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COMP3123 Internet Security Richard Henson University of Worcester November 2011.

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Presentation on theme: "COMP3123 Internet Security Richard Henson University of Worcester November 2011."— Presentation transcript:

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2 COMP3123 Internet Security Richard Henson University of Worcester November 2011

3 Week 6: Securing a LAN connected to the Internet against Attack n Objectives:  Explain what a Firewall is, why it is needed, and why users find it frustrating…  Explain what a Proxy Service is, and why it can be a more flexible solution than a firewall  Relate the principles of IP and TCP port filtering to the challenge posed by threats to LAN server security from Internet

4 ... ROUTER – no packet filtering INTERNET/EXTERNAL NETWORK Internal Network Unsecured LAN-Internet Connection via Router

5 An Unsecured LAN-Internet Connection via Router router Layer 3 Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 2 Layer 1 Data through unchanged

6 An Unsecured LAN-Internet Connection via Router n Routers only process data up to OSI level 3  even with full user authentication on network services… »outgoing IP packets are untouched unless IP filtering is used  BUT, IP filtering will slow down packet flow… n Also…  request by a LAN client for Internet data across a router reveals the client IP address »this is a desired effect…. »“local” IP address must be recorded on the remote server »picks up required data & returns it via the router and server to the local IP address  problem – could be intercepted, and future data to that IP address may not be so harmless…

7 An Unsecured LAN-Internet Connection via Router n Another problem: wrath of IANA  IP address awarding & controlling body  big penalties if ANY internal LAN IP address conflicts with an existing Internet IP address they allocated… n If local clients have direct access to the Internet and they can be allocated locally, this COULD happen  Safeguard: »use DHCP (dynamic host configuration protocol) »allocate client IP from within a fixed range allocated to that domain by IANA

8 ... GATEWAY – packet conversion INTERNET/EXTERNAL NETWORK Internal Network A LAN-Internet connection via Gateway e.g. TCP/IP e.g. Novell IPX/SPX

9 A LAN-Internet connection via Gateway n At a gateway, processing goes up the protocol stack:  to at least level 4  Possibly right up to level 7 n Because local packets can be converted into other formats:  remote network therefore does not have direct access to the local machine  IP packets only recreated at the desktop  local client IP addresses therefore do not need to comply with IANA allocations

10 Creating a “Secure Site”? n To put it bluntly – a secure site is a LAN that provides formidable obstacles to potential hackers  keep a physical barrier between local server and the internet n Physical barrier linked through an intermediate computer called a Firewall or Proxy Server  may place unnecessary restrictions on access  security could be provided at one of the seven layers of the TCP/IP stack

11 Security Architecture & Secure sites n This includes all aspects of security controls  can be imposed on internal users through group policy objects  external attempts to hack cannot be controlled in this way, because they are not authorised users n What about external threats?  need to focus on external data and security controls to deal with it…

12 ... Firewall INTERNET/EXTERNAL NETWORK Internal Network The Firewall… TCP/IP out TCP/IP No data in…

13 Using a Firewall to secure Routed Connections n Completely separate local network data from Internet data using a physical barrier:  Firewall (robust but inflexible)  Proxy Server (flexible) n Either solution will have a similar safeguarding effect to using a gateway:  client IP addresses will not interact with the Internet  therefore do not need to be IANA approved  but makes good sense to use DHCP anyway…

14 What is a Firewall? n “A set of components that restricts access between a protected network and the Internet”  therefore divides a potential internetwork into internal and external components: »Internal Network n under consideration from a security point of view n kept logically separate from the Internet »External Network n Generally assumed to be the Internet or network that cannot be secured

15 A Firewall should… n Protect the network from:  TCP/IP attacks, probes and scans  denial of service attacks  malicious code such as viruses, worms and trojans n Provide, depending upon the security policy and the type of firewall used:  Network Address Translation (NAT)  authentication or encryption services  web filtering n To do this, it must be appropriately configured…

16 The Screening Router Screening Router Blocked Services X

17 n Every IP packet contains:  IP address of source  IP address of destination  source and destination TCP port(s)  protocol being used (e.g. FTP, SMTP, etc) n A router simply routes the packet towards its destination address n A screening router:  scrutinises whole packet headers  decides what to do with the packet Screening Routers

18 The Screening Router n Packets checked individually  therefore requires more processing power than a standard router n Once a packet has been scrutinised, the screening router can take one of three actions:  block the packet  forward it to the intended destination  forward it to another destination n IP addresses on the internal network can therefore be “protected” from external packets with a particular source address

