1. Tosti struck in late spring at the Isle of Wight, then plundered along the coast to Sandwich. As Harold marched towards him, Tosti prudently moved north to the river Humber. There, Harold’s brothers-in- law, Edwin and Morcar, inflicted a punishing defeat on Tosti and forced him to flee back into exile. Meanwhile, Harold, calling out men and ships, organized defences along the southeastern coast against the second threat, Duke William. Given the ports from which William would sail, he was likely to strike first in the same general area that Tosti began his raiding. Unfortunately, Harold could not predict precisely where William’s army would land and would need great luck to intercept William at sea. Harold therefore accepted that William would have the initiative at the beginning of the invasion and stationed forces all along the southeast coast. Because the number of troops at any spot was limited (which reduced logistical difficulties), presumably they would not try to challenge William’s army. What the locally stationed troops could have done was prevent the Normans from sending out foraging parties and shadow William’s army if it moved. Wars of this period were often wars of attrition in which commanders relied on raiding, skirmishing, and sieges, avoiding major battles unless conditions were favourable or desperate. Thus, Harold could have planned for the local forces to begin English countermeasures on a small scale, hampering William’s operations while limiting their own exposure. Meanwhile, Harold and his main fleet waited at the Isle of Wight. From there, in ordinary meteorological conditions, they would have the wind behind them and could swoop down on William’s force wherever it landed. Harold might hope to destroy William’s fleet, push for a major battle, or mount a war of attrition from a chosen position, depending on which course of action he believed circumstances favoured. Harold’s strategy was a sound one; indeed, the strength of Harold’s preparations is one argument in favour of the idea that William purposely delayed his attack. Unfortunately, Harold not only had no way of knowing where William would attack, but he also could not known when William would attack. Harold seems to have had his forces in place for most of the summer, but the mobilization must have produced tremendous strains on his government and treasury. No doubt the troops became bored and restive, and because he was a new king with problematic claims to the throne, Harold could not afford to risk too much political capital on the difficult task of maintaining a large army in the field. On September 8, 1066, he let his force disband; perhaps having run out of supplies or perhaps hoping that because it was near the end of the sailing season, William would not be able to cross to England that year. Even if William did, as long as Harold stayed in the south with a core force, he could hope to reassemble an army at reasonably short notice. As a result, the danger of disbanding his forces must not have seemed as severe to Harold as it appears in retrospect. The Norman Conquest, Hugh M. Thomas In England Harold had regarded Tostig’s raid in May as the warning signal, and mobilized his forces. The plan of defence was local and simple. Earls Edwine and Morkere were primarily responsible for the defence of their earldoms against Tostig and, if it so chanced, Harold Hardrada; the king and his brothers were to defend their earldoms against William of Normandy. Harold himself commanded a fleet which he based on the Isle of Wight in order to intercept the invaders. As it turned out Harold had mobilized too soon. An anti-cyclone centred to the west of the British Isles remained stationary in August bringing a northerly air stream down the North Sea and the Channel. Harold Hardrada took advantage of it to leave Norway; but William could not sail. Early in September Harold’s forces disintegrated. Four month’s inactivity had been disheartening to a defensive army, and the harvest tasks had become urgent. The fleet, too, had run out of supplies, and on 8 September, when the anti-cyclone began to break up, Harold transferred his headquarters to London, and lost many ships in the operation. The Feudal Kindom of England 1042-1216, Frank Barlow