1. Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis Agus Surachman Department of Behavioral Sciences Purdue University Calumet Presented at the Southeastern Council on Family Relations Conference Shreveport, March 6, 2015

2. Outline  Introduction  Theoretical Framework  Method  Results  Discussion Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

3. Introduction Child Poverty Indonesia (UNICEF, 2010): 13.8 million (NPL) ~ 16% 44.3 million ($2/day) ~ 50% Effect of child poverty -Physical health -Cognitive outcomes -Educational attainment -Emotional or behavioral outcomes Intergenerational transmission of poverty Poverty  child outcomes: (Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997) : 1. Home Environment 2. Parental-child interaction ↓ Parental investment on children’s human capital ↓ Timing: early childhood Individual vs. Spousal Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

4. Introduction Objective: Spousal dyadic analysis of factors associated with Indonesian parents’ investment behavior on children’s human capital Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

5. Theoretical Framework Family (commonly parents): decision maker  resources to be provided to the children in order to improve their human capital  The most common ways for families to invest on their children’s human capital: education and socialization (Bryant & Zick, 2006) Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis Intergenerational transfer:  General parental consensus model (Behrman, 1997)  Parents act as one  Collective models of household behavior  Spouse’s bargaining Stumbling block to invest (Quisumbing, 2009) :  Preferences (sex)  Returns (value of children)  Constraints (poverty)  Bargaining (husband vs. wife) Parental investment behavior: every efforts, activities, or family resources allocation that is intended to enhance the quality of children (Hartoyo et al., 2013)

6. Theoretical Framework Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis Value of children to parents: functions that children would be able to provide for the parents or needs of parents that could be fulfilled by the presence of children (Hoffman and Hoffman, 1973)  Dimensions of functions: psychological (e.g., happiness), social (e.g., status), and economic function (e.g., old age security) (Sam, 2001; Suckow & Klaus, 2002; Trommsdorff, Kim, & Nauck 2005) Parental investment and intergenerational transmission of poverty: lack of intergenerational transfer (esp. human capital)  transmission of poverty (Surachman & Hartoyo, 2012; in review) Determinant of bargaining power: control over resources, influences that can be used to influence the bargaining process, mobilization of interpersonal networks, and basic attitudinal attributes (Quisumbing, 2009)  Wives/ mothers spent more time with children  Associated with level of education (Bonke & Espin-Anderson, 2007) Returns Constraint Bargaining

7. Hypotheses  Score of value of children to parents positively associated with the score of parental investment behavior  Poor couples invest less compared to the non-poor couples  Spouse with more opportunity to interact with children and higher level of education invest more on children’s human capital Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

8. Method Data:  Intergenerational Transmission of Poverty in Different Agro-Ecological Areas in West Java, Indonesia (Hartoyo et al., 2013)  240 husbands (age range = 23-59 years old, M = 38.27, SD = 7.62) and wives (age range = 21-52; M = 33.58; SD = 6.39) nested in 120 families (50% poor, 50% lived in rural area, average years of marriage=12.45 years)  Inclusion criteria: the last child under 5 years old  Poor families: recipients of at least one poverty alleviation programs  Husbands and wives were interviewed separately  Unit analysis: dyad; Design: reciprocal standard dyadic design (Kenny, Kashy, Cook, 2006) Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

9. Method Dependent Variable: Parental investment behavior  19 statement of stimulation activities to improve the quality of child’s human capital (4 level of Likert's scale)  α =.85 Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis Independent Variables:  Value of children to parent:  15 items of parental perceptions regarding benefit and detriment of having children: psychological, social, and economic dimensions  PCA: 7 items retained (α =.70)  Demographic variables:  Sex  Age  Years of formal education  Number of children  Poverty status

10. Method Statistical Analysis:  Multilevel modelling  Outcomes variable: parental investment behavior (score)  Level 1 (individual level) variables  Age (years)  Sex (female = -1, male = 1)  Value of children to parents (score)  Formal education (years)  Level 2 (family level) variables  Poverty status (poor = -1, non-poor = 1)  Number of children Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

11. Results Poor couples vs. Non-poor couples:  Poor couples married earlier, stayed shorter in the school, and having more children  Value of children to parents  Poor: M = 20.44, SD = 2.77  Non-poor: M = 22.13, SD = 3.11  Parental investment behavior  Poor: M = 45.37, SD = 7.23  Non-poor: M = 53.12, SD = 7.44 Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis Husbands vs. Wives:  Husbands are older, while wives spent more years in school  Working wives: 1 out of 10  Value of children to parents  Husbands: M = 21.52, SD = 3.09  Wives: M = 21.06, SD = 3.02  Parental investment behavior  Husbands: M = 45.73, SD = 7.43  Wives: M = 52.75, SD = 7.60

