1.  Wrap-up of IPE and free trade review ◦ Gains from trade ◦ Trade balances, in brief  “International institutions” readings takehomes  International Institutions/Regimes ◦ What they are ◦ Two competing views of their influence ◦ Types of problems they resolve ◦ Evaluating their effectiveness ◦ Strategies for influencing state behavior

2.  States, as a whole, GAIN from free trade ◦ Because they specialize in what they do better (i.e.,, cheaper) than other countries, they can get more of what they want  Free trade helps consumers and exporters but harms import-competing sector  States must COOPERATE in international institutions to achieve these gains from trade – it’s a PD, so won’t happen unilaterally  States create institutions only if focused on absolute gains *not* relative gains

3. “For decades, Japan has defended its 778% tariffs on rice with a kind of religious zeal. Rice is a sacred crop, the government has argued, not open to trade negotiations. Its farmers are not just defenders of a proud agrarian heritage, but form the nation’s spiritual center as well.” NYT, 9 January 2014

4.  Trade BALANCE = Exports - imports ◦ Country with more exports than imports has a trade SURPLUS ◦ Country with more imports than exports has a trade DEFICIT  Country-by-country variation: ◦ China surplus with US/EU but deficit with Korea/Saudi Arabia ◦ US deficit with China/EU; surplus with S. & C. America  Benefits of trade surplus: high employment because producing for own AND other countries  Benefits of strong currency: lower priced imports which makes trade deficit more likely  People as employees like trade surplus (more secure jobs) but as consumers like trade deficits (lower prices)

5.  Individual choices and free market: consumer preferences and savings rate  General economic status and demand for one’s exports  Government policies try to increase exports while creating barriers to imports ◦ Trade barriers on imports and subsidies on exports ◦ Exchange rates: devaluing currency makes imports less attractive locally and exports more attractive to foreigners ◦ Fiscal (taxes/expenditures) and monetary policies ◦ Industrial policy – help certain industries

6.  States must balance trade deficits by borrowing money from other countries, i.e., countries must borrow to finance purchases of imports that exceed income from exports  Borrowing to run a trade deficit makes country vulnerable to foreign investors who may stop providing loans to finance that deficit ◦ Largest example: Chinese loans to cover ongoing US trade deficit (current account deficit) ◦ US government budget (2015) = $3.8 trillion ◦ Total debt: $19 trillion (5 years of budget)  Owed to US citizens: $13 trillion  Owed to Chinese government/citizens: $1.2 trillion  Owed to other governments/citizens: $5.0 trillion

7. US Trade Deficit – We buy more from foreigners than we sell to them

8. But much of our trade deficit comes from buying foreign oil

9.  Young & Osherenko, “Theories of regime formation” ◦ Example of research in social sciences ◦ Three types of hypotheses: power-based; interest-based; knowledge-based  Mearsheimer, “False promise of int’l institutions” ◦ States always concerned about relative gains; evidence doesn’t support institutional claims ◦ Rejecting BoP makes war more likely ◦ Compare Mearsheimer today to Grieco on Thursday – both are realists but responses to institutions are quite different  Grieco article (for Thursday, on EU) ◦ First point -- intellectual honesty and willingness to examine own preferred theory carefully -- being an analyst rather than an advocate. ◦ Second point -- EU does not fit well with realist theory and yet still not throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

10.  Institutions and Regimes (synonyms) ◦ "Norms, procedures, rules agreed to … to regulate an issue area" (Haas 1980, 397). ◦ Cooperative effort by states to overcome collective action problems  International example: human rights

11.  International institutions are more than just the rules (just like democracy is more than just the Constitution) ◦ Written rules are PART of it, but only part ◦ General norms ◦ Actors involved ◦ Processes ◦ Expectations

12.  Realist view: no influence of institutions Power and Interests International Institutions Behavior and Outcomes

13.  A:  B: Power and Interests International Institutions Behavior and Outcomes Power and Interests International Institutions Behavior and Outcomes

14.  Realist view: no influence of institutions  Institutionalist view: institutions may influence Power and Interests International Institutions Behavior and Outcomes Power and Interests International Institutions Behavior and Outcomes

15.  Coordination games ◦ Humorous version / non-humorous version Humorous versionnon-humorous version ◦ Once rules agreed to, no reason to cheat ◦ E.g., air traffic control, sea lanes  Collaboration games ◦ Ongoing incentives to cheat ◦ E.g., trade, arms control, environment  Upstream-downstream problems ◦ Upstream state has no incentive to act  Normative “problems” ◦ One/more state wants others to adopt their view

16. COLUMN Decrease Tariffs Increase Tariffs ROW Decrease Tariffs C gets SOLID growth R gets SOLID growth C gets HIGH growth R gets LOW growth Increase Tariffs C gets LOW growth R gets HIGH growth C gets SLOW growth R gets SLOW growth

17. FRANCE Pilots and ATC Speak English Pilots and ATC Speak French US Pilots and ATC Speak English No Crashes BUT High Training Costs No Crashes AND No Training Costs Crashes AND High Training Costs Crashes AND No Training Costs Pilots and ATC Speak French Crashes AND No Training Costs Crashes AND High Training Costs No Crashes AND No Training Costs No Crashes BUT High Training Costs

18.  Manage complexity  Reduce transaction costs  Create rules  Increase reciprocity  Improve information  Create/strengthen norms

19.  Institutions can always be evaluated against TWO definitions of success ◦ Goal achievement: Compare actual behavior (or outcomes) to stated goal ◦ Counterfactual: Compare actual behavior (or outcomes) to what would have occurred otherwise

20. Treaty In Force

22. COUNTERFACTUAL: Predicted Emissions if Treaty Wasn’t Signed

23. Treaty In Force Success of Treaty Relative to COUNTERFACTUAL COUNTERFACTUAL: Predicted Emissions if Treaty Wasn’t Signed

24. Treaty In Force GOAL: Emissions Level Treaty Sought to Achieve

25. Treaty In Force GOAL: Emissions Level Treaty Sought to Achieve Failure of Treaty Relative to GOAL

26. Was the Whaling Treaty a success?

27. “Having decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry” (ICRW, 1946) Goal

28. “Having decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry” (ICRW, 1946)

29. Goal Failure Relative To Goal “Having decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry” (ICRW, 1946)

30. Counterfactual

31. Success Relative To Counterfactual Catch LOWER than would have been otherwise, allowing population to recover But higher population allows MORE catch for longer than would have been possible otherwise

32. Counterfactual Success Relative To Counterfactual Goal Failure Relative To Goal

33.  Institutions can always be evaluated against TWO definitions of success ◦ Goal achievement: Compare actual behavior (or outcomes) to stated goal ◦ Counterfactual: Compare actual behavior (or outcomes) to what would have occurred otherwise