1. Cyber Security in Smart Grids BY ADITYA KANDULA DEVASIA THOMAS

2. Quick Recap  Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)  ANSI C12.22  Security Levels(L0 to L5)  Tables in Meter Board

3. Cont’d..  Zigbee  Zigbee Security  Key Management  Key Establishment Schemes

4. The New Stuff!

5. Cyber Security Requirements  Availability  Integrity  Confidentiality

6. Cyber Security Requirements

7. Network Security threats in the Smart Grid

8. Network security threats: Attack Classification  Attacks targeting availability, also called denial-of-service(DoS) attacks, attempt to delay, block or corrupt the communication in the Smart Grid.  Attacks targeting integrity aim at deliberately and illegally modifying or disrupting data exchange in the Smart Grid.  Attacks targeting confidentiality intend to acquire unauthorized information from network resources in the Smart Grid.

9. Network Security threats: D-o-S

10. Network Security threats: Attacks on Integrity and Availability  Different from DoS, these attacks occur at the application layer.  Usually done with false data injection attacks.  Load redistribution attacks are another attack on Integrity  Wiretapping and traffic analyzers are attacks on confidentiality

11. Smart Grid Use Cases with Critical Security Requirements

12.  Distribution and transmission operation in which communication is time- critical for monitoring, control, and protection  AMI and home-area networks in which communication is primarily for interactions between customers and utilities

13. Distribution and transmission operation  Mission critical components  Hence Availability is a must

14. Distribution and transmission operation

15. Case 1  Potential Attacks:  DOS  Integrity targeting attacks

16. Distribution and transmission operation

17. Case 2  Potential Attacks:  DOS  Integrity targeting attacks

18. Distribution and transmission operation

19. Case 3  Potential Attacks:  DOS  Integrity targeting attacks

20. AMI and home area networks

21. Cases 4 & 5  Potential Attacks:  DOS  Integrity targeting attacks  Eavesdroppers and Traffic Analyzers

22. Summary: Smart Grid Threats  The distribution and transmission system in general features more time- critical yet less confidential communications.

23. Risk assessment of large-scale DoS attacks  Probabilistic risk assessment  Graph based assessment  Security metric based

24. Network countermeasures for the Smart Grid

25. Attack detection for power networks  Signal based detection  Packet based detection  Proactive detection  Hybrid detection

26. Attack detection for power networks

27. Applications of Attack Mitigation Mechanisms to Power Networks  Network-layer mitigation  Physical-layer mitigation

28. Network Layer Mitigation  Rate Limiting  Filtering  Reconfiguration

29. Physical Layer Mitigation  Coordinated Protocols  Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS)  Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)  Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS)  Uncoordinated protocols  UFHSS  UDSSS

30. Network countermeasures for the Smart Grid

31. Encryption  Asymmetric Key Cryptography  Symmetric Key Cryptography D. R.L. Brown, M. J. Campagna, S. A. Vanstone, “Security of ECQV-Certified ECDSA Against Passive Adversaries”, Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/620.

32. Authentication  High Efficiency  Tolerance to faults and attacks  Multicast Support

33. Key Management  Refer to previous presentation

34. Design of secure network protocols and architectures

35. Protocols and standards for secure power system communication  Secure DNP3  IEC 61850 and IEC 62351

36. Secure data aggregation protocols  More efficient than end to end protocols  But requires more computing resources  Homomorphic encryption used

37. Secure network architecture  Trust computing based architecture  Role-based network architecture

38. Discussions and remaining challenges

39. Conclusion THANKYOU

40. Reference  Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges  Wenye Wang  Zhuo Lu  Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27606, USA  Elsevier Computer Networks 57 (2013) 1344–1371 Elsevier Computer Networks 57 (2013) 1344–1371