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Overview The Three Great Debates Classical approach

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0 International Relations Theory Positivism and Post-positivism Karen Devine
School of Law and Government

1 Overview The Three Great Debates Classical approach
Behavioural approach Postpositivist approach: Critical Theory Postpositivist approach: Postmodernism Postpositivist approach: Normative Theory Ontology and Epistemology: positivism and postpositivism Mapping IR Theories on to the Positivism and Post-positivism matrix Combining positivism and post-positivism?

2 The “Great Debates”: First Second Third
Substantive issues What were the causes of World War I? What were the causes of World War II? How is it possible to achieve peace/prevent war? Liberal idealism vs realism Methodological issues How can the politics/IR world be studied with methods of the natural science? How can facts and regularities be discovered? ? Methodological issues: ontological and epistemological What is reality / how do we know what we know is real? Post-positivists: critical constructivists/post-structuralists vs positivists: neorealists/ neoliberals, conventional constructivists Meta-theoretical, subjective/interpretative vs ‘objective’ scientific approach Theory - practice -‘reality’ Behaviouralists /neorealists vs traditionalists Scientific approach vs law, history...perception/intuition Explaining/predicting reality objectively/rigorously using (in)dependent variables. Using theory to better predict reality Law, history Normative/prescriptive vs dangers of normative, describing the reality of the world

3 Positivism and Post-positivism: Classical Approach
Mr Bård Bredrup Knudsen, Counsellor, Security and Defence Policy, Norwegian Mission to the EU, Limerick, April 2006: The 3,000 soldiers of the two Battlegroups that will be on duty at any one time will not be capable of major action but they will be an important component in a broader strategy as an early entry or enabling force – a kind of “fire-brigade” role. (EU Battlegroups will in most cases be deployed in response to a UN request and will be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale. Likely missions include local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. ) vs Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman 19 February In discussions between the EU and NATO, there has been broad agreement that the Battlegroup initiative will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), each providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are analogous to those defined within the NRF. Correctly managed, there is considerable potential for synergy between the two initiatives….. we believe that the EU Battlegroups have the potential to act as a useful stepping-stone" for countries who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard and integrating small countries' contributions into multinational units. The key will be to ensure transparency in the development of these initiatives so that we avoid duplication and enable those Member States contributing to both to harmonise their commitments. SAME ISSUE WITH WEU leaders of larger European states have always pushed for neutral states to join NATO/WEU and proposed a merger of the two bodies in order to create a European Union military alliance. For example, in 1995 “Mr. Wolfgang Schaueble, parliamentary leader of the German Chancellors’ Christian Democrats (CDU), said the EU would only have a real security policy when it became the European arm of the western alliance” (Reuter, 1995). Most member-states see the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the defence arm of the EU (Brennock, 1996a). Schaueble added that the neutral countries should be given time to make a gradual transition into EU security structures (Reuter, 1995). In 1996, the EU’s external affairs Commissioner Mr. Hans van den Broek told reporters in Dublin that no attempt would be made by the EU to force Ireland to abandon neutrality – “this debate will not end with 40 countries surrounding Ireland saying ‘Why don’t you join the WEU?’ That’s not the way Europe works” (Brennock, 1996a). Van den Broek said, “we shouldn’t give Irish citizens the feeling that things are being imposed. They must make their own decision” (Brennock, 1996a). Twenty months later, the government pledged that a referendum on any proposal involving “a mutual defence commitment by Ireland”, perhaps in anticipation that this decision will need to be made in the near future. Positivism and Post-positivism: Classical Approach Hedley Bull is a major proponent Sound scholarship is a matter of experience in the practice of observing, reading, enquiring, reflecting and writing about international relations: emphasis on an enquiring mind Aim is a detached (being aware of your own moral and political premises and holding them in check) and disinterested analysis of the moral foundations of IR/International Law Rejects critical theory’s assertion that IR theory is intrinsically political: those people can’t separate their values from their scholarship Common ground with behaviouralists: both seek to attain clear empirical analyses of unbiased/non-ideological clear concepts BUT: makes a distinction between scholarship and technical or scientific expertise Does not formulate or test hypotheses; foreign policy possesses inherent meaning: translating foreign policy problems into science results in the problems being fundamentally misunderstood No explicit methodology in the scientific meaning of the term: theorising derives from philosophy, history and law; provides partial answers to questions

