1. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Safety in the INB Context and its Impact on Access John Poole AB-SU

2. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 2 Aim of this Talk Explain what the “INB” is Describe CERN’s position with respect to the host states in matters of safety Give an overview of the impact of the recent licensing process for access

3. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Short Version There is no direct impact but…

4. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 4 Context with respect to France At CERN’s request an international treaty (convention) was signed in 1984 for LEP. –CERN and the State of France agree that LEP will be considered as an INB. CERN is therefore not listed as an INB but the parts of our installations within the agreed perimeter are open for inspection like all of the official INB’s in France in as much as this is compatible with CERN’s status as an International Organisation. LEP was dismantled under the 1984 convention –Safety documents were submitted and our plans were approved. The 1984 convention was replaced by a new one covering the LHC and SPS and in an addendum, CNGS.

5. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 5 Consequences of being INB An operator of a facility writes his own safety rules and procedures and submits them to the French authorities for approval. The technical experts from the French authorities analyse the documents and say if they think that they are satisfactory or not (without proposing solutions to any problems which they find). The final package is reviewed by an independent (French) panel which reports back to the licensing authority who then authorise (or refuse) operation of the facility. During operation of the facility the French authorities carry out formal inspections, verifying that what has been written in the safety documentation is being followed.

6. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 6 Tripartite Meetings CERN also reports separately to the Swiss authorities. In order to have a coherent approach, a high level tripartite committee comprising CERN’s management, the head of the French authorities and the head of the Swiss authorities, meets regularly to discuss radiation safety matters.

7. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 7 INBIG In Summer 2003 the INB Implementation Group completed its report which defined a new strategy for handling radiation safety in the accelerators in the context of our inter- governmental status. The major conclusions of this report were: –We should apply our rules and procedures across all of CERN’s accelerators and experiments in exactly the same way. –A quality assurance culture should be progressively introduced for the accelerators, starting with the INB. –Pragmatic radiological zoning for waste should be implemented. –Traceability procedures should be simplified. This strategy was approved by the Directorate at the time. This strategy has also been discussed and agreed at the Tripartite meeting.

8. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 8 Safety Documentation The major reports submitted to the host state authorities were: Rapport provisoire de sûreté (RPS)~850 pages Règles Générales d’exploitation (RGE)~150 pages Étude déchets (ED) [5 volumes]~450 pages Plan d’urgence interne (PUI)~150 pages

9. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 9 Supplementary Documents Mini reports for –SPS Access System –CNGS startup –LHC sector test (not sent) Hundreds of pages of supplementary information requested by the French authorities following written requests, visits and meetings. Major revision of 50% of the RPS and RGE before November 2006. Between December 2006 and April 2007 we wrote more than 300 pages of replies to specific written questions from IRSN about the safety documents.

10. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 10 RPS Part I is a description of the facilities Part II is an analysis of the risks and a description of how they are/will be managed. Annexes: LHC access system SPS access system

11. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Analysis by the Authorities The analysis focused on radiation protection and access. Some weaknesses were exposed during the analysis and modifications were introduced.

12. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 12 Ramifications of the Safety Documents There is nothing more than was anticipated in the INBIG document and we are coming into line with other major laboratories. Main areas of impact (cost) are: –Quality management –Formalised procedures everywhere –Radiation Protection activities –Environment Protection activities –Waste management and disposal –Ventilation and access systems –Alarms and safety devices

13. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Impact for Access Systems The main impact will be in the area of testing both for the commissioning and during the following years. A full quality management process must be applied and this will require planning and documentation.

14. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Undertakings by CERN – subset Send safety file concerning the upgrade of the SPS Access System before the modifications are introduced. Send an Annual Safety Report –During the first years of LHC operation to include a number of specific items in the annual report in addition to the regular: List of incidents Inventory of releases and waste production Summary of personnel dosimetry Summary of periodic testing results (e.g. DSO access system tests) 14

15. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Further Undertakings By the end of 2007 Update the RPS to include all of the information sent since the full documents (v. 1) were submitted (~1man-year). Update and complete the RGE to include all of the information sent since the full documents (v. 1) were submitted. –In this case there is still a lot of work to be done (3-5 man-years), particularly concerning the chapters on Quality Assurance, Radiation Protection procedures, procedures during incidents and routine tests. 15

16. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 The Strategy for Implementation The Safety Documents respect the strategy defined in the INBIG report. It is worth noting at this stage that although there are many more activities which have to be carried out in the coming years, they are driven by CERN’s regulations, not the French or Swiss regulations. A concentrated effort has been made to find pragmatic and simple procedures in all areas of safety. 16

17. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Cultural Change The complexity and greater risks which we will face in the LHC era mean that a more rigorous approach by everyone is required. This will be manifested in more formal procedures and more paperwork and it will affect everyone. Some degree of work planning will be involved for every intervention in LHC 17

18. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Implementation The main impact will be in the following areas: Safety document maintenance Quality assurance procedures (operation and auditing) Training Radiation protection procedures (optimisation/ALARA) Buffer zones and traceability systems Waste management (logistics, legal and contractual aspects and quality management) 18

19. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 19 DIMR – Before Access A safety document concerning an intervention in a radioactive area containing: 1.General Description 2.Radiological Conditions 3.Approvals (RP, Technical Manager, Contractor, DSO/RSO 4.Procedures and special precautions 5.Dose results –Lessons learned and dose follow up 6.Operational procedure –Lessons learned and operational follow up

20. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Traceability Traceability of equipment will be achieved using the standard methods available to us. –Internal documents (transfer slips) –Asset management systems (MTF) & barcodes –Simple labelling for legacy systems (PS, SPS …) –Contractual documents (customs, invoices for scrap etc.) –Waste will be handled by RP using their own tools 20

21. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Control of Material Flow All equipment leaving the accelerator and experimental areas must be checked for radioactivity. –This will mostly be done in the buffer zones A zoning of the accelerators and experiments has been defined (radioactive and conventional areas). –The boundary between two such zones may be inside a 3 dimensional volume Equipment will be measured before it can leave the area. 21

22. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 ATLAS Zoning 22

23. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 LHC Dipole Zoning 23

24. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 24 Each area is classified into one of the following Appropriate procedures are defined for each area Radiological Zoning

25. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Radiological Zoning in LHC after beam 25

26. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 The Doctrine Anything coming from within a volume which has been defined as one which will produce radioactive materials will be classified as radioactive (even when it is not radioactive). Such materials will be classed as radioactive waste once they become waste. If radioactive materials are found within a conventional area there must be an investigation and possible revision of the official zoning. 26

27. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Buffer Zones Separate areas for radioactive and conventional materials Large items (like magnets) will be handled on a one-off basis with special provisions for radiation measurements and traceability 27

28. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Training Radiation protection for radiation workers –New courses tailored to the individual’s needs Procedure preparation/writing Quality management Training concerning specific procedures –e.g. searching the underground areas, access procedures, traceability etc. Training for specific activities e.g. vacuum interventions in TCC2 28

29. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Operations Running within operating limits –Operators must know the limits and stay within them MDs may require that a particular operational limit is exceeded but this must be compensated in some way –Such experiments will require approval by Chef d’Installation Operations will be increasingly dependent on formal procedures (access, maintenance etc.) 29

30. Safety at CERN in the INB Context, J. Poole, July 2007 Long Term Each year we need to compile the information required for the annual safety report –This will be an on-going process, collecting information throughout the year. Changes to the accelerators and our procedures need to be recorded in the safety documents –They are living documents After five years of operation we need to submit a definitive safety report to the French authorities –We are currently working with the provisional version which says what we expect to build and implement. 30