1. AODV and DSR Routing Protocols Under Wormhole Attack Environment
PRESENTED BY
Om Prakash Verma
Roll. No
UNDER THE GUIDENCE OF
Asst. lect. Miss Anupama Tiwari
Department of Computer Science Engineering
Graphic Era Institute of Technology
Dehradun

2. OUTLINE Introduction MANET MANET Routing Protocols
AODV and DSR Routing Protocols
DSR vs. AODV
Attacks on AODA and DSR
Wormhole Attack
Conclusion
References

3. Introduction
MANET is a wireless network consisting of a collection of communication nodes.
Several technical challenges regarding deployment of a MANET such as network scalability , communication stability, energy consumption, security and quality of services.
Detailed discusses on AODV.
Attack on AODV and DSR .
Wormhole attack on AODA & DSR and also avoiding technique wormhole attack.

4. MANET
A system of mobile nodes connected with each other via wireless medium without infrastructure support
The mobile nodes can move while communicating
No fixed base stations
Nodes in a MANET operate both as hosts as well as routers to forward packets.
Fig. 1. An example of MANET

5. Classification of Ad-Hoc Networks
On the basis of the number of hopes:
Single hop ad-hoc networks
Multihop ad-hoc networks
Fig. 2.1 Single hop ad-hoc network Fig. 2.2 Multihop ad-hoc network

6. Design Issues and Constraints
Infrastructure less
Dynamically changing network topologies
Variation in link and node capabilities
Energy constrained operation
Network security
Network scalability
Quality of services

7. MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS
To discover correct and efficient route establishment between a pair of nodes
MANET routing protocols are classified as:
Proactive routing protocols (Table driven)
Reactive routing protocols (On demand protocols)
Hybrid protocols

8. Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
Based on the concept of source routing
Every generated data packet carries the rout information in its packet header.
When node S wants to send a packet to node D, but does not know a route to D, node S initiates a route discovery.
Source node S floods Route Request (RREQ)
Each node appends own identifier when forwarding RREQ
Destination node D reply via reverse path through which RREQ packet was transmitted.

9. Dynamic Source Routing Contd…
Fig. 3. Route discovery in DSR

10. Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV)
AODV is Reactive routing protocol .
The AODV protocol is an on-demand routing protocol, which initiates a route discovery process only when desired by an originating node.
AODV attempts to improve on DSR by maintaining routing tables at the nodes.
Data packets do not have to contain routes.
On-demand routing protocols have two processes-
- Route Discovery.
- Route Maintenance.

11. Route Discovery Massage
The basic message set consists of:-
RREQ – Route request
RREP – Route reply
RERR – Route error
HELLO – For link status monitoring

12. Route Maintenance Route maintenance by following routing table items .
Destination IP
Destination Sequence Number
Hop Count to Destination (cost per hope = 1)
Next Hop
Lifetime
Last Hop Count
Routing Flags
Interface (i.e. eth0, eth1)
List of Precursors

13. Message Routing Fig-4 . Route discovery in AODV
RREQ- ROUTE REQEST MASSAGE WIRELESS LINK
RREP- ROUTE REQEST REPLAY MASSAGE REPLAY MASG. E A
SOURCE
RREP
RREQ
RREQ
RREQ
RREP B D
RREP F
RREQ
DESTNATION
RREQ
RREQ
RREQ
RREQ
RREQ G C

14. DSR vs. AODV
First, by feature of source routing, DSR has access to a significantly greater amount of routing information than AODV.
Second, to make use of route caching aggressively, DSR replies to all requests reaching a destination from a single request cycle.
Third The current specification of DSR does not contain any explicit mechanism to expire musty routes in the cache, or prefer “fresher” routes when faced with multiple choices.
Fourth, the route deletion activity using RERR is also conservative in AODV.

15. DSR vs. AODV Dynamic source routing (DSR)
Source broadcasts RREQ through the network
Intermediate nodes add its addr to RREQ and continue broadcasting until RREP received
Full path chosen by source and put into each packet sent
Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AOVD)
Hop-by-hop routing
Source sends RREQ to neighbors
Each neighbor does so until reach the destination
Destination node sends RREP follow the reverse path
Source doesn’t put whole path but only next hop addr in outgoing packets

16. Attacks on AOVD &DSR Wormhole attack
Two attackers, connected by a high-speed off-channel link.
Sinkhole attack
Hello flood attack.
Black hole attacks
A malicious node sends a false RREP packet to a source node that initiated the route discovery.
Misbehavior
Atomic Misuses of RREQ Messages
Atomic Misuses of RREP Messages
Atomic Misuses of RERR Messages
Atomic Misuses of RREP-ACK Messages

17. Wormhole Attack
Two attackers, connected by a high-speed off-channel link
Attacking nodes tunnel packets received in one place of the network to a distant location
The tunnel can be established in many different ways, such as through an out-of-band hidden channel (e.g., a wired link), packet encapsulation, or high powered transmission.
Attacker can tunnel a request packet RREQ directly to the destination node without increasing the hop-count value

