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Secure M-PSK Communication Via Directional Modulation University of Luxembourg, University of Illinois in Chicago ICASSP, Shanghai, 2016 Ashkan Kalantari,

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Presentation on theme: "Secure M-PSK Communication Via Directional Modulation University of Luxembourg, University of Illinois in Chicago ICASSP, Shanghai, 2016 Ashkan Kalantari,"— Presentation transcript:

1 Secure M-PSK Communication Via Directional Modulation University of Luxembourg, University of Illinois in Chicago ICASSP, Shanghai, 2016 Ashkan Kalantari, Mojtaba Soltanalian, Sina Maleki, Symeon Chatzinotas, and Björn Ottersten

2  What is directional modulation?  Motivation  Security analysis  Transmitter design  Benchmark  Simulation results  Conclusions Outline 1

3  The modulation happens while the signal passes the channel  The antenna weights change as the symbol rate  Different locations get different symbols (constellations)  The symbol is recovered without equalization 2 What is directional modulation?

4  Eavesdropper cannot compute the beamformer  Eavesdropper needs to estimate the symbols and suffers enhanced noise  Legitimate receiver can directly recover the symbols  The eavesdropper’s CSI is not required  The rate is not reduced (compared to secrecy rate) 3 Motivation: Why directional modulation?

5  Signal model  The eavesdropper needs to estimate ”w”!  Strong eavesdropper:  Strong transmitter: 4 Security analysis

6  Preserving a specific phase at each antenna  Satisfying a specific SNR at each antenna  Avoiding an NP-hard problem! 5 Transmitter design

7  Transformed problem     : Last columns of   6 Transmitter design

8  Benchmark: zero-forcing at the transmitter to neutralize interference  Signal model  Signal recovery at the eavesdropper (P is derived)  No need to multiply by ! 7 Benchmark

9  Parameters: 8 Simulation results

10  Parameters: 9 Simulation results

11  Regardless of SNR, an eavesdropper with less antennas than the transmitter cannot estimate the symbol  An eavesdropper with more antennas can estimate the symbols with enhanced noise  The eavesdropper needs to have in the directional modulation, while it is in the ZF precoding  Directional modulation is an attractive choice to enhance security using massive MIMO systems 10 Conclusions

12

13  Assumptions:  Rayleigh flat fading channel  M-PSK modulation  Unit energy symbol, 12 System model


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