4 Positivism and Post-positivism: Behavioural Approach
Mr Bård Bredrup Knudsen, Counsellor, Security and Defence Policy, Norwegian Mission to the EU, Limerick, April 2006: The 3,000 soldiers of the two Battlegroups that will be on duty at any one time will not be capable of major action but they will be an important component in a broader strategy as an early entry or enabling force – a kind of “fire-brigade” role. (EU Battlegroups will in most cases be deployed in response to a UN request and will be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale. Likely missions include local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. ) vs Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman 19 February In discussions between the EU and NATO, there has been broad agreement that the Battlegroup initiative will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), each providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are analogous to those defined within the NRF. Correctly managed, there is considerable potential for synergy between the two initiatives….. we believe that the EU Battlegroups have the potential to act as a useful stepping-stone" for countries who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard and integrating small countries' contributions into multinational units. The key will be to ensure transparency in the development of these initiatives so that we avoid duplication and enable those Member States contributing to both to harmonise their commitments. SAME ISSUE WITH WEU leaders of larger European states have always pushed for neutral states to join NATO/WEU and proposed a merger of the two bodies in order to create a European Union military alliance. For example, in 1995 “Mr. Wolfgang Schaueble, parliamentary leader of the German Chancellors’ Christian Democrats (CDU), said the EU would only have a real security policy when it became the European arm of the western alliance” (Reuter, 1995). Most member-states see the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the defence arm of the EU (Brennock, 1996a). Schaueble added that the neutral countries should be given time to make a gradual transition into EU security structures (Reuter, 1995). In 1996, the EU’s external affairs Commissioner Mr. Hans van den Broek told reporters in Dublin that no attempt would be made by the EU to force Ireland to abandon neutrality – “this debate will not end with 40 countries surrounding Ireland saying ‘Why don’t you join the WEU?’ That’s not the way Europe works” (Brennock, 1996a). Van den Broek said, “we shouldn’t give Irish citizens the feeling that things are being imposed. They must make their own decision” (Brennock, 1996a). Twenty months later, the government pledged that a referendum on any proposal involving “a mutual defence commitment by Ireland”, perhaps in anticipation that this decision will need to be made in the near future. Positivism and Post-positivism: Behavioural Approach Behaviouralism associated with positivism associated with neorealism IR theories in positivism = empirical propositions that can be tested This empirical theory must be consistent with well-established knowledge in related fields of inquiry (unity of behavioural and natural sciences) Epistemology is key: scholars can make generalisations about the social world, including international relations, which are verifiable Theory=> hypotheses => test => eliminate => diverse tests => pass, modification or fail? Independent, dependent and intervening variables are specified, all of which are involved in explaining domestic and international politics In IR: Quantitative research/Rational Choice Theory: game theory (logical) Problem is that humans rarely conform to simple models of their behaviour. Models make reference to values, but overlook disagreements based on values

5 Positivism and Post-positivism: Postpositive Approaches - POMO
Mr Bård Bredrup Knudsen, Counsellor, Security and Defence Policy, Norwegian Mission to the EU, Limerick, April 2006: The 3,000 soldiers of the two Battlegroups that will be on duty at any one time will not be capable of major action but they will be an important component in a broader strategy as an early entry or enabling force – a kind of “fire-brigade” role. (EU Battlegroups will in most cases be deployed in response to a UN request and will be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale. Likely missions include local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. ) vs Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman 19 February In discussions between the EU and NATO, there has been broad agreement that the Battlegroup initiative will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), each providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are analogous to those defined within the NRF. Correctly managed, there is considerable potential for synergy between the two initiatives….. we believe that the EU Battlegroups have the potential to act as a useful stepping-stone" for countries who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard and integrating small countries' contributions into multinational units. The key will be to ensure transparency in the development of these initiatives so that we avoid duplication and enable those Member States contributing to both to harmonise their commitments. SAME ISSUE WITH WEU leaders of larger European states have always pushed for neutral states to join NATO/WEU and proposed a merger of the two bodies in order to create a European Union military alliance. For example, in 1995 “Mr. Wolfgang Schaueble, parliamentary leader of the German Chancellors’ Christian Democrats (CDU), said the EU would only have a real security policy when it became the European arm of the western alliance” (Reuter, 1995). Most member-states see the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the defence arm of the EU (Brennock, 1996a). Schaueble added that the neutral countries should be given time to make a gradual transition into EU security structures (Reuter, 1995). In 1996, the EU’s external affairs Commissioner Mr. Hans van den Broek told reporters in Dublin that no attempt would be made by the EU to force Ireland to abandon neutrality – “this debate will not end with 40 countries surrounding Ireland saying ‘Why don’t you join the WEU?’ That’s not the way Europe works” (Brennock, 1996a). Van den Broek said, “we shouldn’t give Irish citizens the feeling that things are being imposed. They must make their own decision” (Brennock, 1996a). Twenty months later, the government pledged that a referendum on any proposal involving “a mutual defence commitment by Ireland”, perhaps in anticipation that this decision will need to be made in the near future. Positivism and Post-positivism: Postpositive Approaches - POMO Post-positivists do not adhere to positivist claims about knowledge and the world The international world is an entirely humanly-constructed arrangement: approach required is different from natural science, needs to acknowledge that people conceive/construct/constitute the worlds they live in, including the international world Jackson and Sorensen classify critical theory, postmodernism and normative theory as post-positivist methodologies BUT no mention of poststructuralism, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory or Derridian deconstruction – “postmodern deconstruction”? Postmodernists ≠poststructuralists