19 The Proxy Server... Firewall with Proxy service Internal Network Request to proxy server Real server

20 The Proxy Server n A firewall that offers a client-server “proxy” service  allows the firewall to act as an intermediate party between the Internet and local network services: »intercepts user (client) requests for services such as FTP »decides whether or not to forward them to the true server n The effect is that the internal and external computers talk to the proxy service rather than directly to each other

21 n The user on either side of the firewall is presented with an illusion that they are talking to a real server  in fact they are both dealing with a proxy n So if an outside user tries to “hack” into the network server…  the actual internal network architecture is hidden n A proxy server can be programmed to block certain requests, sites, actions e.g:  blocking certain WWW sites  preventing FTP downloads Proxy Service - continued

22 DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) n Beyond the firewall but not yet through the Internet Router/Gateway… n A router normally stops incoming Internet traffic from getting on your network  unless the traffic is in response to one of your computers  or when using port forwarding n Alternately…  incoming traffic can go to one computer on your network by establishing a "Default DMZ Server“ (humorous reference to "Demilitarized Zone")  avoids having to figure out what ports an Internet application wants »all ports are open for that computer…

23 Bastion Host n n Acts as a firewall, and also runs the proxy and other services n n Main or only point of contact between users of an internal network and the external network n n Must be highly secured because it is vulnerable to attack n n External logins to the Bastion Host must not be allowed as user accounts represent an easy way to attack networks…

24 Dual Homed Host n Based on dual homed computer (2+ interfaces) n Does NOT allow through routing of packets n Communication through the DHH occurs as follows:  via proxies  Users login to DHH n However:  logging in of users to DHH will create further security problems…  Not all Internet services can be proxied for technical reasons

25 ** Firewall ** Dual-homed Host with proxy services INTERNET Dual Homed Host

26 n Uses a screening router  can block certain types of service n Routes packets to internal bastion only  may act as a proxy for services n Disadvantage:  if the internal bastion is hacked into  then other computers on the internal network can then easily be accessed Screened Host

27 INTERNET Screened Host Blocked Services X Screening Router Bastion Host (Proxy Services) Firewall

28 Typical Types of External Attacks - 1 n Exhaustive  “brute force” attacks using all possible combinations of passwords to gain access n Inference  taking educated guesses on passwords, based on information gleaned n TOC/TOU (Time of check/use)  1. use of a “sniffer” to capture log on data  2. (later) using captured data & IP address in an attempt to impersonate the original user/client

29 Typical Types of External Attacks - 2 n Three other types of attacks that firewalls should be configured to protect against:  denial of service (DOS) attacks  distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks  IP Spoofing (pretence that the data is coming from a “safe” source IP address

30 Firewalls and TCP, UDP ports n Remember this model? TELNETFTP NFSDNS SNMP TCP UDP IP SMTP

31 TCP ports that may be open to attack n TCP and UDP ports  both important features of TCP/IP  provide logical links for passing data between the transport layer and an application layer service n Usually defined by an RFC (remember those?) n Examples:  FTP: port 21 Telnet: port 23  SMTP: port 25DNS: port 53  HTTP: port 80POP3: port 110 n Problem…  what if the service isn’t being used?…

32 Blocking TCP ports with a Firewall n Very many TCP and UDP ports:  0 - 1023 are tightly bound to application services  1024 – 49151 more loosely bound to services  49152 – 65535 are private, or “dynamic” n In practice, any port over 1023 could be assigned dynamically to a service… n One of the more useful features of a firewall is that ports can be configured, and therefore data flow can be monitored and controlled

33 Blocking TCP ports with a Firewall n Generally, TCP ports should be:  EITHER open for a service (e.g. HTTP on port 80)  OR… blocked if no service, to stop opportunists n But if the firewall only allows “official services” this can cause problems for legitimate users  e.g. if port 25 is blocked, email data cannot be sent

34 Protecting Against TCP/IP Attacks, Probes and Scans n TCP/IP protocol stack has been largely unchanged since the early 1980's:  more than enough time for hackers to discover their weaknesses  often attack through a particular TCP port

35 TCP Port 21: FTP (File Transfer Protocol) n FTP servers excellent  BUT by their very nature they open up very big security holes  those that allow anonymous logins are used: »to launch attacks on the server itself, by connecting to the C: drive and downloading viruses or overwriting/deleting files »to store pirated files and programs n Precaution:  configure FTP servers NOT to accept anonymous logins  only allow access to port 21 through the firewall to that particular server

