4.4.2016 Congruence. Defining Congruence Congruence (symbol: ≅ ) is the state achieved by coming together, the state of agreement. The Latin congruō meaning.

4.4.2016 Congruence

Defining Congruence Congruence (symbol: ≅ ) is the state achieved by coming together, the state of agreement. The Latin congruō meaning “I meet together, I agree”. As an abstract term, congruence means similarity between objects. – Congruence, as opposed to approximation, is a relation which implies a species of equivalence

Congruence As we have seen, the veil of ignorance disconnects the argument from the OP from any given individual’s full conception of the good. – The final question addressed by TJ attempts to reconnect justice to each individual’s good, not in general, but within the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness.

A stable society is one that generates attitudes, such as are encapsulated in an effective sense of justice, that support the just institutions of that society. – If, in the well-ordered society, having those attitudes is also a good for the persons who have them, then there is a “match between justice and goodness” that Rawls calls “congruence.” TJ at 350.

In order to address this question of congruence, TJ develops an account of the good for individuals. – Chapter VII of TJ, in fact, develops a quite general theory of goodness—called “goodness as rationality”—and then applies it to the special case of the good of an individual over a complete life.

Rawls starts from the suggestion that; – “A is a good X if and only if A has the properties (to a higher degree than the average or standard X) which it is rational to want in an X, given what X’s are used for, or expected to do, and the like (whichever rider is appropriate).”

To work out this suggestion for the case of the good for persons, Rawls influentially developed and deployed the notion of a “life plan.” – A rational plan of life for an individual, he argued, is answerable to certain principles of “deliberative rationality.” These Rawls sets out in a low-key way that masks the power and originality of his formulations. TJ at 359-72.

Rawls’s argument for congruence—that having an effective sense of justice built around the principles of Justice as Fairness will be a good for each individual—is a complex and philosophically deep one.

It appeals to at least four types of intermediate good, each of which may be presumed to be of value to just about everyone: – (i) the development and exercise of complex talents (which Rawls’s “Aristotelian Principle” presumes to be a good for human beings), TJ at 374, – (ii) autonomy – (iii) community – (iv) the unity of the self.

Rawls’s argument for congruence is spread out across many sections of TJ. Some of its main threads are pulled together by Samuel Freeman in his contribution to The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Freeman (2003).

With regard to autonomy, to supplement the positive argument flowing from the Kantian interpretation of the OP, Rawls argues that the type of objectivity claimed for the principles of Justice as Fairness is not at odds with the idea of the autonomous establishment of principles. TJ at sec. 78. He further argues that Justice as Fairness supports the kind of tightly-knit community he calls “a social union of social unions,” marked by the shared purpose or “common aim of cooperating together to realize their own and another’s nature in ways allowed by the principles of justice.” – Gemeinschaften

He notes the advantages of a conception of the unity of the self that hangs, instead, on the regulative status of principles of justice. TJ at secs. 83-85. The cumulative effect of these appeals to the development of talent, autonomy, community, and the unity of the self is to support the claim of Justice as Fairness to congruence.

In a well-ordered society corresponding to Justice as Fairness, Rawls concludes, an effective sense of justice is a good for the individual who has it. – In TJ, this congruence between justice and goodness is the main basis for concluding that individual citizens will wholeheartedly accept the principles of justice as fairness.

Area of Contention: Understanding the Distinction between the Public and the Private in the thought of Rawls

The 4 Different Categories of Relationships for Rawls For Rawls, there are actually four different categories of relationships: the political, associational, familial, and personal. Each has its own potential for genuine choice, and distinctively interacts with the reasonable and the rational.

Allowing for Dissent in the Well Ordered Society Rawls allows for a broad spectrum of comprehensive doctrines in the well-ordered society. – For example, Rawls is willing to admit into the well-ordered society “various religious sects [which] oppose the culture of the modern world and wish to lead their common life apart from its unwanted influences” (p. 199, PL).

The Freedom of Association– What about cults and fundamentalist religious sects ? What about fundamentalist religious sects, or even religious value systems that are at odds with Rawls theory?? – For Rawls, these groups should be tolerated in the well-ordered society, so long as their members abide by the political conception of justice and are willing to defend their public claims on grounds acceptable to those who do not affirm their comprehensive doctrine. Clearly this is absurd.

Basically you can have whatever ‘crazy’ views as you would like, SO LONG AS you can defend them according to Rawls understanding of Justice and keep them in the private sphere (i.e. inside your Church, Temple, or Mosque). – This also makes it apparent that you have no right to any political power to realize your vision of ‘the good’ either.

Example: The Islamic Society In an Islamic society, the reis-ulema, and/or council of religious clerics, are always comprised of by MUSLIMS– Basically if you are not a Muslim, regardless of the level of knowledge you have, you are not allowed to be a religious jurist or reis-ulema.

This is a direct violation of Rawls’ ‘equality of opportunity principle.’ However, can one really envision allowing atheists who happen to posses a reasonable amount of knowledge on Islam and fiqh to be a religious jurist? – Even if you can, within Islam’s rules on who can be a religious jurist or Imam, one MUST profess Shahadah and a deep belief in Islam

What if your religious value systems conception of justice stands at odds with Rawls’ principles of justice? What if you believe in a foundationalist religious discourse that categorically forbids certain groups from holding certain offices, or discriminates between believers and disbelievers? Let’s look briefly at the case of Islam The jizyah as one example… Is this not an act of discrimination at some level? Only certain people have to pay it based solely on their beliefs.

Ali Allawi on where justice derives from in Islam ‘A root principle in the world view of Islam is that no individual or social group, if it seeks harmony and justice, can assume the absolute power to determine its own ethical standards of conduct.’

Allawi continues… ‘An ethical system of dynamic stability and justice must derive its coordinates from outside itself.’ – ‘Life must derive from the ‘life-giver’ (al-Hayy); power, from the ‘power-giver’ (al-Qadir); and knowledge from the ‘knowledge-giver’ (al-‘Alim). Only then can individuals and groups be guided and constrained by the only permanently legitimate form of authority.’ (Allawi, 2009: 13)

The Universalizing tendency in Liberalism in General Furthermore, Rawls requires that these sects allow that children are educated so that they understand the public principles of justice, and their education “should prepare them to be fully cooperative members of society and enable them to be self-supporting” (p. 199, PL). – Basically, even if you object to Rawls’ conception of justice, in his society, you would still have to send you kids to a school that indoctrinates them in the dominant state ideology, which in this case is his version of liberalism.

