1. This week’s aims: To set two SMART targets based on formal assessment feedback and progress so far To understand basic ideas concerning each key theory in the materialism unit To explain logical behaviourism To attend the ALP Philosophy of Mind conference in London

2. What is your minimum target grade (MTG)? What is your current performance grade (CPG)? Subject review

3. I will use my free period (e.g. in C block or on Wednesday mornings) to revise for two hours each week. I will practise writing timed answers to two essay questions each week. I will spend two hours each week making notes from my booklet and textbook on each key philosopher and theory. I will attend subject support (insert day and time) each week to get additional help with revision. I will complete all overdue homework tasks by ….. using my booklet and subject support to help me. By the end of this term I will produce double sided flash cards for all the philosophers and theories we have studied. Examples of targets

4. Homework and assessments so far… 300-word summary of the mind-body problem, substance dualism and property dualism Two mindmaps – indivisibility and conceivability Two mindmaps – philosophical zombies and knowledge/Mary Glossary of key terms Two mindmaps – causal interactionism and epiphenomenalism Practice writing answers to 3-mark, 5-mark and 12-mark questions on dualism Re-read p.6-35 in your booklet Re-read p.197-225 and p.266-302 in the Lacewing textbook Two mindmaps – materialism and behaviourism Evaluate the claim that the mind is distinct from the body (25)

5. Work to be completed during subject reviews: 1. Fill in both sides of the subject review sheet 2. Answer the questions on the handout  You can make notes, cards or posters to answer the questions  You can listen to iPods while you do the work if it will help you to concentrate  Don’t waste your time!

6. Materialism – p.36-37 Materialism argues that the mind is not ontologically distinct from the physical. What does this mean? In what way might scientific explanations confirm and describe what we experience? In what way might science actually show that our senses are largely wrong? Based on this idea, do you think science can show that materialism is correct? What is reductionism? What is supervenience? How might materialism be supported by:  Modern physics?  Neuroscience?  Biology? Can science successfully show that the ‘mind’ is redundant?

7. MATERIALISM Philosophy of Mind

8. Key terms You have been given a card containing a question and its answer Pair up with someone else who has a different question from you Ask your partner your question and tell them the answer Swap cards and then find new partners to question / answer Eventually you should know the answers to all the questions without being told

9. Key terms Materialism Logical behaviourism Analytical behaviourism Mind-brain type identity theory Functionalism Eliminative materialism

10. Behaviourism – p.38 Behaviourism asserts that to attribute a ‘mind’ to something is to attribute certain behavioural dispositions to that thing. If a thing exhibits the relevant behaviours that we ascribe to a mind, then that thing does have a mind. For example, to experience pain is nothing more than to be disposed to exhibit such behaviours as moaning, wincing, crying, or saying ‘Ouch!’ when one’s body has been injured. To believe that it’s raining outside is to be disposed to look for an umbrella when the weather forecast predicts rain. To feel fear is to have a tendency to tremble and run away when in the presence of wild animals or knife- wielding strangers in dark alleys.

11. Behaviourism – p.38 In general, to have any sort of mental state is just to have a tendency to produce certain types of behavioural outputs in response to given environmental inputs. So if a purely physical system (like a human body) is capable of exhibiting the behaviour associated with a mind then the mind is obviously physical.

12. Task – 10 minutes What is logical behaviourism? Is it plausible? What is analytical behaviourism?

13. Ryle, The Concept of the Mind Introduction Ryle argues that:  Dualism suggests that we can only know about mental states through introspection  But this would make it impossible for us to use mental concepts at all  Why? Let’s look on p.39

14. Ryle, The Concept of the Mind Why do you think Ryle calls substance dualism ‘the dogma of the ghost in the machine’? What does Ryle mean by a category mistake? Is he right that dualism rests on a category mistake?

15. Criticisms of behaviourism Can we really explain mental states in terms of behaviour alone? E.g. Belief it is raining = behaviour of looking for an umbrella What other mental states might be involved?  Desire  Fear  Belief

16. Criticisms of behaviourism – p.40-42 Group 1: Dualist arguments Group 2: The difficulty of defining mental states accurately Group 3: The conceivability of mental states without associated behaviour Group 4: The asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states What is the criticism? How convincing is it?

17. Practice questions What is analytic behaviourism? (3) Briefly explain logical behaviourism (5) Briefly outline Ryle’s argument that dualism rests on a ‘category mistake’ (5) Briefly explain Putnam’s argument concerning super-Spartans (5) Outline and explain two criticisms of behaviourism (12)

18. Homework Log into Moodle and click on A2 Advanced Philosophy – Homework and Assignments Look at the eighth block that says  8: Mind–brain type identity theory Look at / read at least three links. At least one of them must be an article or website rather than just a YouTube link. Feel free to look at more links than this if you like.