1. Dr Chris Cocking University of Brighton Crowd Behaviour in Emergencies In association with:

2. Crowd Behaviour in Emergencies Dr Chris Cocking c.cocking@brighton.ac.uk Twitter: @DrChrisCocking http://dontpaniccorrectingmythsaboutt hecrowd.blogspot.co.uk/

3. Outline Theoretical perspectives on emergencies Panic model –Social bonds break down Social attachment model –Social bonds endure Social Identity Model of Collective Resilience (SIMCR) –Social bonds emerge Examples from emergencies

4. Panic model & emergencies From irrationalist tradition- crowds ‘mad, bad & dangerous to know’ Threat causes emotion to overwhelm reason Collective identity breaks down Selfish behaviours- pushing, trampling Contagion- behaviours spread uncritically to crowd as a whole

5. Problems with panic model Mass panic rare- noticeable by absence in many different emergencies: –Atomic bombing of Japan WWII –7/7/2005 London bombings –WTC evacuation 9/11- ‘panic’ in less than 1% of behaviours recorded Blake, Galea, Westeng, & Dixon, 2004 What is ‘panic’? Over reaction/ inappropriate behaviour in emergency?

6. Do crowds ‘panic’? ‘When people die in fires, it’s not because of panic, it’s more likely to be the lack of panic.’ (Neil Townsend, Divisional Officer, London FRS, 2003) Concept of ‘Freezing’ People don’t die because of ‘panic’, they ‘panic’ because people are dying’ Professor Keith Still, http://www.gkstill.com/http://www.gkstill.com/

7. Panic on 9/11?

8. Social attachment model Mawson (2007) From Bowlby’s attachment theory In times of stress, people seek out attachment figures- affiliative behaviour Social norms rarely break down & people tend to leave or die as a group But problems remain; –Implies panic in crowd of strangers more likely –Neglects possibility that strangers may co-operate with each other

9. Social Identity Model of Collective Resilience (Drury et al 2009a) Disasters create emergent common identity in response to shared threat  ‘we’re all in this together’ Orderly, altruistic behaviour as people escape common threat Co-operation the norm & isolated selfish behaviour doesn’t tend to spread Any lack of co-operation usually due to physical constraints

10. What do we know about how crowds behave in emergencies? They attempt to flee –Individually –In groups (social attachment) Beverly Hills Supper Club fire (1977): 165 died Fire at the Summerland leisure complex, (1973): 50 people died

11. What do we know about how crowds behave in emergencies? They delay their evacuation 1.Not taking emergency seriously 2.To deal with emergency 3.To be with & help each other WTC attacks (2001): 2973 people died

12. What do we know about how crowds behave in emergencies? Coordination and cooperation common Hillsborough (1989): 96 deaths People acted together with strangers Who concert disaster (Cincinnati, 1979): 11 deaths Rules for social conduct (group norms) often maintained

13. Coordination and cooperation is common Why is this important to us? 1.Difference between orderly queue & door jamming 2.Professional responders may not always be there in time or number 26/4/16 Hillsborough inquests; ‘The failure to recognise and call a major incident led to delays in responding to the emergency’ Fans initiated & coordinated help- ‘heroes of Hillsborough’

14. What we know 1.Coordination & cooperation relatively common 2.Under-reaction (not over-reaction) main problem Research: What are factors that increase: 1.Coordination/cooperation 2.Prompt evacuation?

15. A case study: 7 th July 2005 London bombings 56 dead 700+ injuries Emergency services didn’t reach all survivors immediately crowd left in dark for up to 45 minutes after Piccadilly line bomb

16. The research Accounts from over 146 witnesses 90 of whom were survivors 17 interviewed/written responses Drury, Cocking, & Reicher (2009b) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters

17. A social identity explanation Hypothesis 1: Cause of shared social identity –An emergency can create a sense of ‘common fate’ (new group boundaries) –People use this ‘common fate’ to define themselves Hypothesis 2: Consequences of a shared social identity When ‘they’ = ‘us’ –Caring about others –Giving social support

18. Hypothesis 1 Int: Comparing to before the blast happened what do you think the unity was like before? LB 1: I’d say very low- three out of ten, I mean you don’t really think about unity in a normal train journey, it just doesn’t happen you just want to get from A to B, get a seat maybe ‘Me’ in relation to other individuals

19. Hypothesis 1 Int: “Can you say how much unity there was on a scale of one to ten [after the explosion]?” LB 1: “I’d say it was very high I’d say it was seven or eight out of ten.” Afterwards: ‘Us’ in relation to the bombing

20. Social bonds created ‘One of the things which struck me about this experience is that one minute you are standing around strangers and the next minute they become the closest and most important people in your life. That feeling was quite extraordinary ‘ (online account)