6 Positivism and Post-positivism: Postpositive Approaches - POMO
Mr Bård Bredrup Knudsen, Counsellor, Security and Defence Policy, Norwegian Mission to the EU, Limerick, April 2006: The 3,000 soldiers of the two Battlegroups that will be on duty at any one time will not be capable of major action but they will be an important component in a broader strategy as an early entry or enabling force – a kind of “fire-brigade” role. (EU Battlegroups will in most cases be deployed in response to a UN request and will be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale. Likely missions include local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. ) vs Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman 19 February In discussions between the EU and NATO, there has been broad agreement that the Battlegroup initiative will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), each providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are analogous to those defined within the NRF. Correctly managed, there is considerable potential for synergy between the two initiatives….. we believe that the EU Battlegroups have the potential to act as a useful stepping-stone" for countries who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard and integrating small countries' contributions into multinational units. The key will be to ensure transparency in the development of these initiatives so that we avoid duplication and enable those Member States contributing to both to harmonise their commitments. SAME ISSUE WITH WEU leaders of larger European states have always pushed for neutral states to join NATO/WEU and proposed a merger of the two bodies in order to create a European Union military alliance. For example, in 1995 “Mr. Wolfgang Schaueble, parliamentary leader of the German Chancellors’ Christian Democrats (CDU), said the EU would only have a real security policy when it became the European arm of the western alliance” (Reuter, 1995). Most member-states see the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the defence arm of the EU (Brennock, 1996a). Schaueble added that the neutral countries should be given time to make a gradual transition into EU security structures (Reuter, 1995). In 1996, the EU’s external affairs Commissioner Mr. Hans van den Broek told reporters in Dublin that no attempt would be made by the EU to force Ireland to abandon neutrality – “this debate will not end with 40 countries surrounding Ireland saying ‘Why don’t you join the WEU?’ That’s not the way Europe works” (Brennock, 1996a). Van den Broek said, “we shouldn’t give Irish citizens the feeling that things are being imposed. They must make their own decision” (Brennock, 1996a). Twenty months later, the government pledged that a referendum on any proposal involving “a mutual defence commitment by Ireland”, perhaps in anticipation that this decision will need to be made in the near future. Positivism and Post-positivism: Postpositive Approaches - POMO Postmodernism: ‘incredulity towards narratives’, i.e. theories of IR, etc. Main target is neorealism POMOs: Deny the notion of objectivity, of human progress through enhanced knowledge Sceptical of universal truths, deflates academic egos Conform to academic conventions of intellectual enquiry; tendency to nihilism Moderate POMOs: theories have elements of subjectivity (our values/perspectives) and objectivity (agreement on substantial insights about what the real world is like) 6 6

