1. PHIL 340: ANCIENT ETHICAL THEORY Ben Hole, Winter 2016 Office hours after class.

2. Before Lecture, Opening Question ◦ What do you find most attractive about Aristotle’s virtue ethical theory? ◦ What do you find least attractive about Aristotle’s virtue ethical theory? Discuss before class with 1-2 people next to you.

3. Phil 340 Ancient Ethical Theory “Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it roughly and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate for inquiry.” (EN.1.7.1098a20-28)

4. Agenda ◦ Where we are and what we’re doing / Admin Stuff ◦ Papers ◦ Participation ◦ Changes to next week (see next slide) ◦ Brief introduction / reminder to virtue ethics and ethical theory ◦ Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy ◦ Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues Week, DateRequired Reading 1, 1/5Syllabus for Phil 340 1, 1/7Apology (all) 2, 1/12Meno (70-86); Phaedo (all) 2, 1/14Republic Book 1 (all); Book 2 (357-376) 3, 1/19Republic Book 2 (357-376); Book 4 (all) 3, 1/21Republic Book 4 (all); Book 8 (all) 4, 1/26Nicomachean Ethics Book 1 4, 1/28Nicomachean Ethics Book 1-2 5, 2/2Nicomachean Ethics Book 2-3; Book 6.13 5, 2/5Nicomachean Ethics Book 3-4 6, 2/9Nicomachean Ethics Book 4 6, 2/11Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Nussbaum, “Non- Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” 7, 2/16Euthydemus (278-281); Irwin on the Stoics (PDF) 7, 2/18Stoics (Primary texts excerpts in PDF form) 8, 2/23Hursthouse, OVE Chapter 9; Annas, “Virtue Ethics: Which kind of naturalism?” 8, 2/25Driver, “Virtue Theory”; Hursthouse, “Are the Virtues the Proper Starting Place for Morality?" 9 & 10In-Class Paper Conference

5. Next Week DateRequiredRecommendedSecondary 7, 2/16Euthydemus 278-281 Diogenes Laertius 7.84-131 (PDF) Irwin on the Stoics (PDF)Brickhouse/Smith, “Socratic Ethics” Annas, “Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics” 7, 2/18Diogenes Laertius 7.84-131 (PDF), In-Class Paper Outline Workshop (Bring Outlines)

7. The Right (Duty) & The Good (Value) ◦ “The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good; the concept of a morally worthy person is, I believe, derived from them” ◦ (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 24). ◦ “value based moral theories” vs. “duty based moral theories”

8. Value Base Moral Theory take the good as primary (and derives the right from the good). Duty Based Moral Theory take the right as primary (and derives the good from the right).

9. ◦ Most moral theories ask: What is the right thing to do? ◦ Virtue ethical theory asks: What kind of person should I be? Or, how should I live my life? The term ‘Aristotelian virtue ethics’ describes a class of theories; the aim of these theories is to discover the conditions and character traits that contribute to eudaimonia. Virtue Ethics and Ethical Theory

10. Eudaimonia The function argument; excellence in rational activity Excellence in intellectual virtues Excellence in phronesis Excellence in the moral virtues The doctrine of the mean All of the relevant parameters Moral particulars; objects of moral perception The Structure of Aristotle’s Virtue Ethical Theory

11. ANSCOMBE “Modern Moral Philosophy”

12. Anscombe’s Three Theses 1.“it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy… until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology” 2.“the concepts of obligation, and duty … ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible” 3.“the differences between the well ‑ known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.”

13. (1) Moral Philosophy and Psychology “It is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy” An account of moral psychology would consist of a set of analyses of important psychological concepts, including action, intention, pleasure, virtue, and flourishing.

14. (2) Moral Obligation Anscombe claims that the notion of moral obligation, along with the related notions of being “bound” or “required” to do something, only makes sense within the context of divine law. For those who no longer believe in divine law, the moral “ought” has become “a word containing no intelligible thought: a word retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept at all.”

15. (3) Absolute moral prohibitions “Every one of the best known English academic moral philosophers [since Sidgwick] has put out a philosophy according to which, e.g., it is not possible to hold that it cannot be right to kill the innocent as a means to any end whatsoever and that someone who thinks otherwise is in error.” An acceptable ethical theory will rule out certain actions (e.g., killing innocents) absolutely, regardless of what the consequences of performing the action would be.

16. Anscombe’s Aristotelian alternative Aristotle did not have a notion of “moral obligation,” but built his ethical theory around the notion of virtues. A virtue is a character trait, a disposition to think, feel, and act in certain ways. Aristotle claimed that the flourishing of human beings consists in possessing and exercising the virtues.

17. Anscombe’s Three Theses 1.“it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy… until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology” 2.“the concepts of obligation, and duty … ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible” 3.“the differences between the well ‑ known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.”

