1. FREE-RIDERS and TURNOVER Jun Kobayashi (Chicago) Naoko Taniguchi (Teikyo, Michigan) Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo) August 18, 2004 ASA Mini Conference, SF

2. OVERVIEW Free-riders and Turnover “Free-riding and Mobility” Project Survey on Japanese White-collar workers, N=810 Free-riders and Cooperators in Job Change, Income, Satisfaction

3. QUESTION Effects of FREE-RIDING on of JOB CHANGE??? FR=“Less Efforts than Expected” Cooperator=“Provide Enough Efforts” No Free-riders Assumed Mutual Cooperation, Monitoring

4. LITERATURE Empirical Studies on FR (’92-): No “Job Change” variable Takahashi (1997): Motivated -> LOW Willingness Cooperators -> Job Change↓??? We Challenge this Prediction

5. HYPOTHESES Rational to “Free-ride” and “STAY” Koyama + Ooura + Kobayashi: Cooperators can gain by “EXITING” H1 Cooperators CHANGE Jobs More H2 More WILLING to Change Jobs H3 EARN More H4 More SATISFIED

6. JAPANESE WORKERS 67M Workers (130M) 41% Females 84% Employed Blue 38%, White 49, Service 11 Primary 5%, 2nd 30, Tertiary 65 Focus

7. Introduction Data Result

8. SURVEY “Job Change and Work Attitudes” March 2004, in Japan White-collar, Full-time workers Males, Age 30-49 N=810 Self-report, 74 questions, 5 points

9. SAMPLING On Internet, Marketing company (1) Registered 14,000 -> (2) 1,600 Randomly -> (3) First 810 Receive 250 yens ($2)

11. DEPENDENT VARIABLES Job Change Experience/Willingness Binary Logistic Regressions Covariance Structure Analyses INCOME Increase, SATISFACTION Compare Current and Previous Jobs  “5 years ago” if NO Change

12. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Latent Variables from 5 Point-scales “FREE-RIDING” (α=.51)  Do Less than Fair Share  Save Efforts if Others Work Hard  Not Educate Juniors “PUNITIVE” (α=.53)  Hate Betrayers  “Eye for Eye” is Reasonable  Try to Exclude Lazy Coworkers

13. CONTROL VARIABLES “MOTIVATION” (α=.68)  Try to Improve Skills  Confident in Ability  Long-term Work Plans “COMMITMENT” (α=.66)  Loyalty to Organization  Solidarity with Coworkers  Group Benefits over Personal

14. Introduction Data Result

15. JOB CHANGE N=810 (41.1%)(61.5%)

16. FREE-RIDING, PUNITIVE N=810 Skewness=.184 = -.408

17. y = JOB CHANGE Binary Logistic Regression (N=810) Coefficients College dummy-.678*** Previous Income-.326*** FREE-RIDING-.344** PUNITIVE.011 Motivations.661*** Commitment-.196* Satisfaction (Evaluation).374*** Satisfaction (Income)-.131 † Satisfaction (Future)-.491*** Satisfaction (Manager)-.294*** Cox/Snell R 2, Correct %.177, 70.2%

18. COVARIANCE STRUCTURE Job Change Free-rider Punitive Motivation Commit College Income S: Income S: Future S: Manager S: Evaluation GFI=.670 AIC=19,813 N=769 - + - - - - - + +

19. y = WILLINGNESS Binary Logistic Regression (N=810) Coefficients Job Change dummy.592** College dummy-.302 Work Years-.060*** FREE-RIDING.004 PUNITIVE.087 † Motivations.710*** Commitment-.652*** Satisfaction (Evaluation)-.359*** Satisfaction (Promotion)-.311** Cox/Snell R 2, Correct %.247, 73.1%

20. COVARIANCE STRUCTURE Willingness Free-rider Punitive Motivation Commit Job Change Work Years S: Evaluation S: Promotion GFI=.604 AIC=4,837 N=769 + - - - +†+† - + -

21. INCOME INCREASE Among those who MOVED Those who STAYED NO Significant Difference Income IncreaseN Cooperators\290.5K ($2,500)184 Free-riders\ 11.9K ($ 100)137 Cooperators\298.7K ($2,500)203 Free-riders\261.5K ($2,100)255 > >

22. SATISFACTION Those who MOVED Those who STAYED Difference among those who Stayed Satisfaction (5 points)N Cooperators3.19190 Free-riders3.17143 Cooperators3.00211 Free-riders2.75266 > > **

23. TEST RESULTS H1More JOB CHANGESupported Significant H2More WILLINGNESSNot H3More INCOME INCREASESupported H4More SATISFACTIONSupported

24. SUMMARY Free-riding and Job Change Cooperative workers MOVE more Punitive workers WANT to MOVE Cooperators increase INCOME and SATISFACTION than Free-riders

25. THE BIG PICTURE Org. Equilibrium Theory... Participation and Contribution If Rational to EXIT, Why STAY? WHO Free-rides? Compare w/ Simulation, Experiment, Organizational Survey