Look at France– Total hypocrisy. – Promotes ‘freedom of expression’ then bans the niqab as a violation of ‘French Values’ – Look at Charlie Hebdo– Journalists allowed to mock Islam in the name of ‘free expression’ but are punished and criticized as being anti-Semetic when mocking Israel and Judaism which both have been embraced in the post WWII liberal social and political discourse.

18.4.16– Michael Sandel

Who is Michael Sandel? Professor Dr. Michael Sandel was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota and his family moved Los Angeles when he was thirteen. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Brandeis University with a bachelor's degree in politics (1975). He received his doctorate from Balliol College, Oxford, as a Rhodes Scholar, where he studied under philosopher Charles Taylor. He published ‘Liberalism and the Limits of Justice’ at the age 29 (!!!) and it is perhaps the most important critique of Rawls work. He has been a tenured Professor Dr. at Harvard for over 20 years and is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences He is also widely known as one of Harvard’s very best lecturers.

Michael Sandel Sandel argues that Rawls' theory of justice requires that the person or moral subject be an abstract agent of choice, completely separate from her ends, personal attributes, community, or history. Only by adopting this notion of the person does Rawls' theory of justice make sense.

After describing the theory of the person to which he finds Rawls committed, Sandel claims that Rawls-and deontological liberalism generally-fail because of the inadequacy and extreme individualism of this notion of the person. – This individualism does not allow for the role of community in constituting the person, nor does it allow for the possibility that a person's meaningful identity is more a matter of cognition than choice.

Allawi on the Universalizing nature of liberalism According to Ali Allawi “In many ways, the prized tolerance of these [Western] societies has an obverse side in the form of an intolerance or disregard for other civilizations, which may not subscribe to the ‘universal’ nature of western values.” (Allawi, 2009: 172)

Sandel argues that the theory of the person to which Rawls is committed is inconsistent with Rawls' difference principle. – The difference principle requires that basic societal institutions maximize the position of the worst off.

Sandel claims that if the moral subject is an individual, then the difference principle will involve the conscription of some people's talents in order to benefit the worst off; the difference principle thereby treats those subjects as means.

Only a group or community subject could both choose the difference principle and, since each person's talents would belong to this larger subject, avoid treating the moral subject as a means. Thus, the Rawlsian theory of the moral subject as an individuated person is inadequate to support his theory of the right.

Sandel's second critique emphasizes that Rawls is committed to a thin, denuded notion of the person-a person separate from all ends, commitments, and capacities. This self is so sparse that it cannot constitute an object for self-reflection. It can only be a subject that is, at most, capable of arbitrary and ultimately meaningless choice.

The arbitrariness and meaninglessness of this choice result in another fault-an inadequate theory of the good. In combination these two critiques argue that Rawls' notion of the person is neither appealing, consistent with our understanding and experience of ourselves, nor adequate to support Rawls' theory of justice. Specifically, the Rawlsian theory is inconsistent with selves who are constituted by their values, character, commitments, and practices, who are partially constituted by their membership and participation in communities, or who engage in deep self-reflection.

20.4.16– Continuing with Sandel Sandel critiques Rawls’ “Thin Theory of the Good” – The thin and full theories differ in two respects. – First, they differ in the resources on which they draw. The full theory “takes the principles of justice as already secured” (TJ, p. 349) and so draws on those principles to account for goodness, while the thin theory does not.

– This difference leads to the second difference, which is one of scope. The thin theory can account for the value of some goods, such as the primary goods. Indeed, Rawls says that he introduces the thin theory precisely to account for the value of those goods (TJ, p. 347), though we shall see later that the thin theory can account for the value of other goods as well. Because the full theory draws on more philosophical resources than the thin theory does, it can account for values that the thin theory cannot.

Sandel, p.25

Justice as fairness– this is something that is meant to be an empirically quantifiable category. Justice is meant to operate based on Rawls overall framework… he points to the example of how deliberations in the family take place…however, lets take a closer look at this…

Are family deliberations and agreements good examples of ‘Justice as Fairness”? Of course not… let think of a time when mom or dad gave us an extra piece of burek or köfte just because they ‘loved us’ – Is this actually fair?– however, is it necessary ‘bad’?? – Is justice ever truly fair? Do we even necessarily want ‘perfect fairness’ or even actual justice in ALL cases?? Sometimes we actually benefit from things being unfair and things work out better for everyone!

69% attendance example If you have 69% attendance but a 99% grade going into the final exam, however the RULES are anything less than 70% attendance is an automatic failure Under Justice as Fairness--- what would you grade be?

Sorry, but… F

Here we can see ‘Justice as Fairness’ perfectly at work Perhaps, even though it is ‘not perfectly fair’ so to speak, I act unfairly and give you the A+ grade instead… We call this ‘altruism’ or doing something for the sake of just ‘being nice’

Sandel, 34 An increase in justice can fail to be associated with an overall moral improvement in at least two different ways: – 1) by failing to fully meet an increase in the circumstance in justice – 2) by an inability, however full, to compensate the loss of certain ‘nobler virtues, and more favourable blessings.’

Susan Moeller Okin First we need to discuss Rawls on the Family

Rawls contends that the family is a part of the basic structure in Society. Families perform an essential role in reproducing society and culture. The task demands fair terms of cooperation and the application of principles of justice.

For example, through families, society reproduces the next generation of citizens, an important task in which everyone has a stake. – But members of families also pursue private, rational ends. These can include economic goals (such as purchasing a house), leisure pursuits, bonds of affection, and diverse sexual expressions.

According to Rawls, equal opportunity can limit the pursuit of diverse rational goals. – For example, “special provisions... in family law (and no doubt elsewhere)” can ensure “that the burden of bearing, raising, and educating children does not fall more heavily on women, thereby undermining their fair equality of opportunity.

Is the family a public of private institution for Rawls? At times Rawls, in fact, treats the family as public and identifies it as part of society’s basic structure. At other times, he characterizes the family as private or associational, and as operating according to affectionate rather than coercive principles.