18. A X Y H DESTINATION SOURCE RREQ S RREP RREP D RREQ B C E F G RREQ RREQ
RREQ THROUGH WORMHOLE RREQ RREP THROUGH WORMHOLE RREP X,Y MAILCIOUS NODE. RREQ MASSAGE. RREP THROUGH WORMHOLE. RREQ THROUGH WORM HOLE . WHORMHOLE TUNNEL LINK . Fig. 5.Wormhole Tunneling . A X Y H
DESTINATION
SOURCE
RREQ S
RREP
RREP D
RREQ B C E F G
RREQ
RREQ
REQR

19. Wormhole Attack Classification
Open Wormhole attack:-
In this type of wormhole, the attackers include themselves in the RREQ packet header following the route discovery procedure. Other nodes are aware that the malicious nodes lie on the path but they would think that the malicious nodes are direct neighbours.
Closed Wormhole Attack: -
The attackers do not modify the content of the packet, even the packet in a route discovery packet. Instead, they simply tunnel the packet form one side of wormhole to another side and it rebroadcasts the packet.
Half open wormhole attack: -
One side of wormhole does not modify the packet and only another side modifies the packet.

20. Solutions…
All nodes in the MANET can obtain authenticated symmetric key of every other node. The receiver can authenticate information like time and location from the received packet.
Time of Flight‟ is a technique used for prevention of wormhole attacks.
Directional Antennas‟ are a good solution for wormhole detection for networks relying on directional antennas.
If the directions of both pair match, then and then the relation is set .
Other types of techniques like LiteWorp, Localization and Network Visualization are also very useful in detecting wormhole attacks in wireless networks

21. Average end-to-end delay
Variation with number of nodes:
Average end-to-end delay is very small.
Because wormhole attack provides a fast and longer range directional link for all the traffics from source to destination.
Variation with tunnel length :
Average end-to-end delay is very small and further decreases on increasing the tunnel length.
On increasing tunnel length attackers become nearer to the source and destination and performance of both protocols improves as compared to shorter tunnel length.

22. Frames dropped & Average throughput
Variation with number of nodes:
frames dropped by wormhole attackers increases in case of both routing protocols.
Variation with tunnel length:
On varying tunnel length frames dropped by wormhole attackers increases in case of both routing protocols.
On increasing number of nodes throughput decreases in case of both routing protocols.
On increasing tunnel length throughput decreases in case of both routing protocols

23. CONCLUSION
From the analyses of graphs obtained from simulation it can be said that for small number of nodes performance of AODV is better.
As no. of nodes increases, for AODV protocol, routing overhead in the network increases in large amount. Hence performance for AODV decreases with large network.
The effect of wormhole attack is more for DSR than AODV protocol.

24. References
Djamel Djenouri and Lyes Khelladi, “ A Survey of Security Issues In Mobile Ad Hoc And Sensor Networks”,IEEE COMMUNICATIONS surveys and tutorials, Volume 7, no. 4, Fourth Quarter 2005.
Hoang Lan Nguyen, Uyen Trang Nguyen, “A study of different types of attacks on multicast in mobile ad hoc networks” in: Proceedings of IEEE , Ad Hoc Networks 6, pp. 32–46 , August 2006.
G. K. Singh, H. S. Bindra and A. L. Sangal, “Performance Analysis of DSR, AODV Routing Protocols based on Wormhole Attack in Mobile Ad-hoc Network,” International Journal of Computer Applications,Volume 26, no.5, pp , July 2011.
V. Sharma and A. Baghel, “Analysis of AODV and DSR in Presence of Wormhole Attack in Mobile Ad-hoc Network,” International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology, vol. 2, no.11, pp , April
Y.C. Hu, A. Perrig, D.B. Johnson, Ariadne: A secure on demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks, in: Proceedings of ACM MobiCom 2002, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2002.

25. References Contd…
K. P. Manikandan, R. Satyaprasad, K. Rajasekhararao, “A Survey on Attacks and Defense Metrics of Routing Mechanism in Mobile Ad hoc Networks,” (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, vol. 2, no.3, pp. 7-12, March 2011.
R. H. Jhaveri, A. D. Patel, J. D. Parmar, B. I. Shah, “MANET Routing Protocols and Wormhole Attack against AODV” (IJCSNS) International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, Vol. 10, no. 4, April 2010.
C.E. Perkins, E.M. Royer, S.R. Das, Ad hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) routing, in: Proceedings of IEEE WMCSA’99, New Orleans, LA, February 1999.
Y.C. Hu, A. Perrig, D.B. Johnson, Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols, in: Proceedings of ACM WiSe 2003, San Diego, CA, September 2003.
D. Johnson, D. Maltz, Dynamic Source Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks, Mobile Computing, Kluwer Academic Publishers., Norwell, MA, 1996, pp. 153–181.

26. THANK YOU