1. Patterns of
Democracy

2. Which political institutions prevent a democratic system from becoming a tyranny of the majority?

3. Source: Polity IV Project 2011

4. Defining democracy Procedural definitions = minimalist
Classify political regimes in regard to their institutions and procedures.
Are they legitimate, representative, and accountable?
Focus on concrete indicators and measures of institutional performance.
Substantive definitions = normative
Classify political regimes in regard to the outcomes they produce.
Does the regime promote equality, fairness & inclusion?

5. Dahl’s view of democracy (1971)
Contestation & inclusion = dimensions of classification
Contestation is related to democratic competition
Inclusion is about who participates in the process
Polyarchy = a political regime with high levels or both contestation and inclusion (ideal type)

6. Dahl’s view of democracy
Contestation
Polyarchies
(Ideal type)
Apartheid South Africa
Lichtenstein pre-1984
EU, US
U.S. before 1830
Switzerland pre-1971
France pre-1945
China
URSS
Inclusion
Source: Clark et al. 2009: 153.

8. Source: Polity IV Project 2011

9. European democracies European democracy varies across countries.
This variety can be approached in different ways:
1. An emphasis on the uniqueness of each country.
2. Identifying a single institutional difference as the most important: (Semi-)presidential v. Parliamentary; direct democracy; first-past-the-post v. proportional representation
3. Unified perspective on the variety of political institutions in democracies.
Unified perspectives show how institutions cumulate and interact to produce an overall democratic system.

10. Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy
Dilemma
If democracy is “government by and for the people”
and the people disagree,
who does the governing and
to whom is the government accountable?
1) The bare majority = Majoritarian democracy
2) As big a majority as possible = Consensus democracy

11. Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy
Intuition
Institutions tend towards majoritarianism & consensus.
Majoritarian institutions tend to be found together as do consensus institutions.

12. Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy
How does it work?
Majoritarian model: concentration of power in the hands of the majority
Consensus model: non-concentration of power
Shared = dispersed to political actors operating together within the same political institutions
Ex: coalition governments
Divided = dispersed to separate political institutions
Ex: bicameral parliaments

13. Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy
Two dimensions
1. Joint-power (executive-parties):
shared responsibility, collective agency.
2. Divided power (federal-unitary):
separate and independent institutions.

14. Switzerland’s direct democracy
Group work: watch the video & write down
One example of executive power-sharing.
One example of the way in which political power is dispersed to separate political institutions.
Whom does each parliamentary chamber represent? What are the consequences of this particular structure?
How can laws passed by the parliament be overturned?
Who can change the Constitution? Is the court system involved in this process? Is there a Constitutional Court?
One advantage of direct democracy.
One weakness of direct democracy.

15. Joint-power dimension / executive-parties
1. Concentration of power in single-party majority cabinets v. executive power-sharing in broad multiparty cabinets. 2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant v. executive-legislative balance of power. 3. Two-party v. multi-party systems. 4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems v. proportional representation. 5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups v. coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation.

16. Joint power dimension / executives-parties
1. Concentration of power in single-party majority cabinets v. executive power-sharing in broad multiparty cabinets. 2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant v. executive-legislative balance of power.

18. Joint power dimension / executives-parties
3. Two-party v. multi-party systems. 4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems v. proportional representation.

19. Italy: polarised pluralism
Germany: two large parties, but not majority parties
Strong relationship between party systems and types of cabinets: as the effective number of parliamentary parties increases, the incidence of one-party cabinets decreases.

20. Joint power dimension / executives-parties
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups v. coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation.

21. Divided power dimension / federal-unitary
1. Unitary and decentralized government v. federal and decentralized government. 2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature v. division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses. 3. Flexible constitutions amendable by simple majority v. rigid constitutions amendable only by extraordinary majorities. 4. Legislatures that decide on the constitutionality of laws v. constitutional review by courts. 5. Central banks dependent on the executive v. independent central banks.

22. Divided power dimension / federal-unitary
1. Unitary and decentralized government v. federal and decentralized government. 2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature v. division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
Strong empirical connection between the bicameral-unicameral & federal-unitary dichotomies: all federal systems have bicameral legislatures; some non-federal systems also have bicameral legislatures, but they are more likely to be unicameral.

23. Consensual federal & strong bicameralism
Index of bicameralism: how strong is the second chamber? (1: there is no second chamber; 4: equally strong to the first chamber)
Degree of federalism & decentralisation (1: federal & decentralised; 5: unitary & decentralised)
Majoritarian unitary & unicameral

24. Divided power dimension / federal-unitary
3. Flexible constitutions amendable by simple majority v. rigid constitutions amendable only by extraordinary majorities. 4. Legislatures that decide on the constitutionality of laws v. constitutional review by courts.
When the constitution and an ordinary law conflict, who interprets the constitution: the parliament itself – meaning the majority in parliament – or a body such as a court or a special constitutional council outside and independent of parliament?

25. Consensual rigidity & review Mixed / outliers flexible & review
Constitutional rigidity: how large does the parliamentary majority need to be in order to pass a constitutional amendment?
1: ordinary majority -50%; 2: between two-thirds and ordinary majorities; 3: two-thirds majorities or equivalent; 4: greater than two-thirds;
Judicial review: is the court system involved in the constitution-changing process?
1: no;
2: yes, but only by some courts (decentralised system, rather weak)
3: yes, by special constitutional courts (centralised system, rather strong)
4: yes, by the regular court system (very strong)
Outliers
Switzerland: the absence of judicial review is the only majoritarian characteristic in an otherwise solidly consensual democracy.
Mixed /
outliers
rigidity & no review
Majoritarian
flexibility &
no review

26. Divided power dimension / federal-unitary
5. Central banks dependent on the executive v. independent central banks.

27. Source: Mair in Caramani 2008: 86.

28. Majoritarian prototypes
Consensus
joint-power &
Majoritarian
federal-unitary
Majoritarian prototypes
Prototypes
1) Consensual: Switzerland – not quite as far down as Germany because of the absence of judicial review, but still the clearest prototype.
2) Majoritarian: UK, France
3) Europe: consensual on the power-sharing dimension; majoritarian on the federal-unitary dimension
Correspondence between conceptual and geographical maps & pairs that will be studied in this course
4) Scandinavia
5) Spain, Portugal
6) Belgium, Netherlands
7) UK, Ireland
Majoritarian
joint-power &
Consensus
federal-unitary
Consensual prototypes

29. Patterns of democracy & this course
Majoritarian democracies
Responsive, accountable & efficient BUT less representative
Consensus democracies
Inclusive & more representative BUT less efficient
Real-world democracies have a mix of majoritarian and consensus institutions
How we use this framework
Understand which political institutions are responsible for the majoritarian/consensus tendency of various European countries.
Identify processes of change: Which European countries have shifted from one model to the other? Have they done so as a result of institutional changes? Can we predict the consequences of institutional changes?