1. Review

2. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein (US 1996)

3. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.

4. P sues D in state ct for state law fraud concerning securities J for P (not settlement) P then sues D in fed ct for fed securities law violations Assume instead that P loses in state ct (no misrepresentation by D found) P sues D in fed ct Issue preclusion? Assume instead that P wins in state ct (misrepresentation by D found) P sues D in fed ct Issue preclusion?

5. Marrese If, under state law, federal action would not be precluded by state judgment then the federal court may not preclude the action If, under state law, federal action would be precluded then the federal court must preclude the action unless the federal statute giving the federal courts exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction for the federal action impliedly repealed federal courts' obligations under section 1738 to give full faith and credit to state court judgments.

6. does it matter that this was a settlement?

7. does it matter that this was a class action?

8. substance/procedure

9. § 122 Issues Relating to Judicial Administration A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.

10. § 133 Burden of Proof The forum will apply its own local law in determining which party has the burden of persuading the trier of fact on a particular issue unless the primary purpose of the relevant rule of the state of the otherwise applicable law is to affect decision of the issue rather than to regulate the conduct of the trial. In that event, the rule of the state of the otherwise applicable law will be applied.

11. § 139. Privileged Communications (1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the communication will be admitted, even though it would be privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the admission of such evidence would be contrary to the strong public policy of the forum. (2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the communication but which is not privileged under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is some special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect.

12. § 142. Statute Of Limitations The following § 142 replaces the original §§ 142 and 143: Whether a claim will be maintained against the defense of the statute of limitations is determined under the principles stated in § 6. In general, unless the exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result unreasonable: (1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim. (2) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the claim unless: (a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the forum; and (b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state having a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.

13. ‘08 1.The D Corp. [hereinafter D] is incorporated in Virginia with its principal place of business in Alabama. At a convenience store in California, P (a domiciliary of California) bought a lighter manufactured by D in a plant in Alabama. Upon buying the lighter, P took it home, where he modified it to make it possible to increase the size of the flame beyond what the lighter originally allowed. On a trip to New York, the lighter exploded, injuring P. P sued D in federal court in Virginia for negligent manufacturing. D argued that under Alabama, California and Virginia law, if P is found to have been contributorily negligent in altering the lighter, he should be denied recovery. P argues that New York law of comparative fault applies, which allows P to recover from D even if his negligence contributed to the accident (although P’s damages would be reduced by his degree of fault). Which law applies and why?

14. ’07 2.P (a domiciliary of Michigan) gets into a car accident with D (a domiciliary of Virginia) in Michigan. One and a half years after the accident, P sues D in Virginia state court. Under the Michigan statute defining negligence under Michigan law, the plaintiff has no cause of action unless he proves his own lack of contributory negligence. Michigan law does not specify the statute of limitations for negligence actions, but Michigan’s catch-all statute of limitations is two years. Virginia has no catch- all statute of limitations, but in the statute defining negligence under Virginia law, the statute of limitations for negligence is specified as one year. The Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure specify that the burden is on the defendant to prove the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Is P’s suit within the applicable statute of limitations? Must P or D prove the issue of P’s contributory negligence? Do not address constitutional restrictions on choice of law.

15. ‘08 2.P (a domiciliary of Ontario) and D (a domiciliary of Ontario) are students at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. D was driving the two of them back to Ontario for spring break when she ran into a tree near Detroit, Michigan, injuring P. P sued D in Michigan state court for negligence. D argued that Ontario’s guest statute applies. Michigan no longer has a guest statute. How should the Michigan court decide and why?

