1. Gap in the literature Recent evidence of gender gap in productivity comparing men- women managed plots Evidence of gender specific impacts and responses to climate change but not optimal from household perspective BUT the household (HH) is an entity managing a HH farming system AND HH consumption Intra-household decisions on production AND consumption not necessarily cooperative nor efficient 1 IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015 Lifting gender constraints to sustainable intensification in coffee production Els Lecoutere with Laurence Jassogne, IITA Uganda

2. Theoretical framework Each member in HH -separate but interrelated production (a) and consumption (b) decisions -based on own preferences and expectations about others a)M (men) and/or W (women)may under-invest in HH production because uncertain about benefits (consumption) b)M and/or W may over-consume HH income because does not bear full cost of overuse and uncertain about others’ investments BUT if better “rules of the game” for intra HH decisions cooperative/efficiency gains possible 2 IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

3. Differences between couples -adopted joint planning and decision making ( change agents ) - with awareness raising - without “ “ “ “ Stronger incentives by both partners to invest in HH farm Husband more certain about benefits from HH farm and that wife will not shirk Wife more certain about benefits from HH farm and that husband will not shirk More HH investment in sustainable intensification Higher productivity of HH farm HH farm more sustainably managed More HH income available (also on longer term) Higher output to sell (also on longer term) Wife more certain about husband’s investment in HH farm Husband more certain about wife’s investment in HH farm Stronger incentives by both partners to consume in a fair and sustainable way from HH income Wife does not overconsume or shirk Husband does not overconsume or shirk More HH income availablefor investinginHH farm Better agronomic practices and diversification Intra household bargaining – Stronger bargaining position of women Joint decision making on production and consumption Gender roles and non-cooperative intra- household decision making challenged in wider community H1: M and W contribute more to investment in HH commons H4: Fairer consumption by M and W H 3: More sustainable consumption from common income by M and W H2: M and W contribute more equally RQ 1 - Intra-household investment and consumption behaviour? (Experiment) RQ 2 - More efficient and sustainably intensified farming ? (In reality) H5: More investment in the HH farming system H6: Women’s interests taken more into account H7: More balanced control over income between M and W RQ 3 - Equality of control over income ? (In reality)

4. Research tools - Experiment Data collection in April 2015 Sample: from Hanns R. Neumann Stiftung (HRNS) farmer groups in Kasese district - 37 Direct change agent couples (DCA) - 18 Indirect change agent couples (ICA) - 47 Couples with awareness raising (MT) - 53 Couples without “ “ “ “ (NT) 4 IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

5. Research tools - Experiment Experiment design Stage 1: Decision about contribution to investment in common HH farm - M and W privately decide how much to invest from 2000 UGX - Knowing returns to investment may be 10, 30 or 50 % Stage 2: Decision about consumption from HH income generated through investment - Reveal HH income after investment in stage 1 - M and W privately decide on share Post-experiment evaluation - A lot/some resemblance experiment-reality: Investment decisions: M 88% and W 79% Consumption decisions: M 83% and W 73% 5 IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

6. Research tools – Survey, FGD Individual survey (N=310) –Individual and household socio-economic characteristics –Individual income and assets –Farming systems –Individual adoption of agronomic practices –Intra-household control over income FGD with NT men, NT women, DCA-ICA-MT men and DCA-ICA-MT women –Prevailing farming systems –Prevailing gender roles decisions about production and income use –Attitudes towards sustainable intensification –Reasons for resistance to joint planning and decision making 6 IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

7. Results - Experiment 7 Total contribution DCA couples (2416 UGX)= ICA couples > MT couples (2013 UGX) > NT couples (2132 UGX) H1: M and W and couples with joint decision making contribute more to HH commons Stage 1: Contributions to investment in HH commons Contributions by husbands – by wives DCA > MT > NT NOT CONFIRMED - H2: Couples with joint decision making contribute more equal amounts IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

9. Reference = DCA Total contribution by couple = f(type couple, age diff, diff education, diff value indiv assets, diff off-farm income) EstimateStd. errorPr(>|t|) (Intercept) 2519.897147.202<2e-16*** ICA -155.588178.3360.3844 MT -333.755139.3250.0179* NT -266.238133.6430.0482* DIFF_age 8.6997.2680.2333 DIFF_edu: W H edu 136.396174.2430.435 DIFF_edu: W L edu -109.787111.3150.3257 DIFF_assets Squared -31.56413.3680.0196* DIFF_assets -81.70293.0770.3815 DIFF_off Squared 4.05720.2340.8414 DIFF_off -103.35363.8780.1079 Residual standard error: 597.7 on 144 DF Adjusted r-squared: 0.0997 f-stat: 2.705 on 10 and 144 DF, p-value: 0.004528 N (couples) = 155

