1. www.qog.pol.gu.se Bureaucracy and Quality of Government Carl Dahlström & Victor Lapuente The Quality of Government Institute Statsvetenskapliga institutionen Göteborgs universitet

2. www.qog.pol.gu.se Research puzzle Bureaucracy matters for curbing corruption/increase QoG… yet through which particular characteristics? Browsed 3 bureaucratic mechanisms in current research Tested with new datasets

3. www.qog.pol.gu.se Bureaucratic structureCausal MechanismsObservable indicators A) Closed bureaucracy (Rauch and Evans 2000) “Esprit de Corps”. The key is to “create better types” through socialization in certain values, strong ties among the members of the Corps and isolation from external influences 1.Formal Entry Examinations 2. Life Tenure/Career stability 3. Special Employment Laws 4. Flat salaries (no performance pay) B) Well-paid bureaucracy (Becker and Stigler 1974) “Temptation”. The key is to pay bureaucrats enough, so as they do not engage in corrupt behavior to complement their salaries. 5. Competitive salaries in public sector (vs. private sector) C) Professional bureaucracy (based on TCEs: Miller and Hammond 1994, Miller and Falaschetti 2000) “Separation of interests”  coordination problems & different chains of accountability (e.g. whistle-blowers) 6. Meritocratic recruitment 7. Non-politicized recruitment.

4. www.qog.pol.gu.se 1. Do formal examinations curb corruption?

5. www.qog.pol.gu.se 2. Does life tenure in the public sector curb corruption?

6. www.qog.pol.gu.se 3. Should public employees have special employment laws?

7. www.qog.pol.gu.se 4. Does discretion in public sector salaries lead to opportunities for corruption?

8. www.qog.pol.gu.se 5. Do competitive salaries discourage corruption?

9. www.qog.pol.gu.se 6. Meritocratic recruitment and corruption

10. www.qog.pol.gu.se 7. Political loyalty in recruitment and corruption

11. www.qog.pol.gu.se Comparing Local Governments across Europe 1) Should we have a strong Mayor? 2) Should we keep classical separation politicians = policy-making and civil servants = policy-implementation?

12. 1) Strong mayor? … probably not Type of local government Transparency International CPI SwedenCommitee-leader9.3 DenmarkCommitee-leader9.3 FinlandCouncil-manager9.0 HollandCollective leadership 8.9 AustraliaCouncil-manager8.7 NorwayCouncil-manager7.9 IrelandCouncil-manager7.7 UKCommitee-leader7.7 BelgiumCollective leadership 7.3 USCouncil-manager & Strong-mayor 7.3 FranceStrong-mayor6.9 SpainStrong-mayor6.5 PortugalStrong-mayor6.1 ItalyStrong-mayor4.8

13. www.qog.pol.gu.se 2) Should we prevent local civil servants from engaging in policy-making?

14. www.qog.pol.gu.se The Arch of Leadership in good local government (Self 1972, Mouritzen & Svara 2002) Elected Officials Sets policy priorities Requires super-majority to affect CAO’s career CAOs Engaged in policy-making Preserves meritocracy in the rest of the local administration

15. www.qog.pol.gu.se The Arch of Leadership in Strong Mayor Local Governments Elected officials (Mayor) Monopoly of public policy cycle Margin of manouvre to affect CAO’s and other employees’ careers CAOs

16. Andel myndighetschefer med politisk bakgrund, 1960-2010.

17. Antalet politiskt anställda i RK, 1981-2011