1. Myongji University HMCL
Attacks, Vulnerabilities and Security Requirements in Smart Metering Networks: A Survey
Myongji University
HMCL

2. Table of Contents Electricity Crisis Smart Grid
Advanced Metering Devices
Power Resources
Communication
Attacks and Security issues

3. The Electricity Crisis
Population of Electric devices +
More Electricity demanding

4. The Smart Grid
Smart grid is an electrical grid that intelligently predicts and
responds to the behaviors of electric power users
So, it efficiently delivers reliable, economic, and maintainable
electricity services.

5. Comparison on properties of the grids
Existing vs. Smart Grid
Existing Grid
Smart Grid
One-way communication
Two-way communication
Centralized generation
Distributed generation
Few sensors
Sensors throughout
Manual monitoring
Self-monitoring
Manual restoration
Self-healing
Limited control
Pervasive control
Few customer choices
Many customer choices
Comparison on properties of the grids

6. Smart Grids Achievement
Three important components needed:
Governments
Companies: Utilities Companies and Vendors
Customers: Owners, Residents.

7. Power Sources for Smart Grid
Wind Plant
Hydropower
Solar power
Nuclear power

8. Power Sources for Smart Grid
Wind Plant
Hydropower
Solar power
Nuclear power
Micro Hydro

9. Power Sources for Smart Grid
Wind Plant
Hydropower Plant
Solar power
Nuclear power

10. Power Sources for Smart Grid
Wind Plant
Hydropower Plant
Solar power
Nuclear power

11. Power Sources for Smart Grid
Wind Plant
Hydropower Plant
Solar power
Nuclear power
Others

12. Smart Grids Conceptual Model

13. Communication media used for smart grids
FCC allocation for smart grids
PLC –Power line carriers
Ethernet
WLAN
Zigbee
Bluetooth
Optical fiber
Microwave etc
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

14. Multi-Tier Smart Grid Architecture
Smart Grids consists of Multi-Tier Network:
WAN (distribution) Miles
NAN (metering)  Meters
HAN (consumer)  Yards

15. Multi-Tier Smart Grid Architecture

16. Security attacks in Smart Grid
Large-scale attack [Core network]
Small-scale attack [ HAN, CAN]
Current Risk of Attack through Smart Grid Technology
Attackers may use entry points physically unprotected.
Wireless networks can be easily monitored by attackers.
Wireless networks may be vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
There may be weaknesses in preventing unauthorized communication.
Vulnerable appliances can be easily attacked and compromised to attack
other appliances or smart grids
Vulnerabilities exist, not discovered yet.
No significant risks at this time, but the risk grows as the deployment of
smart grids grows .

17. Attack Methodologies A: Physical attack:
exists when a criminal physically attacks home security

18. Attack Methodologies B: Cyber-attack:
exists when accessible information gets attacked causing a compromise to
the home controller or appliances

19. Advanced Metering devices
AMI: Advanced Metering Infrastructure
A device for a utility or the customer to monitor and control
energy usage.
It transmits data on energy use back to the utility instead of \
driving by and reading.
SMART METER

20. Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI)
AMI: integral part of smart grid
Reconfigurable nature and communication capabilities of advanced (smart) meters allow for deploying a rich set of applications
Automated meter reading
Outage management
Demand response
Electricity theft detection
Support for distributed power generation

21. Security attacks in Smart Metering Networks
False Data Injection attack
Denial of Service attack – Jammer (RF signals)
Eavesdropping Attack – (Human behavior rec:)
Impersonation Attack – (man-in-the-middle)
Replay Attack – Storing unauthorized data

22. Security requirement for Smart Metering Networks
Data Confidentiality- cryptosystems
Data Integrity – MAC can be added for verification.
Data Freshness – nonce technique (Counter)
Data Availability - network alive during DoS attack
Non-Repudiation – public key cryptography
Authentication – Data and Entity Authentication

23. Conclusion and Open Issues
Privacy Issues
Data Aggregation Issue
Security Issue in smart Metering Data

24. Contact:
Myongji University Computer Engineering Dept.
HMCL Lab, Dileep Kumar