16. ’08 3.In California, the D Corp [hereinafter D] (incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in California) entered into a written contract with the P Corp [hereinafter P] (incorporated in Virginia with its principal place of business in Maryland), under which P was to build a new wing of a hospital for D in Michigan. In return, D was to pay P three installments of $1.2 million each, to be deposited in a bank account in Michigan. Although P built the wing, D found it was not able to pay the final installment. Instead it sent to P’s office in Maryland a promissory note, under which D was to pay P $1.5 million in three years time. P did not acknowledge the note. One year after receiving the note, P brought suit against D for breach of contract in Virginia state court. D made a motion to dismiss, claiming that, under the promissory note, P could pay $1.5 million in two years. Under the law of Virginia and Michigan, because P did not repudiate the promissory note in a timely fashion, P is now bound to accept payment in accordance with the promissory note as satisfying D’s obligations under the contract. Under the law of Maryland and California, P is so bound only if it explicitly agrees, which it did not. Should D’s motion succeed and why or why not?

17. ‘07 5.X (a domiciliary of Virginia) became drunk in a bar in DC owned and run by D (a domiciliary of DC). After getting drunk at D’s bar, X drove home to Virginia, where X got into an accident with P (a domiciliary of DC). P sues D in DC court under DC’s Dram Shop Act, which imposes liability on tavern keepers for the accidents of those whom they intoxicate. Virginia does not have a dram shop act. D argues that Virginia law applies and makes a motion to dismiss. What result? Do not address constitutional restrictions on choice of law. [5 points – 9 minutes]

18. ’08 6.P (an attorney and domiciliary of California) entered into a contract in California with X (a domiciliary of Virginia) to represent X in a case before a court in California. In Virginia, D (a domiciliary if Virginia) successfully encouraged X to break the contract with P and use another lawyer’s services instead. P brought an action against D in California state court for interference with contractual relations, a cause of action under Virginia law. Under California law (and most other states’ laws) this cause of action is no longer recognized. D brings a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that California law applies. How should the court decide and why?

19. ‘07 6.P (a DC corporation with its principal place of business in DC) and D (a domiciliary of Virginia) entered into a contract in Maryland for D to deliver coal to P’s power plant in DC. The contract included no choice of law provision. D failed to deliver, forcing P to buy coal on the open market for $100,000 more than the contract price. P sues D in Virginia state court and receives a judgment for $100,000 – plus interest on $100,000 for the amount of time that elapsed between P’s purchase of the coal on the open market and the time of P’s judgment against D. Under the law of all the relevant states (DC, Virginia, and Maryland), P is entitled to interest because, but for D’s breach, P could have profitably invested the extra $100,000 he had to pay for the coal. Under the law of Virginia the relevant rate of interest is 6%. Under the law of Maryland it is 5%. Under the law of DC is it 4%. Which interest rate applies? Do not address constitutional restrictions on choice of law.

20. ‘08 7.D (a domiciliary of New York) left New York in his car for trip to Florida. At a rest stop in Virginia he picked up a hitchhiker, P (a domiciliary of Maryland). While traveling south in Virginia a deer jumped in front of the car. D swerved to get out of the way and hit a tree. In the accident, P, who was not wearing a seatbelt, was ejected from the car and sustained serious injuries. P sued D in state court in New York. D introduced the affirmative defense that P was contributorily negligent by failing to wear a seatbelt. Under the law of New York, Maryland, and Virginia, P was obligated to wear a seatbelt. But under the law of Virginia, in a negligence suit the defendant may not argue that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent by virtue of not wearing a seatbelt. New York and Maryland allow such a defense. Arguing that Virginia law applies, P moved to strike D’s affirmative defense. Should the motion be granted and why or why not?

21. ‘07 8.While on a trip in Chicago, Illinois, D (domiciled in Virginia) authorizes his son X (also domiciled in Virginia) to use D’s car to drive around Chicago. Contrary to D’s orders, X decides to drive the car to Madison, Wisconsin, where he hits P (domiciled in Wisconsin). P sues D in Virginia state court. Under the law of Wisconsin, anyone who licenses another to use his car is liable for the torts of the licensee. Under the law of Illinois the licensor is not liable for the torts of the licensee. Under the law of Virginia, the licensor is liable for the torts of the licensee only if the licensee acted recklessly or with malice. Which law should the Virginia court apply? Do not address constitutional restrictions on choice of law.