The Feminist Critique of Rawls distinction between the public and the private Feminists takes issue precisely with the distinction Rawls draws between the public/political and non-public/non-political. There are two main ways that feminists have questioned the public/private distinction: – (a) by doubting whether a principled and non-sexist distinction can really be drawn between the allegedly public and the allegedly private – (b) by doubting that the family is really private, even if the public/private distinction can be sensibly drawn.

Feminists are not only troubled by families that adopt explicitly sexist or patriarchal comprehensive doctrines. They are also troubled by ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ families that do not avow explicitly sexist or patriarchal comprehensive doctrines. Rawls assumes in A Theory of Justice that most families are, by and large, characterized by fairness and by relationships of love and trust. And in Political Liberalism, Rawls reaffirms this claim: “I do assume that in some form the family is just” (p. xxix, PL). – But he offers no evidence or argument for the claim that the contemporary form of the family is just.

Is the Institution of the Family actually ‘just’??? Feminist critics of Rawls, on the other hand, have doubted whether the institution of the family as we know it is just. Specifically, they have wondered whether the family as characterized by a gendered division of labor is just. – Historically, women have assumed a disproportionately large share of housework and childcare within families. – This is still true today, even in households where both the wife and husband work full-time.

Would it even be agreed to as an institution from the Original Position under the veil of Ignorance??? Considering the institution of the family from the Original Position asks us to consider whether parties in a situation of initial fairness would approve the family as an element in the basic structure of the well-ordered society. The first perspective assumes that the family is already part of the basic structure and asks whether or not adult women are free to participate in it.

To consider the family from the perspective of the Original Position, in contrast, asks us to consider whether the family as we know it should be revised or even eliminated. One might think that the Original Position does not recommend the typical gendered family. – It seems, that is, unlikely that free and equal individuals acting behind the veil of ignorance would choose an institution in which it might turn out that they had responsibility for the greatest share of unpaid labor while being made economically vulnerable in the process.

Susan Moeller Okin (1946-2004) Susan Moeller Okin held that “the family is a social institution that defies [Rawls’] political/nonpolitical dichotomy” (p. 27, Okin 1994). Okin believes that the family is BOTH a political and nonpolitical social institution at the same time

Okin believed that people like Rawls wrote from a male perspective that wrongly assumes that the institution of the family is just. She believes that the family perpetuates gender inequalities throughout all of society, particularly because children acquire their values and ideas in the family's sexist setting, then grow up to enact these ideas as adults. If a theory of justice is to be complete, Okin asserts that it must include women and it must address the gender inequalities she believes are prevalent in modern-day families.

In Okin’s account, the family is political in at least two ways: (i) Questions of power, distribution of resources, and differences of interest are at least as relevant within families as they are outside of families (ii) Families have significant social and political effects. As Rawls has it, elements of the basic structure have, “deep and long-term social effects and in fundamental ways shape citizen’s character and aims, the kinds of persons they are and aspire to be” (p. 68, PL).

It is, furthermore, plausible to think that the family has greater influence on the character and aims of individuals than other elements of the basic structure, such as the structure of markets. Thus, Okin holds that the family should not be immune to the principles of justice in the well- ordered society.

Understanding Okin’s criticism here helps Defenders of Rawls (including Rawls himself) have alleged that Okin misunderstands justice as fairness by arguing that, since families are part of the basic structure, they should be strongly subject to the principles of justice. These defenders point out that since Rawlsian liberalism allows that institutions can be part of the basic structure without being internally ordered by the principles of justice/ – there is no reason to think that the family must be internally ordered by the principles of justice.

That is, individual families need not be accountable to the public conception of justice but may be largely autonomous in how they are organized, how family decisions are made, and how family resources are allocated.

These responses, however, miss the force of Okin’s objection. It is true that if the institution of the family, as we know it, is to be retained in the well-ordered society, it will be largely autonomous. But this response begs the question against the feminist critics of Rawls. – Feminists wonder precisely whether an institution like the contemporary family should be retained in the well-ordered society, or whether the well-ordered society should revise or replace the institution of the family as we know it.

Defenders of Rawlsian liberalism, then, cannot simply assert that the family is nonpublic and thus is only subject to minimal constraints from the principles of justice. They must justify regarding the family as a non-public institution in this way.

Mary Barbara Walsh Defense of Rawls Rawls’s principles of justice provide a three- pronged attack against women’s oppression in the family. – First, his principles of justice clarify the background conditions conducive to justice in families. – Second, they induce the oppressed to combat their subordination and create just social institutions. – Third, these principles provide oppressed members of families with the resources and education essential to combating their oppression.

Rawls’ Difference Principle empowers the oppressed, expands options for escape, and respects the individual and the possibility of choice.

May 9 th, 2016 Today we will talk about the difference between Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivism This question is an essential one in which politics and modes of action hinge upon. – What are ethics? – Where does morality derive? – What type of ethics is most appropriate for a given society?

Moral Relativism vs Moral Objectivism Moral Relativism: The view that what is morally right or wrong depends on what someone thinks. (To which the claim that opinions vary substantially about right and wrong is usually added.)

We can think of this position as coming in two flavours: – (a) Subjectivism: What is morally right or wrong for you depends on what you think is morally right or wrong, i.e., right or wrong is relative to the individual. The 'moral facts' may alter from person to person. – (b) Conventionalism: What is morally right or wrong depends on what the society we are dealing with thinks, i.e., morality depends on the conventions of the society we are concerned with. The 'moral facts' may alter from society to society.

Moral Relativism has become an increasingly popular view in the latter part of this century. Why?

A couple of possible reasons: (i) The Decline of Religion – Religion seems to offer the possibility that morality was independent of us. With a turning away from religion there seems to have come a certain amount of doubt about the possibility of objective morality. – As Dostoevsky famously wrote "If God doesn't exist, everything is permissible". But does it make sense to say that if there's no God, there's no such thing as morality?

Not really… Think back to the Euthyphro problem. – This was a dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro that sought to define ‘piety’ Euthyphro offered 5 definition but none of the were good enough for Socrates, in the end, he gives up and leaves. What we saw was that it is not as though believing there is a God makes it obvious why some things are right and others are wrong.

