1. Type author names here © Oxford University Press, 2014. All rights reserved. Economics of Monetary Union 10e Chapter 4: Costs and Benefits Compared Paul De Grauwe

2. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Costs and benefits of a monetary union Benefits Costs Costs and Benefits (% GDP) Trade (% GDP) Figure 4.1 Costs and benefits of a monetary union

3. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Two views about costs and benefits of MU Trade (% GDP) Costs and benefits Benefits Costs Benefits T*T* T* (a) The monetarist view(b) The Keynesian view Figure 4.2 Costs and benefits of a monetary union: two views.

4. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Two views about costs of MU The ‘monetarist’ view : –Monetary policies are ineffective as instruments to correct for different developments between countries. –The cost curve is close to the origin. –Thus, many countries in the world would gain by relinquishing their national currencies, and by joining a monetary union.

5. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e The 'Keynesian' view : –the world is full of rigidities, –Monetary policy (including exchange rate policy) is a powerful instrument in eliminating disequilibria, –the cost curve is far away from the origin, –relatively few countries should find it in their interest to join a monetary union.

6. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Since the early 1980s the 'monetarist' view has gained adherents, and has changed the view many economists have about the desirability of a monetary union. The popularity of monetarism helps to explain why EMU became a reality in the 1990s.

7. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Figure 4.3 Costs and benefits with decreasing rigidities Costs and benefits Trade (% GDP) T*T** Benefits Costs With decline in wage and price rigidities and an increase in labour mobility: Cost curve shifts downwards Monetary union becomes more attractive

8. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Is EMU an optimal currency area? In order to answer to this question there are different parameters to evaluate: –Intra-EU trade –Degree of rigidities –Degree of asymmetry of shocks.

9. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e large differences in openness of EU countries with the rest of the Union. cost-benefit analysis is likely to show net benefits of being in EMU for Benelux, and small central European countries For countries with a small degree of openness (UK and Greece), it is less clear that they belong to an optimal currency area with the rest of the EU. Source: European Commission, European Economy, Statistical Appendix. Table 4.1 Intra-union exports of EU countries (% of GDP) in 2012

10. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Asymmetric shocks and labour market flexibility The degree of labour market flexibility matters for determining whether a monetary union will be attractive to countries. Also asymmetry in demand and supply shocks matters. There is a link between labour market flexibility and asymmetric shocks in a monetary union.

11. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Figure 4.4 Symmetry and labour market flexibility in monetary unions Eurozone EU-25 USA Symmetry Flexibility Downward sloping OCA-line shows minimum combinations of symmetry and flexibility that countries must have in order for a monetary union to provide more benefits than costs Countries or regions located below the OCA line do not have enough flexibility given the level of symmetry they face Countries to the right of the OCA line have a lot of flexibility given the level of symmetry they face Evidence about how many countries in EU form OCA is not clear-cut OCA

12. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e The challenging task for the EU-25 is to move to the other side of the OCA-line, i.e. to make a monetary union less costly. How can this be achieved? There are essentially two strategies. –reduce the degree of real divergence (political union) –increase the degree of flexibility of labour markets

13. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e The degree of completeness of a monetary union In an incomplete monetary union, i.e. one in which there is no budgetary union, there will be great fragility of the government bond markets. In addition, in such unions, asymmetric shocks are likely to be intensified by disruptions in the government bond markets that impose high interest rates in countries experiencing negative shocks. In monetary unions that are embedded in a budgetary union these problems disappear and the cost of a monetary union is likely to be lower.

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15. A prediction Previous analysis leads to prediction that we are more likely to observe monetary unions that are budgetary unions at the same time. A budgetary union is an essential component of a political union. Thus a combination of monetary and political union is more likely to have fewer costs and therefore to function better than monetary unions that are not embedded in a political union. Indeed, the overwhelming evidence is that monetary unions are almost always embedded in a political union. The Eurozone is a big exception to this rule.

16. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Costs and benefits in the long run OCAT T Symmetry Trade integration EU-25 Figure 4.7 The European Commission view of monetary integration Upward sloping line (TT): a s trade integration increases the degree of symmetry between the countries involved increases Downward sloping line (OCA): less symmetry makes a monetary union more costly. More integration reduces the costs of a monetary union. Thus a reduction in symmetry must be compensated by more integration to make a monetary union worthwhile (in terms of costs and benefits) points on OCA line are minimal combinations of symmetry and integration for which monetary union has zero net gain

17. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e EU-25 T´ T T OCA Symmetry Trade integration Figure 4.8 The Krugman view of monetary integration Costs and benefits in the long run

18. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Two possibilities for the long-term prospects of monetary union. –One is represented by the TT line. In this case, although today the EU-25 may not be an optimum currency area, it will move into the OCA zone over time (right side of OCA). –The second case is represented by the steep T’T’ line. Integration brings us increasingly farther away from the OCA zone. The net gains of a monetary union do not increase fast enough with the degree of integration. Thus, the costs of asymmetry overwhelm all the other benefits a monetary union may have. –Second case is implausible

19. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Endogeneity of monetary union A decision by an individual country to join EMU, even if it does not satisfy the OCA criteria, can have a self-fulfilling character. In this case the process of integration is sped up by the very decision to join the monetary union, so that this new country grouping moves faster into the OCA zone. OCA becomes endogenous

20. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Is there evidence for endogeneity? Three OCA-criteria are potentially affected by endogeneity –Trade integration –Symmetry –Flexibility Trade integration: econometric evidence suggests that euro may have increased intra-trade by 10 to 20% Symmetry: is symmetry increasing in eurozone? (see next slide) Flexibility has increased (but much of it before 1999; and very unequal between countries) Thus there is mitigated support for endogeneity

21. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Figure 4.8: Mean Eurozone correlation of cyclical component of industrial production During the pre-crisis period (1999-2007) the mean correlation coefficient is marginally smaller than in the pre-Eurozone period (1987-1998). During the post-crisis period (2008-11) the correlation increases significantly. Mostly due to the strong decline in output that occurred in 2009 and that hit all countries together as a result of the “Great Recession”. This is likely to be temporary Thus not much evidence of increasing correlation since 1999

22. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e The challenge of enlargement of EMU Two challenges –enlargement poses problems for the 12 present members –enlargement poses problems for the newcomers.

23. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Is Euro-25 OCA? Openness as a criterion

24. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e The central European countries are as open towards the EU as the EU-countries themselves. The Central European countries appear to be more integrated with the EU than Denmark, Sweden, and the UK.

25. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Is Euro-25 OCA? Asymmetry of shocks Each point represents correlation between demand and supply shocks of particular country with EU- average Many CE-countries’ demand shocks negatively correlated with EU demand shocks Low correlation of supply shocks between CE- countries and EU Asymmetries in demand shocks may disappear partly in MU, asymmetries in supply shocks more likely to stay

26. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Thus, not all CE-countries may be part of an optimal currency area with the rest of the European Union. –Despite relatively large openness of the CE-countries vis-a-vis the EU, many are subjected to relatively large asymmetric shocks, so that it is not obvious that they would gain from entering EMU. However, for some of these countries entering EMU might be the best possible way to import exchange rate and price stability.

27. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Should the UK join EMU? Costs of a monetary union: –Openness: the UK has the lowest degree of openness towards the rest of the EU –Asymmetry of shocks: demand shocks in the UK are negatively correlated with the demand shocks in Euroland. –Flexibility: there is greater flexibility in the UK labour markets than in the euro zone It is unclear whether costs of monetary union are larger in UK than in euro zone

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30. Has cost benefit calculus for UK changed by sovereign deb crisis? The UK government issues debt in pound sterling. As a result, it can guarantee that its debt will always be repaid. We have seen that this guarantee makes it less vulnerable to movements of distrust in financial markets. The power of that guarantee can be seen by looking at figures 4.15 and 4.16.