22. ‘08 8.In Wisconsin, D (a domiciliary of Illinois) entered into an employment contract with the P Corp [hereinafter P] (incorporated in Wisconsin with its principal place of business in Wisconsin). Under the terms of the contract, D was to serve as P’s sales representative in Illinois. The contract also included: 1) a covenant not to compete, according to which, on termination of employment, D was not to compete against P for three years and 2) a Wisconsin choice-of-law clause. One year after ending his employment with P, D began working for a competitor. P sued D for breach of contract in Illinois state court. D made a motion to dismiss, arguing that under Illinois law, covenants not to compete may not last longer than one year. P argued that Wisconsin, not Illinois, law applied. Under Wisconsin law the three-year covenant is enforceable. How should the court decide D’s motion and why?

23. ‘07 7.Father (domiciled in Virginia) and Son (domiciled in Maryland) are visiting a chemical factory in Michigan when it explodes and they both die intestate (that is, without a will). At the time of his death Father has only two assets: land in DC and a bank account in Virginia. After his death, Father’s land is sold and the proceeds are added to the bank account in Virginia. Administrative proceedings concerning Father’s estate are then brought in Virginia state court. There are only two claimants – Mother (the wife of Father), who is domiciled in Virginia, and Grandson (the son of Son), who is domiciled in Maryland. Under the law of intestate succession of all relevant states (Virginia, Maryland, DC, and Michigan), if Son died before Father or if Father and Son died at the same time, Father’s assets go to Mother. On the other hand, under the law of all relevant states, if Son outlived Father (if only for a second), then Mother and Grandson share Father’s assets equally. There is no evidence concerning who died first, Father or Son. Under the law of Virginia and Michigan, when a parent and a child both die in the same event, the rebuttable presumption is that they both died at the same time. Under the law of DC and Maryland, when a parent and a child both die in the same event, the rebuttable presumption is that the child died after the parent. Should the Virginia court rule that Grandson is entitled to one half of the proceeds from the sale of the DC land? Should it rule that Grandson is entitled to one half of the rest of Father’s estate? Do not address constitutional restrictions on choice of law.

24. ‘08 9.The city of Chicago, Illinois levied a “wage tax” upon everyone working in the city, including commuters residing in other states. D (a domiciliary of Wisconsin working in Chicago), refused to pay the tax and was sued by the city of Chicago in Illinois state court. D lost and a judgment was issued against her. Although no wage taxes are levied in Wisconsin, soon after Chicago enacted its wage tax, the state of Wisconsin enacted a law specifying that wage tax judgments could not be enforced through the attachment of real property. Under Illinois law, attachment of real property is a means of enforcing judgments, including wage tax judgments. The city of Chicago brought suit against D on the Illinois judgment in Wisconsin state court, asking that D’s real property be attached. May the Wisconsin court refuse to attach D’s real property?

25. ‘07 9.P (a domiciliary of Illinois) enters into an employment contract with D (an Illinois business with its principal place of business in Illinois). In the course of the employment, P engages in some work for D in Maryland, where P is injured. P sues D in Maryland state court for relief under Illinois’s Workers Compensation Statute, even though the statute states that actions under it must be brought before Illinois’s Industrial Commission. May the Maryland court entertain P’s action anyway?

26. ‘08 11.In Virginia, X (a domiciliary of Virginia) gives P (a domiciliary of California) the impression that X has given P some valuable paintings that are located in Virginia. When X dies, P takes the paintings home to California, where he engages in costly restoration efforts that increase the paintings’ value. In X’s will it is made clear that the paintings in fact belong to D (a domiciliary of Virginia). P returns the paintings to D, but sues D for the difference in the painting’s value that resulted from the restoration. Under California law, D is not liable for the difference in value. Under Virginia law, D is liable. How should a Virginia state court decide which state’s law applies? How should a California state court decide?