If we join Euthyphro in saying that God loves the things, He does because they are good, then we are saying that things are good (or bad) independently of God, and so, presumably, independently of whether God exists or not. Perhaps defined religious systems like Islam, Judaism, and Christianity do explain this in greater detail, but ‘deism’ or ‘theism’ as formulated simply as ‘I believe in God’ does not

(ii) Observing Cultural Diversity: Most of us are aware that the world contains many different cultures and that some of those cultures engage in practices very different from our own. Some people, notably the anthropologist Ruth Benedict, have argued that given all this diversity, we should conclude that there is no single objective morality and that morality varies with culture.

Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) Benedict, in Patterns of Culture, expresses her belief in cultural relativism. She desired to show that each culture has its own moral imperatives that can be understood only if one studies that culture as a whole.

Moral Relativism It was wrong, she felt, to disparage the customs or values of a culture different from one's own. – Those customs had a meaning to the people who lived them which should not be dismissed or trivialized. We should not try to evaluate people by our standards alone. Morality, she argued, was relative to the values of the culture in which one operated

Is this a good argument for moral relativism? Again, not really. First of all, we might dispute whether there is really as much diversity of belief about morality as folks like Benedict say. But even if there is, notice that it is a mistake to conclude based upon differing opinions about morality, that there are no facts about morality.

Imagine this argument being offered approximately 500 years ago: "There is widespread disagreement about the shape of the earth. Some people say it's flat, others say it's spherical, some have even suggested it's a cube. What can we conclude, except that there is really no fact of the matter about what the shape of the earth is?"

Moving on to Moral Objectivism The lesson to take from all this is that, while moral relativism might be a correct theory, if it is, it isn't for either of these reasons. You need to do more work than this if you want to be a moral relativist. In particular, you need to confront: Moral Objectivism

Moral Objectivism The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are.

Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts: Deontological and Utilitarian Theories (i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is. – E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law. – What would the Islamic Equivalent to this be? (ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences.

Utilitarianism is the best known sort of Consequentialism. Its best known defender is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). – Essentially, utilitarianism tells us that, in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall. (The wrong thing to do is anything else.)

Who's right here? That's clearly a very difficult question to answer. But here's what we can conclude: it's intellectually lazy (and perhaps false) to say 'morality is all just a matter of opinion‘ Who do you think is right and why?

Moral Objectivism and Moral Absolutism Moral objectivism: There is a fact of the matter as to whether any given action is morally permissible or impermissible: a fact of the matter that does not depend solely on social custom or individual acceptance Moral absolutism: There is at least one principle that ought never to be violated. – Ethical theories which place strong emphasis on rights and duty, such as the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant, are often forms of moral absolutism, as are many religious moral codes

Robert Nozick (1938-2002)--Justice as Entitlement (Anarchy, State, and Utopia)

In these upcoming lectures, we will address the following topics…  Libertarianism  Nozick vs. Rawls  Property rights  The labor theory of property  The Lockean proviso  The entitlement theory of justice  History and pattern  Liberty upsets patterns  Taxation and redistribution  Criticisms

Libertarianism  Libertarianism starts from the thought that, as far as possible, government should be kept out of individual lives.  Government should not tell people what they can and cannot do, as long as they respect the rights of others.

Libertarianism  In particular, libertarianism opposes coercive forms of redistribution of wealth and income.  Libertarians argue that it is illegitimate for the state (government) to seize the wealth of some and present it to others.

Libertarianism  Robert Nozick’s libertarianism starts from the fundamental premise that individuals have equal natural rights against force, theft and fraud.  These individual rights, Nozick argues, permit only a ‘minimal state’, i.e. one whose power should be limited to the protection of people’s existing rights.

Libertarianism  Notably, all individuals are entitled to the right to private ownership of property, which includes the rights to possess, use, exchange, and gain income from trades of property in a market, without government interference, regulation or taxation.

May 11, 2016

Libertarianism  Libertarians champion the idea of ‘self- ownership’. They claim that individuals own themselves – their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the fruits or products resulting from exercising their talents, abilities and labor.

Libertarianism  Justice, Nozick argues, is about respecting people’s rights, in particular, their rights to self-ownership and their rights to property.  People must be allowed the freedom to decide what they want to do with what they own.

Nozick vs. Rawls  Rawls’ influential book A Theory of Justice (1971) is a systematic defense of egalitarianism and the welfare state, whereas Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) is a compelling defense of free-market libertarianism.

Nozick vs. Rawls  Rawls’ theory of justice requires equal basic liberties, political equality, equal opportunities, and redistribution of income and wealth from the rich to the poor, all of which, he argues, are necessary to maximize the position of the least advantaged members of society.

Nozick vs. Rawls  Nozick criticizes the idea of redistribution inherent in Rawls’ proposals.  Nozick claims that inequality of wealth and income is not unjust if it is the result of legitimate acquisition and voluntary transactions of private property.

Nozick vs. Rawls  Nozick notes that Rawls does not include property rights among the liberties protected by his first principle (the principle of equal liberty).  Nozick objects that Rawls treats wealth as if it belongs to society, to share out, rather than to its producers, in proportion to their productive contributions.

Nozick vs. Rawls  Government, in Rawls’ view, must engage in redistributive taxation in order to ensure a fair distribution of wealth and resources among its citizens.  Nozick, on the other hand, argues against redistribution through taxation and social welfare.

Nozick vs. Rawls  Nozick criticizes Rawls’ conception of justice because in order to put Rawls’ ideas into practice, government has to meddle continually with citizens’ existing property rights and voluntary exchange in the free market.

Nozick vs. Rawls  For Nozick, the only sort of government that can be morally justified is what he calls a minimal or ‘night-watchman’ state, that is, a government which protects individuals, via police and military forces, from force, fraud, and theft, and administers courts of law, but does nothing else.

Property rights  Nozick maintains that wealth and resources should never be collected together and then reallocated by a central distributor (i.e. state or government).  In a free market economy, there is no central distributor – no one should be given the right or power to control all the wealth and resources and decide how they are to be distributed.

