1. Inglese 15-16 Lezz. 11-13

2. Lez. 11 9 nov. 15

3. Continuiamo a leggere da Locke, ESSAY, BOOK II, CHAPTER XXVII. OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY.

4. 7. The Identity of Man. This also shows wherein the identity of the same MAN consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in anything else, but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued, under one organization of life, in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the SAME man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar Borgia, to be the same man.

5. For if the identity of SOUL ALONE makes the same MAN; and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men, living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man, applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I think nobody, could he be sure that the SOUL of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a MAN or Heliogabalus.

6. Lez. 12 9 nov 15

7. Continuiamo a leggere da Locke, ESSAY, BOOK II, CHAPTER XXVII. OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY.

8. 11. Personal Identity. This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what PERSON stands for;--which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without PERCEIVING that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so.

9. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that which he calls SELF:--it not being considered, in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances. For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

10. Lez. 13 9 nov. 15

11. Reazioni immediate a Locke da parte di John Reid (1710-1796), Essays on the intellectual powers of men, Vescovo Joseph Butler (1692-1752), The analogy of religion, Dissertation I, of personal identity, essay 3, ch. 4, of memory

12. Importanza della teoria di Locke nel dibattito contemporaneo. Leggiamo dalla voce “personal identity” di E. Olson nella SEP

13. a past or future person is you just in the case that you (who are now a person) can now remember an experience she had then, or she can then remember an experience you are having now. Call this the memory criterion. (It is also sometimes attributed to Locke, though it is doubtful whether he actually held it: see Behan 1979.)

14. There are three main sorts of answers to the persistence question in the literature. The most popular are psychologicalcontinuity views, according to which the holding of some psychological relation is necessary or sufficient (or both) for one to persist. You are that future being that in some sense inherits its mental features—beliefs, memories, preferences, the capacity for rational thought, that sort of thing—from you; and you are that past being whose mental features you have inherited in this way. There is dispute over what sort of inheritance this has to be—whether it must be underpinned by some kind of physical continuity, for instance, or whether a “nonbranching” requirement is needed.

15. There is also disagreement about what mental features need to be inherited. (We will return to some of these points.) But most philosophers writing on personal identity since the early 20th century have endorsed some version of this view. The memory criterion mentioned earlier is an example. Advocates of psychologicalcontinuity views include Johnston (1987), Garrett (1998), Hudson (2001), Lewis (1976), Nagel (1986: 40), Noonan (2003), Nozick (1981), Parfit (1971; 1984: 207), Perry (1972), Shoemaker (1970; 1984: 90; 1997; 1999), and Unger (1990: ch. 5; 2000).

16. 12. Consciousness makes personal Identity. But it is further inquired, whether it be the same identical substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts,--I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e. the same SUBSTANCE or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not PERSONAL identity at all.