1. Trade Facilitation and Customs Importance for Economic Development

2. Are Customs born facilitators? Culture of control Rapid emergence of largely untested private sector The importance of shuttle trade Conflicting agenda Not necessarily the only ones involved

3. A few statements overheard “ I went through Customs …” “ Customs are so corrupt …” “ Do we need Customs at all in the global economy? ” “ IT and equipment will solve it all ” “ What about outsourcing Customs? ”

4. The place of Customs Role of other services and agencies The “ corruption ” vicious circle “ Customs are corrupt ” Therefore, bring in other agencies Who get corrupt Therefore, blame “ Customs ” But Customs may be the best placed THUS: Who is in charge? Make Customs responsible

5. Customs are at the cross- roads Unique vantage point Non-judicial, routine, access to trade intelligence and data Good understanding of the supply chain Excellent cooperation in the Customs world

6. Customs is more than Customs, but Customs do more than Customs In other words: Distinguish between the function and the institution

7. Is there an alternative to Customs? Pre-shipment inspection May be necessary Usually antagonizes Customs Difficult to end Mixed results Incentives always go in the wrong direction And rather expensive Management contracts Rather expensive too Low hanging fruit syndrome Limited transfer of competence Sovereignty issues Style rather than philosophy (two separate organizations in the same territory)

8. The tools for facilitation Traditional Legislation IT Procedure streamlining More recent Integration Pro-Committees Regional approach Performance monitoring

9. Legislation Templates exist Kyoto Convention EU code WTO Require adaptation Huge legislative changes are sometimes needed Must fit in national policies Danger of over- legislating v/ regulating Protects Transparent Can stifle initiatives May prevent flexibility May prevent customization

10. Recent tools we supported Integration: Integrated Border Management Cross-border exchanges Single Window approach Delegation/ cross- designation Regional approach At borders: Infrastructure and operations National: Unique interlocutor Regional: practical working groups

11. Recent tools we supported PRO – Committees Private sector involvement Capacity to take over projects Ability to promote ideas across the industry Performance monitoring Information

12. Recent tools we supported Performance measurement Pilot site approach Undisputed methodology for measuring “ Macro indicators ” Baselines Targets

13. Where is it measured

14. Results What is measured gets managed … Times tend to come down

15. Inland clearance station

16. Border station

17. One example of baseline

18. Efficiency: Declarations / Staff

19. Our experience Customs will always be blamed by some persons, yet...

20. The paradox: The role of the private sector

21. But when times go down, revenue goes up

22. Physical examinations Sometimes perceived a contrario as a punishment The punishment is the time and the fine Not linked to simplified procedures They are not a ritual but an essential part of control But they do not bring too many results!

23. Lessons learned: Exams can be fruitless

24. Some conclusions: When examinations come down, detections go up, except when risk management comes in

25. Post release checks and audits Chain of procedure: Control over cargo, declaration processing, verification Deferred checks, compliance verification, audit Criminal investigation

26. Post release audits are not A criminal investigation Always possible (licenses and permits) Limited to one operation, unlike up- front verifications

27. Post release audits are A way to ensure future compliance (clarification and fines) Providing a wider picture of the supply chain and a dialogue with importers Conducted to see if financial records can be reconciled with Customs records, and Usually successful

28. Compliance models Moving from a culture of control to “ enlightened compliance ” raises issues: Business environment Enforcement environment Socially acceptable risk and cost of marginal compliance

29. Compliance v. Detection Optimal levels of control in a given compliance model

30. A possible model The optimal level of inspection is close to 40 percent