12. Results  Couples from poor family and having more children reported lower score of parental investment behavior  Being a mother and having higher level of education associated with higher score of parental investment behavior  Effect of value of children on parental investment behavior more pronounced for poor participants  Higher level of education  less number of children  higher score of parental investment  Increase of age associated with higher parental investment behavior score for couples from poor family Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

13. Results Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis Fixed EffectsCoefficientset Ratio For Intercept1, β 0 Intercept2, γ 00 26.95.3381.24*** Poverty status, γ 01 2.40.337.34*** Number of child, γ 02 -.60.19-3.10** For Sex, β 1 Intercept2, γ 10 -3.23.28-11.45*** Poverty status, γ 11.09.29.30 Number of child, γ 12 -.07.13-.56 For Value of Children, β 2 Intercept2, γ 20.11.091.17 Poverty status, γ 21 -.15.10-2.13* Number of child, γ 22.10.042.46* For Age, β 3 Intercept2, γ 30 -.11.08-1.38 Poverty status, γ 31 -.17.08-1.98* Number of child, γ 32 0.08.042.16* For Level of education, β 4 Intercept2, γ 40.35.162.15* Poverty status, γ 41.13.16.81 Number of child, γ 42 -.24.06-3.98*** Random EffectVariance Componentd.f.χ2χ2 Intecept1, u 0 7.82117276.58*** Level-1, r11.46

14. Discussion  Results supported part of the hypotheses:  Stumbling blocks of parental investment: poverty (education), number of children/ quantity vs. quality trade off (Becker & Tomes 1976; Becker & Lewis 1973; Willis 1974)  no direct effect from value of children to parental investment behavior, interaction effect with poverty status  Being poor parents associated with higher chance to expect financial support from children in the future when they aged (Surachman, Hartoyo, & Edwards, 2014)  Mother’s role on child socialization Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

15. Discussion  Limitation  Cross-sectional  Measurement  Value of children  specific dimension, life course perspective  Parental investment  alternatives: measuring actual resources allocated  Future direction  Rural vs. Urban analysis  Further analysis of Collective models of household behavior  Analysis of spousal bargaining on children socialization Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

16. References Becker, G. S., Tomes, N. (1986). Human capital and the rise and fall of families. Journal of Labor Economics, 4 (3), S1-S39. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2534952.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2534952 Becker, G. S., & Lewis, H. G. (1973). On the interaction between the quantity and quality of children. Journal of Political Economy, 80, S279-99. Behrman, J. B. (1997). Intrahousehold distribution and the family. In M. R. Rosenzweig, & O. Stark (Eds.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics. Elsevier Science. Bryant, W. K. & Zick, C. D. (2006). The economic organization of the household (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoffman, L. W. & Hoffman, M. L. (1973). The value of children to parents. In J. T. Fawcett (Ed.), Psychological perspectives on population. New York: Basic Books. Hartoyo, Herawati, Djamaludin, M. D. (2013). Transfer kemiskinan di wilayah agro-ecological yang berbeda (Intergenerational transmission of poverty in different agro- ecological area in Indonesia). Bogor: Bogor Agricultural University. Quisumbing, A. R. (2009). Investment, bequest, and public policy: Intergenerational transfer and the escape from poverty. In T. Addison, D. Hulme, & R. Kanbur (Eds.), Poverty dynamics. Oxford: Ofxord University Press. Sam, D. L. (2001). Value of children: effects of globalization on fertility behavior and child-rearing practices in Ghana. Research Review, 17(2), 5-16. Suckow, J. & Klaus, D. (2002). Value of children in six cultures. In I. Planava & M. Pilat (Eds.), Proceeding of children, youth, and families in period of transition symposium. Brno, Czech Republic: Masaryk University Surachman, A., Hartoyo. 2012. Bore to be destitute: Capital transfer and intergenerational transfer of poverty. Undergraduate Research Journal for Human Sciences, 11. Retrived from: http://www.kon.org/urc/v11/surachman.html.http://www.kon.org/urc/v11/surachman.html Surachman, A., & Hartoyo. (in review). Parental investment and poverty dynamics in Indonesia. Revise and resubmit requested by Journal of Family and Economics Issues. Trommsdorff, G., Kim, U., & Nauck, B. (2005). Factors influencing value of chidren and intergenerational relations in times of social change. Applied Psychology, 54 (3), 313- 316. Doi: 10.1111/j.1464-0597.2005.00212.x Willis, R. J. (1974). Economic theory of fertility behavior. In T. W. Schultz (Ed.), Economics of the family: Marriage, children, and human capital. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis

17. Thank You Special thanks to: 1.Dr. Hartoyo (Bogor Agricultural University, Indonesia) 2.Dr. Anne Edwards (Purdue University Calumet) Parental Investment Behavior: A Spousal Dyadic Analysis