Property rights  For Nozick, to respect people’s liberty means that there should be no restrictions on individual property holdings (i.e. property ownership).  Limiting how much property people can possess, and what they can do with it, is unjust because doing so reduces individual liberty.

Property rights  Nozick thinks that private property rights are fundamental in the sense that they are derived from ‘self-ownership’.  A person has a right to what they produce, because they own their own labor, which they invest in creating wealth.

Property rights  Each individual owns himself or herself and the property he or she has acquired in the right way (i.e. he or she has not done anything illegal to acquire it).  Property owners have no moral obligation to share their property with anyone else.

Property rights  If someone attempts to take property from its legitimate owner, the owner has the right to resist this attempt with all the force that is necessary to defend his property.

Property rights  According to Nozick, force may permissibly be used to take something back from someone who has acquired it via illegitimate means (through fraud or theft, for instance), but it is always unjust to force someone to give up something that he or she rightfully owns.

16.5.2016 Continuing with Nozick

Property rights  Nozick argues that the most important function of the minimal state is to protect people’s existing rights (liberty, self- ownership and property rights).  But it is morally impermissible for the state or government to force individuals to give up their private property (through levying taxes on them, for example).

The labor theory of property  Consider a piece of paper. It is made from wood. The trees from which that wood came might have been deliberately planted as a crop, but those saplings came from seeds, and those seeds were descended from trees which once belonged to no one.

The labor theory of property  Thus at some point an object, be it tree or seed, which belonged to no one became someone’s private property. How could that be?

The labor theory of property  The question is even more pressing in the case of land. Anyone may use unowned land. As soon as it becomes private property, however, no one may use it without the permission of the owner.  How can someone come to have the right to exclude others from using what used to be a common resource?

The labor theory of property  John Locke, the seventeenth century English philosopher, proposed that initially the world was owned in common by all human beings.  How, then, could anyone come to own anything as individual private property?

The labor theory of property  According to Locke, a person has a property in himself and in his labor. Each person has liberty to decide what he wants to do (subject to the rights of others), and a right to reap the rewards of his own labor.

The labor theory of property  Locke’s theory of property holds that a person (being a self-owner) owns his labor. By ‘mixing his labor’ with a previously unowned part of the natural world, he comes to own this natural resource.

The labor theory of property  In other words, an individual owns his labor and in laboring on an object he ‘mixes his labor’ with that object.  So long as that object is not already justly claimed by another person, he comes to own that object on which he has labored.

The labor theory of property  For Locke, a person can ‘appropriate’ an unowned natural resource – originally common property – and claim that the resource is now his own private property by mixing his labor with it.

The labor theory of property  For Locke, certain conditions must be satisfied for just appropriation of an unowned natural resource as one’s private property; namely, a person must: 1.mix his labor with it 2.not allow anything to go to waste 3.leave enough for others

The labor theory of property  Nozick notices that there is a problem with Locke’s argument: the premise that mixing your labor with land entitles you to the land cannot be morally justified.

The labor theory of property  Nozick provides a counterexample:  “If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?”

The labor theory of property  It can be argued, however, that mixing labor is not the same as mixing tomato juice.  In laboring on land one massively increases its value. This can be a reason why laboring entitles the laboror to appropriate cultivated land.

The labor theory of property  But this argument too has an obvious difficulty. The laboror may have the right to keep the ‘added value’ (i.e. the fruit of his labor) but not the land itself.  The land is not part of the added value; it was there before the laboror came to work on it.

The labor theory of property  If land is scarce then all of it would have been taken by those first to stake their claim by labor.  Those born to a later generation, unable to find land of their own, may complain that they have been unjustly treated in comparison with those who have inherited land.

The labor theory of property  Before a natural resource comes to be appropriated by an individual, everyone is at liberty to use it.  Once it becomes an individual’s property, this liberty of non-owners is canceled. Others cannot use it without the owner’s permission.

The labor theory of property  Why should anything I do to an object overturn your previous liberty to use it?  It is very hard to find an answer; thus it is very hard to find a satisfactory principle of justice in acquisition (i.e. just appropriation of natural resources as private property).

The Lockean proviso  Nozick uses as a starting point Locke’s approach to justice in property acquisition – namely, that ownership of an object originates in one’s mixing of labor with that object.  He then draws attention to some difficulties in Locke’s labor theory of property.

The Lockean proviso  Why does mixing one’s labor with something make one the owner of it?  Why should one’s entitlement (ownership) extend to the whole object rather than just the added value one’s labor has produced?

The Lockean proviso  Nozick notices that Locke imposed, as a condition on appropriation of a natural resource, that ‘enough and as good’ should be left for others.  The ‘Lockean proviso’: Natural resources, such as land, come to be rightfully owned by the first person to appropriate it, as long as he has left ‘enough and as good’ for others.

The Lockean proviso  Nozick reinterprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that no individual should be made worse off by the appropriation of a natural resource.  The ‘Nozickean proviso’: Acquisition is just so long as no one’s condition is worsened by someone’s appropriation of a natural resource.

The Lockean proviso  In other words, individuals may justly appropriate a natural resource that is not owned by anyone if doing so does not have any bad consequences for others.  The Nozickean proviso expresses the idea that one’s natural rights to property extend only as far as exercising them does not harm others.

The Lockean proviso  Once an item is owned, others cannot use it without the permission of the owner.  However, because having exclusive rights over a natural resource might motivate its owner to improve it, which might in turn benefit others in various ways. Thus, the advantages of private property ownership may outweigh its disadvantages.

The Lockean proviso  Counterexample: Person X can satisfy Nozick’s proviso by ‘appropriating’ a beach and charging $1 admission to those who previously were able to use the beach for free, so long as Person X compensates them with a benefit they deem equally valuable, such as a clean up or life- guarding service on the beach…

The Lockean proviso  …However, the beach-goers would have been even better off if the beach had been appropriated or acquired by a more efficient organizer, Person Y, who would have only charged 50 cents for the same service. But this alternative is never considered under Nozick's proviso.

The entitlement theory of justice  For Nozick, an ‘entitlement’ (property ownership) is a just holding (possession), and a just holding can come about in either of the two following ways: [1] direct acquisition by the holder, or [2] transfer from some other person or persons through voluntary exchange or gift.

