1. www.gu.se “The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht ” An influential work – why? A clear, structured theory. Strong empirical underpinnings. Positioned against common assumptions in earlier research on European integration.

2. www.gu.se The puzzle: why have governments in Europe chosen to coordinate policies and surrender sovereignty? To explain major turning points, not the day-to- day operations of the EC/EU : the “big bangs” or “grand bargains”. Focus on big countries: Germany, France, the UK. The Choice for Europe: Moravcsik’s aims

3. www.gu.se Moravcsik’s major claims on European integration Driven by commercial economic interests and by the most powerful member states. Powerful producer groups and governments. When these interests converged, integration advanced. Political economy, not “pure” economics.

4. www.gu.se Moravcsik’s theoretical framework Liberal intergovernmentalism Rational choice Governments and interest groups

5. www.gu.se Three stages of EC negotiations National preference formation: why do member state governments want what they want? Interstate bargaining: how are preferences aggregated – how are decisions taken? Institutional choice: why have member states chosen the actual institutional setup of the EC?

6. www.gu.se National preference formation “Preferences” = ranking of different alternatives. I prefer A over B over C… Preferences pertain to potential substantial outcomes: “states of the world”. Nation states generally unitary agents vis-à-vis other states, but not internally.

7. www.gu.se National preference formation Geopolitical interest and ideology or political economic interests? Geopolitical interest and ideology: balancing the superpowers, promoting peace within Europe, relations to former colonies. Political economic interests: increasing national wealth (macro-level), increasing profits for producer groups (micro-level).

8. www.gu.se National preference formation Moravcsik: primarily political economic interests. Economic officials will be the most important alongside prime ministers/presidents. The strongest and most well-organized economic interest groups will wield the most influence. Domestic cleavages according to economic factors.

9. www.gu.se Interstate bargaining How are preferences aggregated/collective decisions taken? Moravcsik: through interstate bargaining. Two components: -effectiveness (positive sum, win-win) -distribution (zero-sum, win-lose)

10. www.gu.se Interstate bargaining Supranational entrepreneurship or intergovernmental bargaining theory? Supranational entrepreneurship: supranational agents have superior access to information and steer bargaining towards more integration. Intergovernmental bargaining: governments are well-informed. Supranational agents are superfluous or counterproductive.

11. www.gu.se Interstate bargaining Moravcsik: governments are well-informed. No need for supranational entrepreneurs. Influence through asymmetrical interdependence. Those who have the most intense preferences have the least power because they are ready to compromise the most.

12. www.gu.se Institutional choice Member states want increased wealth and reach collective decisions through bargaining – but why the EC institutions? Pooling of sovereignty: decision by voting procedures other than unanimity. QMV. Delegation of sovereignty: supranational agents allowed to take autonomous decisions.

13. www.gu.se Institutional choice Federalist ideology or technical expertise or credible commitments? Federalist ideology: belief in a federal Europe. Technical expertise: the need for centralized experts and information. Credible commitments: governments want to make sure nobody backs out.

14. www.gu.se Institutional choice Moravcsik: credible commitments. To ensure agreements are implemented. To handle “incomplete contracts”. Also to avoid domestic opposition before (and after) an agreement.

15. www.gu.se Why trust Moravcsik? Three methodological principles To test alternative, falsifiable hypotheses – no “grand theory”. To multiply the number of observations to generate variation on variables within and across cases. Reliable evidence: “hard” primary sources.

16. www.gu.se For the seminar Read intensively: the introduction and the first chapter. As well as: one of the empirical chapters. Be prepared to present this chapter to the others on the seminar. Read extensively: the rest of the book.