7 Positivism and Post-positivism: Postpositive Approaches - CT
Mr Bård Bredrup Knudsen, Counsellor, Security and Defence Policy, Norwegian Mission to the EU, Limerick, April 2006: The 3,000 soldiers of the two Battlegroups that will be on duty at any one time will not be capable of major action but they will be an important component in a broader strategy as an early entry or enabling force – a kind of “fire-brigade” role. (EU Battlegroups will in most cases be deployed in response to a UN request and will be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale. Likely missions include local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. ) vs Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman 19 February In discussions between the EU and NATO, there has been broad agreement that the Battlegroup initiative will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), each providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are analogous to those defined within the NRF. Correctly managed, there is considerable potential for synergy between the two initiatives….. we believe that the EU Battlegroups have the potential to act as a useful stepping-stone" for countries who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard and integrating small countries' contributions into multinational units. The key will be to ensure transparency in the development of these initiatives so that we avoid duplication and enable those Member States contributing to both to harmonise their commitments. SAME ISSUE WITH WEU leaders of larger European states have always pushed for neutral states to join NATO/WEU and proposed a merger of the two bodies in order to create a European Union military alliance. For example, in 1995 “Mr. Wolfgang Schaueble, parliamentary leader of the German Chancellors’ Christian Democrats (CDU), said the EU would only have a real security policy when it became the European arm of the western alliance” (Reuter, 1995). Most member-states see the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the defence arm of the EU (Brennock, 1996a). Schaueble added that the neutral countries should be given time to make a gradual transition into EU security structures (Reuter, 1995). In 1996, the EU’s external affairs Commissioner Mr. Hans van den Broek told reporters in Dublin that no attempt would be made by the EU to force Ireland to abandon neutrality – “this debate will not end with 40 countries surrounding Ireland saying ‘Why don’t you join the WEU?’ That’s not the way Europe works” (Brennock, 1996a). Van den Broek said, “we shouldn’t give Irish citizens the feeling that things are being imposed. They must make their own decision” (Brennock, 1996a). Twenty months later, the government pledged that a referendum on any proposal involving “a mutual defence commitment by Ireland”, perhaps in anticipation that this decision will need to be made in the near future. Positivism and Post-positivism: Postpositive Approaches - CT Critical Theory developed from Marxist thought; German group of scholars: Frankfurt School; work of Robert Cox and Andrew Linklater CT rejects three basic premises of positivism: (1) an objective, external (to the observer) reality (2) subject/object distinction (3) value-free social science Theory is always for someone and for some purpose; knowledge in IR is either positivist/problem-solving or critical/emancipatory: do you agree? Critical Theory: International system is a construct of the most powerful states Focus on power and domination, not just states and state system Seek to determine the political interests that IR theories/theorists serve Seek to provide knowledge on human progress and possibilities for emancipation Use theory to help bring about change; echoing the Idealists Cannot escape one’s position 7 7

8 Positivism and Post-positivism: Postpositive Approaches - NT
Mr Bård Bredrup Knudsen, Counsellor, Security and Defence Policy, Norwegian Mission to the EU, Limerick, April 2006: The 3,000 soldiers of the two Battlegroups that will be on duty at any one time will not be capable of major action but they will be an important component in a broader strategy as an early entry or enabling force – a kind of “fire-brigade” role. (EU Battlegroups will in most cases be deployed in response to a UN request and will be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale. Likely missions include local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. ) vs Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman 19 February In discussions between the EU and NATO, there has been broad agreement that the Battlegroup initiative will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), each providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are analogous to those defined within the NRF. Correctly managed, there is considerable potential for synergy between the two initiatives….. we believe that the EU Battlegroups have the potential to act as a useful stepping-stone" for countries who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard and integrating small countries' contributions into multinational units. The key will be to ensure transparency in the development of these initiatives so that we avoid duplication and enable those Member States contributing to both to harmonise their commitments. SAME ISSUE WITH WEU leaders of larger European states have always pushed for neutral states to join NATO/WEU and proposed a merger of the two bodies in order to create a European Union military alliance. For example, in 1995 “Mr. Wolfgang Schaueble, parliamentary leader of the German Chancellors’ Christian Democrats (CDU), said the EU would only have a real security policy when it became the European arm of the western alliance” (Reuter, 1995). Most member-states see the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the defence arm of the EU (Brennock, 1996a). Schaueble added that the neutral countries should be given time to make a gradual transition into EU security structures (Reuter, 1995). In 1996, the EU’s external affairs Commissioner Mr. Hans van den Broek told reporters in Dublin that no attempt would be made by the EU to force Ireland to abandon neutrality – “this debate will not end with 40 countries surrounding Ireland saying ‘Why don’t you join the WEU?’ That’s not the way Europe works” (Brennock, 1996a). Van den Broek said, “we shouldn’t give Irish citizens the feeling that things are being imposed. They must make their own decision” (Brennock, 1996a). Twenty months later, the government pledged that a referendum on any proposal involving “a mutual defence commitment by Ireland”, perhaps in anticipation that this decision will need to be made in the near future. Positivism and Post-positivism: Postpositive Approaches - NT Normative Theory is not post-positivist, it is ‘pre- and post-positivist’ NT addresses the ethical nature of relations between communities and states NT: rejects premises of positivism because positivism does not normally consider moral decisions and dilemmas, which for NT, are the most important issues in IR has a common thread with constructivism, sharing a focus on intersubjective meanings, ideas and beliefs is another name for political theory or the moral philosophy of international relations 8 8