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33. Since the start of the financial crisis the debt to GDP ratio in the UK has been higher than in Spain. Yet in Figure 4.16 we see that since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone in 2010, the financial markets have hit Spain, not the UK. Investors have massively sold Spanish government bonds thereby raising the interest rate on these bonds.

34. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e As a result, since 2010 the Spanish government paid more than 200 to 300 basis points extra on its debt than the UK government. It is likely that if the UK had been in the Eurozone, the unfavourable trend in its government debt ratio would have put it in the same position as Spain and would have forced it to pay significantly higher interest rates on its debt.

35. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Is Latin America an optimal currency area? Monetary instability has made the idea of forming a monetary union in Latin America popular Costs of monetary union in Latin America –Latin American countries have very low levels of trade with the rest of Latin America.

36. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Figure 4.16 Intraregional exports of goods and services, EU and Latin America as a percentage of GDP (2007)

37. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e –Degree of synchronization of output movements is low in Latin America, and asymmetric shocks are relatively large. –Very little empirical evidence has been undertaken to measure the degree of flexibility of labour markets Main driving force for popularity of MU is the hope to import price stability If monetary union comes about it will have to provide the right institutions guaranteeing price stability

38. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Is East-Asia an optimal currency area? Source: IMF, IFS and Xu Ning(2004) Note: the exports of the East-Asian countries is to ASEAN plus China, Korea and Japan. The data for China relate to 2001. Figure 4.17 Intra-regional exports of goods and services, EU and Latin America, as a percentage of GDP (2010).

39. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Shocks are not more asymmetric in Asia than in Eurozone Figure 4.19 Percentage of demand and supply changes explained by common shock in East Asia Figure 4.20 Percentage of demand and supply changes explained by common shock in the Eurozone.

40. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Economic conditions for monetary union in East Asia seem to be satisfied Main stumbling block is political Desire for political unification is weak Contrast with Europe is great: process of political unification in Europe has been going on since 1960

41. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Monetary Unions in Africa There is a history of monetary union in West- and Central Africa Legacy of colonization: CFA-zone New initiative to extend existing monetary unions: The Economic Community of West- African States (ECOWAS) This is a grouping of 15 states Do these form an OCA?

42. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Figure 4.20 Intraregional exports of goods and services in West-Africa (2003) and the Eurozone (2010)

43. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e When using the Eurozone as a benchmark, the evidence on whether West Africa forms an optimal currency area is mixed: –the degree of integration among West African countries is low, yielding relatively few benefits of a monetary union. –labour mobility is substantially stronger. –the degree of asymmetry does not seem to be larger in West Africa than it is in the Eurozone –West African countries (the members of WAEMU) have already set into place a series of institutions, such as a common central bank facilitating further steps towards a monetary union.

44. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Conclusion It is unlikely that the EU as a whole constitutes an optimal monetary union. Even the countries that are net gainers from a monetary union take a risk by joining the union. –The risk is that when large shocks occur (like the recent shocks resulting from the financial crisis), they will find it more difficult to adjust, having relinquished their national currencies. –Thus, even for those countries that have joined a monetary union, it is not entirely academic to know whether they form an optimal currency area. –As a result of the sovereign debt crisis, in some of these countries doubts are voiced about whether it was a good idea to be in the Eurozone.

45. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e Enlargement of the Euro-zone to potentially 27 countries creates serious challenges. –Enlargement will change the cost benefit calculus of existing members of the Euro-zone. –Some of these member countries may find out that the enlargement makes the monetary union less attractive.

46. De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union 10e It is unlikely that Latin America and East Asia will come to monetary union soon, although reasons are different. Evidence about West-Africa as an OCA is mixed Our analysis has been based on an economic cost- benefit analysis. Countries may also decide to adopt a common currency for political reasons. The economic cost-benefit analysis remains useful, because it gives an idea of the price some countries will have to pay to achieve these political objectives