The entitlement theory of justice  Nozick defends what he calls a theory of entitlement (or property rights) according to which all holdings which have been acquired in a justifiable manner, or gained through voluntary exchange with those who acquired their holdings in a justifiable manner, are just.

The entitlement theory of justice  Nozick’s entitlement theory is concerned with ‘justice in holdings’.  It is formulated to assess the holdings of any given person at any given time to determine whether they are justly possessed by that person.

The entitlement theory of justice  For Nozick, there are three major topic areas of justice: 1.original acquisition of holdings 2.transfer of holdings 3.the rectification of injustice in holdings

The entitlement theory of justice  Accordingly, Nozick’s entitlement theory consists of 3 propositions: a.A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.

The entitlement theory of justice b.A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. c.No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of [a] and [b].

The entitlement theory of justice  The first proposition [a] is an account of justice in initial acquisition, which explains how anyone can be the first owner of property.  The first claimant is entitled to a holding provided that no one would be made worse off by the acquisition of it (i.e. the Nozickean proviso).

The entitlement theory of justice  The second proposition [b] is a principle of justice in transfer, which explains how property may pass from one legitimate owner to another.  The owner has the right to give property away as a gift or in exchange for something else as he or she sees fit. By contrast, theft, fraud or breach of contract violates the principle of transfer.

The entitlement theory of justice  The final proposition [c] would be a principle of justice in rectification, governing the proper means of setting right past injustices in acquisition and transfer.  It would require, for example, that stolen goods be returned to the legitimate owner.

The entitlement theory of justice  Not all holdings are just entitlements: a holding can be acquired unjustly, by theft or fraud, for example.  A person is entitled to a holding only if it has been justly acquired or justly transferred. If a holding has arisen from a past injustice, it is just to ‘rectify’ it.

The entitlement theory of justice  To sum up: Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice asserts that anyone who owns property in a manner consistent with the three principles (justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and justice in rectification) is justly entitled to it.

The entitlement theory of justice  A distribution of wealth in a society as a whole is a just distribution if everyone in that society is entitled to what he or she has, i.e. has gotten his or her holdings in accordance with the principles of acquisition, transfer, and rectification.  It is just no matter how equal or unequal it happens to be.

History and pattern  According to Nozick, there are 3 kinds of principles of justice: 1.historical principles of justice 2.end-state principles of justice 3.patterned principles of justice  Nozick’s principles are ‘historical’ yet ‘unpatterned.’ He rejects all other principles of justice.

History and pattern  Nozick advocates a ‘historical’ conception of justice: “The entitlement theory of justice in distribution is historical; whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about.”

History and pattern  Nozick distinguishes what he calls ‘historical’ and ‘end-state’ (non-historical) theories of justice.  An end-state theory of justice supposes that we can determine whether a distribution is just without considering how people acquire their wealth or resources.

History and pattern  A historical theory, on the other hand, supposes that to determine whether a distribution is just, we need to take into consideration how people came to possess their wealth and resources.

History and pattern  For Nozick, justice is historical in the sense that a just distribution of resources is simply the result of people’s exercising their freedom of choice with respect to investment, consumption and giving.

History and pattern  Patterned theories of justice say that just distribution should be the result of conforming to some pattern (or principle) such as ‘an equal share for everyone’ or ‘to each according to his need.’  John Rawls’ difference principle, for example, can be regarded as a ‘patterned’ principle of justice.

History and pattern  Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice is historical yet unpatterned: the justice of a distribution is determined by certain historical circumstances (contrary to end- state theories), but it has nothing to do with fitting any pattern.

History and pattern  For Nozick, a particular distributive pattern is not required for justice.  The free market is just, not as a means to some pattern, but insofar as the transactions permitted in the market satisfy the conditions of just (voluntary) exchange.

History and pattern  According to Nozick’s entitlement theory, a distribution is just (i.e. everyone is rightfully entitled to his or her holdings) if and only if everyone’s private property is owned through a sequence of transactions in accordance with the principles of just acquisition and just transfer.

History and pattern  Whether a distribution is just depends on how it came about. If it came about in accordance with the rules of acquisition, transfer and rectification, then it is not unjust, however unequal it may be.

History and pattern  In short, Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice is historical yet unpatterned. All other theories of justice are either non- historical or patterned and therefore must be rejected.

Liberty upsets pattern  Nozick points out that if a patterned distribution were established at any given moment, it would of necessity be destroyed if individuals could freely (and hence unpredictably) transfer some of their holdings to others by means of purchases, gifts, loans, etc.

Liberty upsets pattern  To maintain a patterned distribution, government would have to ban certain transactions in the free market, or constantly intervene in the market to redistribute property. Either way, a pattern can only be enforced at the expense of individual rights and liberties.

Liberty upsets pattern  Imagine a society in which the distribution of wealth fits a particular pattern. Suppose, for simplicity’s sake, that it is an equal distribution (everyone gets an equal share of income). Let us call it D1.

25.5.2016 Concluding Nozick!

Liberty upsets pattern  Among the members of this society is Wilt Chamberlain, a famous basketball player. Knowing his popularity with spectators, Chamberlain signs up for a team in a contract stipulating that for each game played at the home ground he is to receive twenty-five cents from the price of every ticket sold.

Liberty upsets pattern  Suppose further that over the course of the season, one million fans decide to pay the twenty-five cents to watch him play. The result will be a new distribution, D2, in which Chamberlain now has earned $250,000, much more than anyone else – a distribution which thereby breaks the original pattern established in D1.

Liberty upsets pattern  Is the new distribution D2 just? Nozick’s answer is ‘Yes’. Why? Because everyone who gave up twenty-five cents in the transition from D1 to D2 did so voluntarily, and thus has no grounds for complaint; and those who did not want to pay to see Chamberlain play still have their twenty- five cents, so they have no grounds for complaint either.

Liberty upsets pattern  If D1 is just, and people voluntarily moved from D1 to D2, then, Nozick argues, surely D2 is also just.  But once we have conceded this, then we have admitted that there can be just distributions which do not conform to the original pattern. So all patterned conceptions of justice must be rejected.