9 Positivism and Post-positivism: by ontology and epistemology
Objectivist: material object ‘out there’ Behaviouralism Positivism Critical Theory Explaining: Verify empirical propositions Understanding: Interpret intersubjective meanings postmodernism? Classical Theory Normative Theory Subjectivist: idea constituted by language

10 Objectivist: material object ‘out there’ ?
Positivism and Post-positivism: where would you locate realism, neorealism, conventional constructivism and critical constructivism? Objectivist: material object ‘out there’ ? ? Understanding: Interpret intersubjective meanings Explaining: Verify empirical propositions ? ? ? Subjectivist: idea constituted by language

11 Positivism and Post-positivism: Combining Approaches?
Mr Bård Bredrup Knudsen, Counsellor, Security and Defence Policy, Norwegian Mission to the EU, Limerick, April 2006: The 3,000 soldiers of the two Battlegroups that will be on duty at any one time will not be capable of major action but they will be an important component in a broader strategy as an early entry or enabling force – a kind of “fire-brigade” role. (EU Battlegroups will in most cases be deployed in response to a UN request and will be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale. Likely missions include local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. ) vs Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman 19 February In discussions between the EU and NATO, there has been broad agreement that the Battlegroup initiative will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), each providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are analogous to those defined within the NRF. Correctly managed, there is considerable potential for synergy between the two initiatives….. we believe that the EU Battlegroups have the potential to act as a useful stepping-stone" for countries who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard and integrating small countries' contributions into multinational units. The key will be to ensure transparency in the development of these initiatives so that we avoid duplication and enable those Member States contributing to both to harmonise their commitments. SAME ISSUE WITH WEU leaders of larger European states have always pushed for neutral states to join NATO/WEU and proposed a merger of the two bodies in order to create a European Union military alliance. For example, in 1995 “Mr. Wolfgang Schaueble, parliamentary leader of the German Chancellors’ Christian Democrats (CDU), said the EU would only have a real security policy when it became the European arm of the western alliance” (Reuter, 1995). Most member-states see the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the defence arm of the EU (Brennock, 1996a). Schaueble added that the neutral countries should be given time to make a gradual transition into EU security structures (Reuter, 1995). In 1996, the EU’s external affairs Commissioner Mr. Hans van den Broek told reporters in Dublin that no attempt would be made by the EU to force Ireland to abandon neutrality – “this debate will not end with 40 countries surrounding Ireland saying ‘Why don’t you join the WEU?’ That’s not the way Europe works” (Brennock, 1996a). Van den Broek said, “we shouldn’t give Irish citizens the feeling that things are being imposed. They must make their own decision” (Brennock, 1996a). Twenty months later, the government pledged that a referendum on any proposal involving “a mutual defence commitment by Ireland”, perhaps in anticipation that this decision will need to be made in the near future. Positivism and Post-positivism: Combining Approaches? Some scholars try to avoid the extreme positions on the positivist-postpositivist debate Seek out a middle ground between pure explaining and pure understanding Weberian notion of social science advocates a science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects Understanding does not prevent scholars from proceeding to frame hypotheses to test empirical theories that seek to explain social phenomena: it is not either/or, it can be both/and Some of the major debates in IR are about this issue, between neorealists and realists; between neoliberals and liberal internationalists; between conventional constructivists and critical constructivists. Do you think it is either/or or both/and? 11 11

12 The researcher’s process…
Research interest Ontology Literature Theoretical paradigm Research question Epistemology Teaching Juppille points out that, “different disciplines (for example, sociology, economics, political science) and subdisciplines (for example, Comparative Politics and International Relations within political science) often entail different architectures of inquiry. They provide different sets of received wisdoms (and empirical puzzles), leading questions and suggested answers. In that sense, while they are not usually recognised as such, disciplines and subfields, arguably, are metatheoretical” (emphasis added). (2005: 211) The term “paradigm” is used in two different senses. On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science (Kuhn. 175). Ontology Epistemology Method/approach Formal/statistical model Constructivism Realism/Liberalism Anti-empirical Empirical Empirical Cognitive/discursive Unobservable Observable Observable Immaterial Material Critical Constructivism Abstract Concrete 12


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