36 Making Effective use of the DMZ  Ever better alternative for port 21 security: »place FTP server on a perimeter network, or "DMZ" of the firewall  A DMZ is used to segregate inherently insecure servers that require a higher degree of network access from the rest of your network »an FTP server on a DMZ that has been compromised will then not be able to be used to attack the rest of the network »of course, if there is no FTP server, a DMZ might not be necessary…

37 TCP Port 23: Telnet n Telnet is really good for providing access to servers and other devices  accessing a server via Telnet is very much like being physically located at the server console n Protecting against Telnet is simple:  block ALL access to port 23 from the outside  block perimeter networks to the inside n Protecting internal servers from attack from the inside:  configure them to accept telnet connections from very few sources  block port 23 completely…

38 TCP Port 25: SMTP n Email programs large, complex, accessible…  Therefore an easy target…  Buffer overrun: »attacker enters more characters – perhaps including executable code - into an email field (e.g. To: ) than is expected by an email server –error could be generated –hackers could gain access to the server and the network  SPAM attack: »protocol design allows a message to go directly from the originator's email server to the recipient's email server n can ALSO be relayed by one or more mail servers in the middle n BUT… this is routinely abused by spammers –forward message to thousands of unwilling recipients

39 Port 25 SMTP: solution… n Buffer Overrun:  Solution: put server on a perimeter network n Spam Attack  Solution: DISABLE the relaying facility…

40 TCP and UDP Port 53: DNS (Domain Name Service) n One of the core protocols of the Internet  without it, domain name to IP address translation would not exist n PROBLEMS: If a site hosts DNS, attackers will try to:  modify DNS entries  download a copy of your DNS records (a process called zone transfer)

41 Port 53 DNS: Solution… n Solution:  configure firewall to accept connections from the outside to TCP port 53 only from your secondary DNS server »the one downstream from you e.g. your ISP  consider creating two DNS servers: one on your perimeter network, the other on the internal network: »perimeter DNS will answer queries from the outside »internal DNS will respond to all internal lookups »configure a Stateful inspection firewall to allow replies to internal DNS server, but deny connections being initiated from it

42 TCP Port 79: Finger n A service that enumerates all the services you have available on your network servers:  invaluable tool in probing or scanning a network prior to an attack! n To deny all this information about network services to would-be attackers, just block port 79…

43 TCP Ports 109-110: POP (Post Office Protocol) n POP easy-to-use…  but sadly it has a number of insecurities n The most insecure version is POP3 which runs on port 110  if the email server requires POP3, block all access to port 110 except to that server  if POP3 not used, block port 110 entirely…

44 TCP Ports 135 and 137 NetBIOS n The Microsoft Windows protocol used for file and print sharing  last thing you probably want is for users on the Internet to connect to your servers' files and printers! n Block NetBIOS. Period!

45 UDP Port 161 SNMP n SNMP is important for remote management of network devices:  but also it poses inherent security risks  stores configuration and performance parameters in a database that is then accessible via the network… n If network is open to the Internet, hackers can gain a large amount of very valuable information about the network… n So… if SNMP is used:  allow access to port 161 from internal network only  otherwise, block it entirely

46 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks n An attempt to harm a network by flooding it with traffic so that network devices are overwhelmed and unable to provide services. n One of the primary DOS attacks uses Ping, an ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) service:  sends a brief request to a remote computer asking it to echo back its IP address

47 “Ping” Attacks n Dubbed the "Ping of Death“ n Two forms:  the attacker deliberately creates a very large ping packet and then transmits it to a victim »ICMP can't deal with large packets »the receiving computer is unable to accept delivery and crashes or hangs  an attacker will send thousands of ping requests to a victim so that its processor time is taken up answering ping requests, preventing the processor from responding to other, legitimate requests n Protection:  block ICMP echo requests and replies  ensure there is a rule blocking "outgoing time exceeded" & "unreachable" messages

48 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks/IP Spoofing n Related :  A DDOS attack has occurred when attackers gain access to a wide number of PCs and then use them to launch a coordinated attack against a victim »often rely on home computers, since they are less frequently protected (they can also use worms and viruses)  If IP spoofing is used, attackers can gain access to a PC within a protected network by obtaining its IP address and then using it in packet headers

49 Protection against DDOS & IP Spoofing n Block traffic coming into the network that contains IP addresses from the internal network… n In addition, block the following private IP, illegal and unroutable addresses:  Illegal/unroutable: »255.255.255.255, 27.0.0.0, 240.0.0.0, & 0.0.0.0  “Private” addresses useful for NAT, or Proxy Servers (RFC 1918): »10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255 »172.16.0.0-172.31.255.255 »192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255 n Finally, keep anti-virus software up-to-date, & firewall software patched and up-to-date


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