18. Additional literature ◦ Michael Stocker, “Moral Schizophrenia” ◦ Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints” ◦ Martha Nussbaum, Excerpts from “Love’s Knowledge” (the priority of the particular thesis) ◦ Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism” (not posted)

19. MARTHA NUSSBAUM “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach”

20. Eudaimonia The function argument; excellence in rational activity Excellence in intellectual virtues Excellence in phronesis Excellence in the moral virtues The doctrine of the mean All of the relevant parameters Moral particulars; objects of moral perception Phronesis and moral perception: EN.6.8.1142a.25.ff (pg. 93).

21. Tragic dilemmas Moral Perception (EN.6.8) Practical Guidance Moral Residue / Remainder

22. The Relativism Worry Moral Perception Endoxa Megalopsuchia

23. The Relativism Worry Moral Perception Endoxa Megalopsuchia “[Any] virtue ethics which is ‘Aristotelian’ as described inevitably aims to stick close to the author’s interpretation of Aristotle, and interpretations of Aristotle, in many of which relevant issues vary.” We can reject Aristotle’s views, e.g., on women and slavery. We can also revise the list of virtues. Hursthouse ON VIRTUE ETHICS, (1999), 9.

24. An Aristotelian Program This is Nussbaum’s response to the relativism worry. A two-stage inquiry 1. Isolate a sphere of human experience that figures in more or less any human life, in which nearly everyone will have to make some choices about how to act. 2. Find a correct fuller specification of what it is to act well in that sphere.

25. Aristotle’s Virtues VirtueSphere of Life Virtues of feelings Courage Fear/confidence Temperance (Bodily) pleasure Virtues of external goods Generosity Money Magnificence Magnanimity Honor Proper Pride Virtues concerned with social life Mildness Anger Truthfulness Truth-telling Wit Pleasure amusements Friendliness Pleasure in daily life

26. Nussbaum’s Spheres of Virtue VIRTUESPHERE 1. Courage Fear of important damages, esp. death. 2. Moderation Bodily appetites and their pleasures. 3. Justice Distribution of limited resources. 4. Generosity Management of one’s personal property where others are concerned. 5. Expansive hospitality Management of one’s personal property where hospitality is concerned. 6. Greatness of soul Attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. 7. Mildness of temper Attitude to slights and damages 8.a. Truthfulness 8.b. Easy grace (contrasted with coarseness, rudeness, insensitivity) 8.c. Nameless, but a kind of friendliness (contrasted with irritability and grumpiness) “Association and living together and the fellowship of words and actions.” a.Truthfulness in speech b.Social association of a playful kind c.Social association more generally 9. Proper judgment (contrasted with enviousness, spitefulness, etc.) Attitude to the good and ill fortune of others. 10. The various intellectual virtues, such as perceptiveness, knowledge, etc. Intellectual life. 11. Practical Wisdom The planning of one’s life.

27. Filling in the Spheres

28. Perceptive Equilibrium ◦ Our moral perceptions and ethical principles “hang beautifully together … an equilibrium that is always ready to reconstitute itself in response to the new.” Nussbaum (Love’s Knowledge, 1990), 29, 183. ◦ The ship of Neurath

29. The Relativism Worry ◦ Greatness of soul (megalopsuchia) is Aristotle’s virtue concerned with deservedly claiming great external goods, such as honor (ENIV.3). ◦ While Aristotle’s specific description is reminiscent of “a certain sort of Greek gentleman,” Nussbaum argues that the account is objective in the “features of humanness that lie beneath all local traditions.” Nussbaum (1993), 705-6.

30. Objection: Even if we settle on a single subject matter (how to behave in a particular sphere of human experience), this does not establish that there is a single correct answer. Reply: There might be many concrete specifications of the virtues, in connection with local conditions. Objection 1

31. Greatness of soul: “features of humanness that lie beneath all local traditions.”? ◦ Greek megalopsuchia ◦ Christian humility Sphere: Attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth.

32. Objection 2 Objection: The allegedly shared human experiences are in fact differently constructed by different cultures. Reply: This is true, but we can nonetheless identify certain features of our common humanity that are nearly universally shared, including mortality, pain and pleasure, and practical reason.

33. Objection 3 Objection: We can imagine a form of life, perhaps a preferable one, that does not contain these “shared human experiences” such as property ownership. Reply: All forms of life contain certain boundaries and limits, and will thus require some set of virtues.

34. Gary Watson’s Dilemma Horn One ◦ An ethical theory grounded in human experience/nature is morally indeterminate Horn Two ◦ An ethical theory grounded in human experience/nature is circular

35. Next Week DateRequiredRecommendedSecondary 7, 2/16Euthydemus 278-281, Diogenes Laertius 7.84-131 (PDF) Irwin on the Stoics (PDF)Brickhouse/Smith, “Socratic Ethics”, Annas, “Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics” 7, 2/18Diogenes Laertius 7.84-131 (PDF), In-Class Paper Outline Workshop (Bring Outlines)