21. Hypothesis 2 Almost all who referred to ‘unity’ also referred to ‘help’ Drury, Cocking, & Reicher (2009b) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters

22. ‘Helping’ (versus personal ‘selfishness’) (Helping = giving reassurance, sharing water, pulling people from the wreckage, supporting people up as they evacuated, tying tourniquets) Drury, Cocking, & Reicher (2009b) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters

23. Chile earthquake (2010) – 492 died Other evidence from emergencies challenges clichéd views of ‘irrational/ anti-social behaviour

24. Disaster myths Hurricane Katrina, Sept 2005 Initial reports of mass looting, gang-rapes, and murders in New Orleans later shown to be wildly exaggerated –crime rate actually dropped! Rare cases of aggression emerge from escalating mutual inter-group distrust (Kemmelmeier et al 2008) UK floods coverage & disaster myths http://dontpaniccorrectingmythsaboutthecrowd.b logspot.co.uk/2015/12/uk-floods-disaster- myths.html

25. Shared identity post disaster? Can shared experience of adversity endure & help post emergency? Shoreham air disaster August 2015 Paris & Brussels attacks

26. Different cultural influences? Common belief that lack of panic often due to specific local identity & ‘panic’ would happen elsewhere  Glasgow helicopter crash Nov 2013 http://dontpaniccorrectingmythsaboutthecrowd.blogspot.co.uk/2 013/11/glasgow-helicopter-crash.html http://dontpaniccorrectingmythsaboutthecrowd.blogspot.co.uk/2 013/11/glasgow-helicopter-crash.html Some minor cultural variations in responses to disasters & existing inequalities may be enhanced post disaster  Katrina, 2005, Haiti 2010 But people usually remarkably resilient 2004 Asian tsunami- co-operation between locals & tourists during emergency, but common ID diminished once danger passed

27. Potential issues… Some problematic behaviours, but usually when people cast in competition with each other & not inherent to crowds –Defining as ‘panic’ doesn’t address problem! –http://dontpaniccorrectingmythsaboutthecrowd.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/las-vegas-plane-fire- and-evacuation.htmlhttp://dontpaniccorrectingmythsaboutthecrowd.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/las-vegas-plane-fire- and-evacuation.html

28. Resilience vs vulnerability Those affected by disasters often behave much better than expected & ASB tends to decrease Cocking (2013b) While physical infrastructure & services may be compromised- ‘social capital’ often endures Remarkable communities of resilience can emerge from disasters Breakdown of social bonds often exaggerated & can become self- fulfilling prophesy

29. Social identity& crowd resilience ‘collective resilience’ refers to the way a shared identification allows groups [and crowds] of survivors to express solidarity and cohesion, and thereby to coordinate and draw upon collective sources of support and other practical resources, to deal with adversity. (Drury, Cocking & Reicher, 2009a, p. 502) As used in Department of Health (2009) NHS Emergency Planning Guidance: Planning for the Psychosocial and Mental Health Care of People Affected by Major Incidents and Disasters

30. The Politics of resilience Rhetorical nature of resilience in national emergencies But vulnerability still assumed Resilience shouldn’t be excuse for not taking public protection seriously/cutting post disaster support Resilience doesn’t mean absence of distress/disruption, but ability to bounce back if given resources to do so

31. General conclusions Little evidence for mass panic in emergencies ‘panic’ models should not be used in planning emergency responses Any selfish behaviour is confined to individuals and rarely spreads Risks associated with crowds are usually due to physical constraints & lack of info rather than any inherent irrationality/selfishness

32. References Cocking, C. (2013a) Crowd resilience during the 7/7/2005 London Bombings: Implications for the Emergency Services. International Journal of the Emergency Services, 2 (2) 79-93. Cocking, C (2013b) Collective resilience versus collective vulnerability after disasters- a Social Psychological perspective. In R. Arora (ed.) Disaster Management: A Medical Perspective. CABI: Oxford, UK. http://bookshop.cabi.org/?page=2633&pid=2433&site=191 http://bookshop.cabi.org/?page=2633&pid=2433&site=191 Cocking, C. & Drury, J. (2014) Talking about Hillsborough: ‘Panic’ as discourse in survivors’ accounts of the 1989 football stadium disaster. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 24 (2) 86-99. Drury, J., Cocking, C., & Reicher, S. (2009a) Every one for themselves? Understanding how crowd solidarity can arise in an emergency: An interview study of disaster survivors. British Journal of Social Psychology 48. Drury, J., Cocking, C., Reicher, S. (2009b) The nature of collective ‘resilience’: Survivor reactions to the July 7th (2005) London bombings. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 27 (1) 66-95.