Liberty upsets pattern  The Wilt Chamberlain example shows that a distribution (such as D2) can be just even if it does not follow a particular pattern.  Free choice of action is essential to justice, and such freedom will always upset any patterned principle of distributive justice.

Liberty upsets pattern  Nozick argues that any attempt to impose a pattern of holdings will violate individual liberty.  In order to preserve a pattern, it would be necessary to either prohibit people from making pattern-breaking transactions, or forcibly redistribute property on a regular basis (to restore the original pattern).

Taxation and redistribution  In Nozick’s view, taxation is equivalent to forced labor.  Taxing earnings is, in effect, forcing taxpayers to work unpaid. To take the fruit of one person’s labor for the benefit of another is effectively to make one person work for another against his will.

Taxation and redistribution  Taking a proportion of people’s earnings is like making them spend a proportion of their time working for the benefit of others.  Taxation by the state for the provision of social welfare – a forced transfer – is therefore unjust.

Taxation and redistribution  Each individual possesses inviolable rights that all others, including the state, must respect. To take property away from people in order to redistribute it violates their private property rights.

Taxation and redistribution  The functions of Nozick’s ideal ‘minimal state’ are limited to the protection against force, theft, fraud, and the enforcement of contracts.  Redistributive taxation violates people’s property rights, and therefore must be rejected.

Criticisms  Nozick’s position rests on the claim that property rights are in some way absolute.  His theory of entitlement appears to rest on the dubious assumption that rights of self-ownership can be extended to include rights over natural resources.

Criticisms  One might agree with Nozick that a person has the right to decide what should happen to his or her own self, but at the same time refuses to extend this reasoning to claims over natural resources.

Criticisms  Nozick himself ultimately acknowledges that his entitlement theory is inadequate, since it can never be demonstrated that existing holdings actually result from an unbroken series of voluntary transfers.

Criticisms  History shows that a great deal of initial acquisition of property was unjust, based on theft, exploitation, slavery and colonization.  All property that derives from unjust acquisition is unjustly held.

Criticisms  It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to rectify the injustice of the past. We often have no way of establishing what rightfully belongs to whom.  So Nozick’s theory has no application unless we could map out the history of every property ownership and transfer from the very beginning down to the present.

Criticisms  Another objection to Nozick’s view is that taxation is not the same as forcing taxpayers to work unpaid for the needy.  Forced unpaid labor would violate the right to freedom of occupation, but taxation of earnings is compatible with that right.

Criticisms  A further reason why Nozick’s theory is controversial is that it could justify very unequal distributions of property.  It can be argued, for example, that economic inequality is likely to produce unequal political influence, which undermines democracy.

Criticisms  Nozick claims that whatever distribution resulting from voluntary transactions is just, no matter how unequal it is.  However, voluntary transactions over time produce inequalities that are unjust. For example, economic inequalities produce inequalities of opportunity for children from different family backgrounds.

Criticisms  Supporters of the welfare state would argue that property must be redistributed from the wealthy to the less fortunate to ensure equal liberty for all.  By increasing the income of the poor, redistribution allows them to have a wider range of choices that they would not otherwise have.

Joseph J. Kaminski International University of Sarajevo 30.5.2016 Why Not Liberalism?—A Deeper Reflection on the Incompatibilities of Liberalism and the Muslim Mindset at the Ontological and Epistemological Levels

Origins of this project My recently completed manuscript, Reconceptualizing a Contemporary Islamic Governed State—Connecting Theory to Practice in the 21 st Century (Provisionally Accepted by Khaled Abou El Fadl for his series on Islamic Theology, History, and Law at Palgrave Macmillan), offered a normative discursive framework for conceptualizing an Islamic governed state. This is basically an expansion of the 2nd chapter that argues that Islam is deeply incompatible with Liberalism at an Ontological and Epistemological level

Major Efforts to show compatibilities between Islam and Liberalism There have been many works that have made efforts to show compatibilities between Liberalism and Islam, most notably Leonard Binder’s ‘Islamic Liberalism’ (1988) and Nader Hashemi’s ‘Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Islamic Societies’ (2009).

Andrew March and ‘Overlapping Consensus’ Andrew March’s, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus (Oxford, 2009) that argued that, utilizing John Rawls notion of an ‘overlapping consensus’ that one could articulate a way in which Muslims can live peacefully and co-exist in non-Muslim societies.

An Overlapping Consensus An overlapping consensus refers to how supporters of different comprehensive normative doctrines—that entail apparently inconsistent conceptions of justice—can agree on particular principles of justice that underwrite a political community's basic social institutions. – Comprehensive doctrines can include systems of religion, political ideology, or morality.

March suggests that within Islam’s broader discursive framework is a notion of overlapping consensus, in which Muslim’s are instructed to live peacefully in Non-Muslim nations, so long as they are not openly oppressed. There are also numerous stipulations that note that Muslim’s are to provide protection for those non-Muslim citizens who pay the jizya tax.

The Larger Question: Despite the compatibility in many ways with Rawls notion of an overlapping consensus with Islam, does this actually mean liberalism, as a discursive framework is appropriate for a society steeped in an Islamic ontological and epistemological worldview?

The Key Postulates of Liberalism The constitution was the jewel in the crown of the new world. The individual would no longer be an object of domination, but rather a subject vested with rights; a citizen. Reciprocity, rather than artificially imposed forms of hierarchy would define the formal relations between individuals. Each would be a part of an undertaking intent on constraining the arbitrary exercise of power under the liberal idea of ‘the rule of law.’ (Bronner, 1999: 26)

The Enlightenment European Enlightenment scholars have argued that one of the most undeniable fundamental guiding principles of the Enlightenment was the notion that laws were created by men, for men. (Gay, 1969; Bronner 1995; Bronner, 1999, and Himmelfarb, 2004)

Revelation was no longer a valid source of laws within the new Enlightenment discourse—secularism was the widely held battle cry amongst the Enlightenment’s more radical figures such as Diderot and Voltaire. In the words of Harvey Cox, secularism could best be understood as, ‘the liberation of man from religious and metaphysical tutelage, the turning of his attention away from other worlds and toward this one.” (Cox, 1966: 17) – This stands in stark contrast to the basic Islamic worldview which does place primacy on revelation as a primary source of laws.