10. Results - Experiment 10 Average share consumed (controlled for available HH income) DCA, ICA, MT, NT women = MT men > DCA men when HH income is medium Overconsumption by couple (= Consumption W + M - available HH income) MT couples > DCA couples when HH income is medium H3 and H4: M and couples with joint decision making consume HH income in a more sustainable and fair way at medium income levels Stage 2: Consumption from HH income generated through investment IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

11. Reference = DCA High invest Average share consumed - Husbands Consumption husband/INVEST= f(type couple*invest category + contribution husband) Average share consumed - Wives Consumption wife/INVEST= f(type couple*invest category + contribution wife) Overconsumption- Couples Consump_wife + consump_husband – INVEST = f(type couple* invest category) EstSEPr(>|t|) EstSEPr(>|t|)EstimateStd. errorPr(>|t|) (Intercept)0.5540.1091.14e-06 ***0.6380.1535.29e-05 *** 931.33320.340.00423 ** ICA-0.0030.1080.98160.0430.1310.744 -25.62567.910.96408 MT-0.1690.097 0.083.-0.1280.1170.274 -1289.33506.510.01197 * NT-0.0680.0880.4420.0010.1060.992 -274.19461.050.55298 Low invest0.1340.120.2690.0060.1510.966 -226.33599.310.70624 Medium invest-0.1370.0870.116-0.0060.1080.957 -751.33445.90.09417. Contribution husband/wife000.455000.729 ICA*Low invest-0.2140.1740.223-0.1010.210.631 -479.38914.120.6008 MT*Low invest0.0180.1460.9030.0610.1750.728 830.7763.590.27848 NT*Low invest-0.1030.1440.4760.0640.1740.714 -46.81756.130.95072 ICA*Medium invest-0.0330.1620.837-0.0180.1960.926 109.62852.40.89785 MT* Medium invest0.3270.1290.012 *0.0620.1550.688 1572.67674.820.02118 * NT* Medium invest0.1030.1160.3787-0.0770.140.585 205.86610.670.73653 Residual SE: 0.2361 on 142 DFResidual SE: 0.2844 on 142 DFResidual standard error: 1241 on 143 DF Adjusted R-squared: 0.01141Adjusted R-squared: -0.04038Adjusted r-squared: -0.0008312 F-stat: 1.148 on 12 and 142 DFF-stat: 0.5019 on 12 and 142 DFf-stat: 0.9884 on 11 and 143 DF p-value: 0.3266, N (men) =155p-value: 0.9108, N (women) =155p-value: 0.4598, N (couples) = 155

12. Results - Reality 12 Outcomes of intra-household investment behaviour Adoption of sustainable intensification practices By men, personally or jointly managing coffee, as most important HH cash crop (N=139) Number of practices: DCA men > MT men > NT men Adoption per practice: Pct DCA men > Pct NT men (sig for coffee specific practices) No relation with investment behaviour in experiment H5: Couples with joint decision making (men) higher adoption rates of sustainable intensification of coffee IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

13. Reference=DCA Number of practices ADOP_ SUM (Men, Coffee) Adoption per practice (proportion) SHADE TREES - STUMPING (Men, Coffee) EstS.EPr(>|t|)SigEstS.EPr(>|t|)Sig (Intercept)4.010.506.27E-13***1.0650.1494.96E-11*** ICA-0.270.460.5575-0.0690.1350.6098 MT-0.630.360.0839.-0.1300.1070.2268 NT-0.580.350.1066-0.1990.1050.0591. Contribution husband in exp 0.00 0.9559-0.0000.0000.0582. Residual SE: 1.498 on 134 DFResidual SE: 0.4427 on 134 DF Adj R2: -0.0008803Adj R2: 0.02053 F-statistic: 0.9697 on 4 and 134 DFF-statistic: 1.723 on 4 and 134 DF p-value: 0.4264, N=139 p-value: 0.1485, N=139

14. Results - Reality 14 Outcomes of intra-household investment behaviour Adoption of sustainable intensification practices FOOD crops (By women – Cassava) (N=121) Number of practices: On average only 1 – No differences Ownership of plot (cash – food crop) H6: Women’s interests taken more into account in couples with joint decision making (Joint ownership of plots) IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

15. Results - Reality 15 Outcomes of intra-household consumption behaviour Who controls lion share of the 1 st cash crop income (i.e. 80% or more)? (As reported by women) 73% of DCA women report joint control > 57% of NT women (Sig diff) H7: More balanced control over income by couples jointly making decisions IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015

16. Conclusion and ways forward 16 Experimental and cross-sectional evidence: More cooperative outcomes in case of reduced information asymmetries and power imbalances in intra-household decision making about HH farm production and consumption Ways forward: A.Random introduction for causal inference B.Other approaches to improving intra-household decision making (e.g. increase women’s human/financial capital) C.Altered HH farming system as more cooperative outcome IOB Seminar on Development Actors Policies and Processes, 9 June 2015