powers in Global Political Order Dr. Vinícius Rodrigues Vieira (Postdoctoral Researcher) IRI-USP, São Paulo, 28 March 2016

2.  Blocs focused on economic cooperation

3.  Blocs focused on strategic/political alliances

4.  Different normative stances  different views on structural power!!!  potential revisionism  More likely when regions are poles of power "The legitimacy of regional organizations comes from the role that they play (or at least are intended to play) in the broader structure of global governance" (Hurrell, 2006: 132)

6.  Regions matter for global governance;  So do regional powers!!! “The multilateral order cannot hold if the power and influence embedded in international institutions is significantly misaligned with the real distribution of power” (Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, 2010) Economic power  Structural power

8.  How does China see itself? 1. Developing country  Part of the Global South (Suzuki, 2014: 636); 2. An emerging power  BRICS; 3. Great power  Permanent member of the UN Security Council; 4. Superpower: with the US; 5. Regional power.

9.  Blocs focused on economic cooperation

12. BRICS bank  New Development Bank (NDB) Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB)  Attempt to circumvent Western (in particular American) dominance of the World Bank (with loans for development-related projects) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, with loans to provide short-time relief in eventual macroeconomic crises)...  Or complementarity with Bretton Woods???

13.  Redistribution of IMF quota share

14.  Just-Reformed IMF quota share

16.  World Bank reform tends to become obsolete soon…

24. How to understand China? (Reich and Lebow 2014, 85) 1 ) Understand Chinese Foreign Policy in the light of its culture and history; 2 ) Different views from the elites (e.g. perceptions on U.S. behavior regarding Taiwan).  No elaborate "game plan"  Benefit from peace rather from war

25. History suggest China pursues hegemonia rather than hegemony or a balance of power  Even at the regional level (???!!!)  So why has Beijing expanded its custodial role in the world? Realists  Pursuit of power Liberals  Accommodation to the existent order

26. Therefore, no revisionism???  Not necessarily  Status recognition: the center of the world  Resembles the ancient tributary system

27. Therefore, no revisionism??? "The tributary system found institutional representation in investiture, a diplomatic protocol by which a state sent envoys to China to accept explicitly their subordinate status… These forms of obeisance were acknowledgments of Chinese cultural superiority, not political overlordship. China had no desire to impose its vision on the world, but was interested in stable and productive relations with its neighbors" (Reich and Lebow 2014, 96).

28. Some revisionism  Custodianship rather than sponsorship fits better into the tributary logic. Example: Overseas Development Aid (ODA): "China’s ODA is often highly strategic, intended to stimulate trade with developing markets, foster Chinese foreign direct investment, secure access to natural resources, and “export” Chinese labor when possible.. It ignores more general human rights concerns and general labor standards, making it a target of criticism from Washington and elsewhere” (Reich and Lebow 2014, 117).

34. “A number of studies of China’s international behaviour have pointed to the way in which the country has tended to conform to existing ways of doing things when it joins international organizations, rather than trying to challenge and change existing modi operandi… Or, to put it another way, while China might be dissatisfied with the (global) status quo, it will articulate this dissatisfaction and push for change in a responsible manner that does not destabilize the global system” (Breslin, 2013: 616).

35.  Possible strategies for soft revisionism (also called soft balancing) (Breslin, 2013: 617).  Peaceful Rise (heping jueqi);  Peace and Development (heping yu fazhan);  Peaceful Development(heping fazhan, since 2011 has been part of the official rhetoric).  Therefore, is China seeking to emulate the West?

36.  Occidentalism (Suzuki, 2014): seeking West as a model and its approval to be a Great Power.  (Suzuki, 2014: 641): Occidentalism is dubious;  West perceived as a model, but also with declining influence in the world;  Emulation: as Meji Japan did (19 th Century), but without warfare (at least at this stage). Past: China was great (and it is still), yet… Present: Greatness depends on recognition, because…

37.  Rising as a great power is not given!!! It is necessary to flex muscles…

38.  Rising as a great power is not given!!! (Breslin, 2013: 624).  So US example has to be followed!!! "...positive affirmation of the US’s eschewing of imperialist expansion… What made America’s path to power different from traditional ones was that US foreign policy after America’s rise was cautious and friendly. US expansion was limited to local areas, mainly the Americas, and it took care that this did not clash with European interests" (Suzuki, 2014: 645)

39.  Has China the aim to build up regional strength through spheres of influence?  Influence as power;  Power as a means to stabilize disputes;  Order  understood as security (to gain more power;  Emulating the US? Monroe Doctrine (1823): “The America for the Americans”.

40.  US built up influence in the Western Hemisphere in the 19 th Century before becoming a world power in the 20 th Century;  It included even imperial expansion along with the establishment of a hegemonic relationship.

41.  Concert of Nations (diplomacy outside organizations)  Depends on agreeing with others in the Pacific Rim  Japan;  Indonesia;  US.  But do Chinese domestic constituencies want it? The Past is Still a Burden!!! (War Events  Rape of Nanking/Nanking Massacre)