1. The challenge of Political Islam There is no doubt that today, the challenge of Piolitical islam in all its forms is the most significant one for MENA regimes and for the international community. This is still true today. –The political project of political Islam is radical because it implies the transformation of social, economic, political and cultural relationships in society. Political Islam might be truly revolutionary, but not necessarily progressive. There is considerable difference between objectives (the creation of am Islamic state) and means to achieve those objectives. Accordingly there are differences in strategies of containment.

2. Political violence – violent Islamism There has always been a current within political Islam that has subscribed to the belief that it is only through armed struggle that political objectives will be achieved. What explains the choice of violence? In addition, what explains the high level of anti-civilian violence? –We are going to leave aside for the moment the question of fighting foreign occupations Hamas Hizballah

3. Hafez’s ‘Why Muslims Rebel?’ The most common explanations for the choice of violence are: –The authoritarian nature of the political system, which does not allow for the formal institutionalisation of alternative voices. –Jihadi ideology is particularly virulent in its opposition to current regimes: no compromise is possible. The previous explanations are necessary for the choice of violence, but they are not sufficient to explain the degree of anti-civilian violence. –The nature of state repression has to be taken into account. Specifically, Timing Targeting

4. Timing and targeting The timing of repression is very important in determining how the targeted movement will react: –Pre-emptive repression takes place before the movement is fully organised and mobilised. –Reactive repression takes place after the movement is in the ascending phase and activists are fully mobilised. The targeting of repression is equally important in determining how activists will react: –Selective repression only targets the leaders and the committed activists, leaving sympathisers out of the picture. –Indiscriminate repression targets anyone associated, no matter how loosely, with the movement.

5. Regime survival – Strategy 1 This leads to discuss the first strategy that regimes use to counter the threat of political Islam: repression. Such strategy has historically been the most significant one until the early 1990s with the exception of Jordan. –Secular regimes in particular violently repressed Islamist movements even though the latter were not necessarily bent on overthrowing the regime through violence. Syria 1980s Algeria 1990s Egypt mid-1980s and early 1990s Libya 1980s and 1990s Tunisia late 1980s –It proved effective even when the level of violence reached significant peaks.

6. Regime Survival – Strategy 1 The effectiveness of repression fades during the 1990s for a number of reasons. –There is increasing scrutiny on the part of the international community, which is more reluctant to tolerate widespread abuses. –Islamist movements go through a process of political learning and non-violent elements and strategies emerge.

7. The Brothers’ Islamism and the ‘opening’ The Brothers have become increasingly involved in institutional politics, attempting to take advantage of limited political openings: Participation does not mean policy-making power and autonomy. –Authoritarian leader retains ultimate decision-making power. There are several constraints placed on Islamist movements playing the game of elections. Constituency boundaries. Urban vs. rural representation. Choice of candidates. Issues that can be talked about. Certain red lines cannot be crossed. Electoral engineering and frauds. –The research question is then: why do they participate to such institutional games?

8. Participation: costs and benefits There are a number of benefits that participation can bring to the movement: –Participation gives public visibility and ‘shows the regime up.’ The possibility of campaigning to strengthen presence in society –Participation signals readiness to activists/militants. ‘We are ready to govern.’ Militants and sympathisers can have something to look forward to. –Access to patronage resources. Distribution of jobs and benefits There are also a number of costs that the movement has to bear: –Facing increasingly disillusioned militants for lack of progress –Outflanking by more extremist movements. –Co-optation.