Nader Hashemi on how an Islamic society can come to embrace liberal democracy I have argued that political development does not require the privatization or marginalization of religion from the public sphere, but in order for religious groups to make a lasting contribution to democratic consolidation, a reinterpretation of religious ideas with respect to individual rights and the moral bases of legitimate political authority is needed. In short, the contribution religious groups can make to the development of democracy is often a function of their ability to undertake some form of doctrinal reformulation in this direction. (Hashemi, 2009: 173)

Thinking through Hashemi’s Proposition Based on Hashemi’s proposition, a liberal- democratic state in the Muslim world should be allowed to have religious political parties and/or groups; however these religious parties and/or groups need to undertake some form of doctrinal reformulation—which means abandoning certain elements that are understood as constitutive of the Islamic religious value system itself.

John Locke The basis of Locke’s social contract derived from the introduction of private property into the previously unclaimed state of nature. – “Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” (Locke [§27], quoted in Cox (Ed.), 1982: 18)

Pre-Political/Not Pre-Moral The state of nature for Locke was pre-political, but it was not pre-moral. Locke believed that within the state of nature, there already existed the Law of Nature that was the basis of all morality. “And reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” (Locke [§6], quoted in Cox (Ed.), 1982: 4) This implies that man did not need actually need ‘a state’ to live a moral life.

In Islam a state is necessary to live a moral life 1) While Maturidi’s believe man is capable of understanding some moral laws without the aid of revelation, the more widely held Ash‛ari/ ‛Athari position holds than man is not capable of this. Man is born in a state of fiṭrah, or innate goodness for both Ibn Taymiyyah and Ayatollah Khomeini, but nature then corrupts him– this is also similar to the position held by Plotinus 2000 years ago

In the words of Syed Mohammed Naquib al-Attas “Forgetfulness is the cause of man’s disobedience, and this blameworthy nature inclines him towards injustice (ɀulm) and ignorance (jahl) ([Qur’an] 33: 72).” (al-Attas, 1993: 140) – It was through divine intervention, often through the various messages conveyed by certain chosen Prophets, that man was able to be guided back on the right path.

According to Alija Izetbegović on this matter, “Generally speaking, a Muslim does not exist as a sole individual. If he wishes to live and survive as a Muslim, he must create an environment, a community, a system. He must change the world or himself submit to change.” (Izetbegović, 1990: 68)

Hajj and Zakat In order to be a ‘moral’ Muslim community is essential– otherwise wajīb religious duties such as Hajj and Zakat could not even be preformed. – This example demonstrates man does have a moral obligation to live in communities– one can look back at the old testament story of Lut as well– do you remember why Lut went into the city?

Locke’s general understanding of freedom deeply resonated with the standard liberal understanding of freedom as being primarily framed in terms of freedom from. – “The liberal definition of freedom is normally couched in the former, in terms of “freedom from” rather than “freedom to.” Negative freedom is the condition in which one is not compelled, not restricted, not interfered with, and not pressurized.” (Tamimi, 2001: 74) Locke’s view of the social contract and society in general posited man as being primarily independent and individualistic

Gessellschaften Locke’s understanding of man prefigures a liberal social and political order in which the individual takes precedent over the community. This has all the hallmarks of Gesellschaft. – “Nothing happens in Gesellschaft that is more important for the individual’s wider group than it is for himself. On the contrary, everyone is out for himself alone and living in a state of tension against everyone else.” (Tönnies, cited in Harris (Ed.), 2001: 52)

Gemeinschaften Tönnies claims that Aristotle’s understanding of the ideal constitution of the city or town was also in terms of Gemeinschaften—within Aristotle’s worldview, the city or town operates as a self-sufficient household or as an organism living in a communitarian way. – “Whatever its empirical origins, its existence must be viewed as a totality, together with the individual associations and families that belong to it and are dependent on it. With its language, its customs, its beliefs, as well as its land, buildings and treasures, it forms a permanent entity that outlives the changes of many generations.” (Tönnies, cited in Harris (Ed.), 2001: 48-49) Community, optimally a close knit community (Gemeinschaft), has a far more essential function within the ontological discursive framework of Islam than it has within Western liberalism. I do not think this point can be refuted.

The notion of ‘the individual’ and the separation of the sacred from the profane The recognition of the inseparable nature of the sacred and the profane in Islam was not just limited to thinking within the more conservative Ashā`irah and 'Atharī traditions. Even the more ‘open’ Mu’tazila discourse, “could never entertain the idea of breaking the God-Man relationship and the validity of revelation, in spite of their espousal of a rationalist philosophy.” (Allawi, 2009: 11)

Al-fard vs the Western ‘Individual’ In Arabic, the word for the ‘the individual’ is al- fard and does not carry with it the same existential weight as does the notion of ‘the individual’ in the Western context in which one thinks of a being endowed with free will, purpose, and rational faculties. The word for ‘the individual’ in Arabic “carries the connotation of singularity, aloofness, or solitariness.” (Allawi, 2009: 11)

The Right to Rule Islam also does not posit that all people are equal and anyone is entitled to rule—God ordained the Prophet Mohammed’s ( ﷺ ) rule over his community, and repeatedly in the Qur’an it is mentioned that those with religious knowledge ought to rule. The Qur’an explicitly states, – “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the messenger if ye are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more seemly in the end.” (Qur’an, 4:59)

In Conclusion Regardless of how one interprets the Qur’an; progressive, moderate, or conservative—Western liberal notions of culture, the individual, and human rights at a deep philosophical level— beyond just the content of these particular values, but rather at the existential and ontological foundations of where these values derive, in general, stand in contradistinction with an Islamic discourse that at its core is about ‘re- enchanting the world’ and the perpetual remembrance of Allah.

4.4.2016 Congruence. Defining Congruence Congruence (symbol: ≅ ) is the state achieved by coming together, the state of agreement. The Latin congruō meaning.

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4.4.2016 Congruence. Defining Congruence Congruence (symbol: ≅ ) is the state achieved by coming together, the state of agreement. The Latin congruō meaning.

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Presentation on theme: "4.4.2016 Congruence. Defining Congruence Congruence (symbol: ≅ ) is the state achieved by coming together, the state of agreement. The Latin congruō meaning."— Presentation transcript:

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