1. In case of break-down Standardization and the vulnerability of technological cultures Anique Hommels Maastricht University

2. Overview Perspectives on vulnerability –NAT –HROT –MMD –STS Standardization and vulnerability Case: emergency communication Implications for governance

3. Vulnerability People, organizations, systems, cultures or places that are susceptible to harm Vulnerability = reduced ability to anticipate, resist, cope with and recover from events that could reduce a system’s functional integrity (Wackers & Kørte)

4. Perspectives on vulnerability Normal Accidents Theory (Perrow) High Reliability Organisations Theory (LaPorte, Sagan) Man Made Disasters model (Turner, Pidgeon)

5. Normal Accidents Theory Normal accidents (Perrow, 1984) Organizations act not as rationally as assumed System characteristics: –Loose - Tight coupling –Linear - Complex interactions System characteristics determine vulnerability Critique: too static, tight coupling can change over time (Weick, 1990)

6. Normal Accidents Theory

7. High Reliability Organizations Systems that are supposed to be vulnerable, don’t fail that often (LaPorte, Sagan) Positive safety record explained by “high reliability culture in decentralized and continually practiced operations” (Sagan, 1993) Safety can be achieved by organizational measures

8. Man Made Disasters Focus on “disaster incubation period” “Culture is positioned at the heart of the system vulnerability problem, because of its role in shaping blindness to certain forms of hazard.” (Pigeon, 1997: 5) Interactions between humans and organizational arrangements: prime cause of accidents

9. STS perspective Three claims: 1.Vulnerability as a characteristic of technological cultures 2.Vulnerability as socially constructed 3.Vulnerability as potentially positive (Bijker, 2006 and ‘work in progress’ Bijker, Hommels, Mesman)

10. Vulnerability of Technological Cultures We live in a technological culture Vulnerability as a key characteristic of technological cultures Double role of technology: reducing vulnerabilities but also creating new ones

11. Vulnerability as a social construction Vulnerability is not an inherent characteristic of a system Focus on: –Analyzing vulnerabilities in their context –Negotiating vulnerabilities –Trade-offs between vulnerabilities (e.g. efficiency/safety) –Vulnerability perceptions

12. Vulnerability as potentially positive Vulnerability can be a necessary condition for survival: “Only when a culture is capable of learning, innovating, and flexibly reacting to external threats, will it be sustainable on the long run.” (Bijker, 2006)

13. Standardization and vulnerability Dealing with standards, rules and protocols in high-tech organizations Assumption: standardization saves lives Notions as –Practical drift (Snook; Rosness) –Safety drift (Farjoun) –Bricolage (Sanne) –Normalization of deviance (Vaughan) (small deviations from norms and rules become standard behavior) show that it can be risky to deviate from the rules

14. Standardization and vulnerability Study gaps between standards and local practices Implications for vulnerability? Example: emergency communication

16. Case study Emergency communication as a critical infrastructure Characterised by both high degree of standardization and the need to improvise in case of emergencies Balance standardization – improvisation Transnational aspect

17. Emergency collaboration across borders Schengen agreements ETSI developed Tetra standard (1990s): –Dream of a Pan-European system In the end: two standards –Tetra –Tetrapol

18. Key Nationwide TETRA Regional TETRA Nationwide TETRA under construction Project in progress likely to be TETRA Other technologies No project known European Public Safety Networks

20. Two cases 1.Before the introduction of the Tetra standard: –The explosion of a fire works storage facility in the Dutch city of Enschede (close to the German border) (2000)

21. Border region Enschede

24. Two cases 2.Using the Tetra standard: –The 3 Countries Pilot (Netherlands, Germany, Belgium) (2003)

25. Border region 3CP

26. Methodology 20 semi-structured interviews Document analysis –Archival sources (minutes, correspondence) –Reports Enschede disaster –Reports 3CP Interview transcripts Secondary literature vulnerability, improvisation, standardization Comparison (before/after)

27. Explosion in Enschede May 13, 2000, 22 people died, 950 injured At that time, practices were characterized by: –Use of improvised gateways (Egyedi, 2000) Exchange of equipment Double sets of equipment –Local, short-term arrangements for international radio communication –No communication between dispatch rooms in Germany and NL –Separate radio networks for police, ambulance and fire

28. Coordination problems Not only technological communication problems Also differences in: –governmental structures and responsibilities –legal arrangements (not allowed to cross borders with light/sound/weapons) –tactics (offensive and defensive fire fighting) –language

29. Vulnerability issues Vulnerability due to coordination problems Ambiguous role of culture (notion of ‘noaberschap’) “Uncoordinated action is the worst thing that can happen… because you loose control, people take risks, there is no communication, certainly not when they begin spontaneously and use their own communication technologies. So on the one hand you have to be grateful that they come to help you – on the other hand, it is important to coordinate this in a different way.” (chief commander Enschede fire brigade)

30. 3 Countries Pilot Operational Tetra test 2003 Border area Germany, Netherlands, Belgium

31. Coordination problems Operational differences (sequence of spoken orders) Language differences (English/German/local dialects) Legal differences Technological coordination –Lacking Inter System Interface –Nokia/Motorola

32. Vulnerability issues 3CP Vulnerability due to coordination problems ánd the problem of concentration of power Dependence on two suppliers (Nokia/Motorola), reluctance to share knowledge

33. Conclusions Enschede3CP Historical period1980s-20002003 Type of gatewayImprovisedStandardized Type and scale of collaboration Cross-border/short-termTransnational/ long-term Type of vulnerability test DisasterExperiment Types of vulnerabilityCoordination problemsCoordination problems and power concentration/ dependence

34. Conclusions (2) Coordination of heterogeneous elements is precondition for reduction of vulnerability Technological interoperability is not sufficient Also in case of standardized gateways, improvisation needed Ambiguous role standardization: –On the one hand: helps to improve coordination –On the other hand: can create new vulnerabilities: dependence on manufacturers/concentration

35. Governance implications Right balance between standardization and improvisation Criticizing belief that standardization (automatically) saves lives Focus on messiness and drift contradicts (governmental) focus on more detailed standards and rules Reflexivity on trade-offs between different vulnerabilities should improve Discussion about C2000 in the Netherlands (blaming the users)