1. RUCH KONTROLI WYBORÓW PROBLEMS OF ELECTION INTEGRITY CONTROL AS STATISTICAL STUDY OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES Józef Oleński Łazarski University Warsaw 2015

2. Elections as statistical study Democracy is based on statistical measures of social preference o Appointment of authorities in general elections – a full statistical public opinion poll o Making decisions based on simple statistical indicators from sample polls (e.g. voting in parliament, the Senate, provincial assemblies, local authorities, committees) Conclusion – quality of the election should be assessed based on the methods and criteria applied in the statistical studies.

3. Are elections in Poland falsified according to statistical methods of quality evaluation? YES – finding based on evidence o extreme differences in rate of intentional biases - invalid votes among districts o changes in electoral preferences during the day of the vote registered by the firms conducting "exit polls" (see – Polish Presidential Election of 2010) o alleged failures of servers (which are statistically trouble-free) and IT systems (which are very simple) Conclusion - elections have been systematically falsified at least since 2006.

4. Signs of systematic intentional biases Intentional biases show extreme differences: o in voter turnout in different electoral districts within one settlement unit (no data) o between the structure of persons entitled to vote and the structure of the votes cast (no data) o between the results of voting at the election committees of adjacent districts within the settlement unit (no data) o in share of invalid votes between electoral districts and constituencies (including the adjacent ones, with similar settlement network)

5. Maps of invalid votes The maximum allowable share of invalid ballot papers in the election as a statistical study: o 1% (one-seat and presidential elections) o 2% (parliamentary and local government elections) o 0,5 – 0,7% - election in the second round and in one-seat constituencies Areas marked dark blue (marked dark green on the 3rd map) indicate districts where election results were fairly calculated In other regions, the results do not meet the minimum criteria of statistical quality The authors of the maps: dr J. Flis, prof. J.Rzążkowski, prof. P. Śleszyński

6. Local Government Elections of 2002

7. Provincial Council Elections of 2006

8. Provincial Council Elections of 2014

10. No possibility to control the election as a statistical study ex ante and ex post Lack of control and certification of software by independent external experts and monitoring of the processing IT systems and "servers failures" - resulting in disorganization and disorder in the counting of votes and the lack of a structured original documentation (the list of voters, ballot papers, ballot papers returned by voters), preventing ex-post control Lack of external control of results at the level higher than district

11. No possibilities to control the election as a statistical study ex ante and ex post Low turnout increases the impact of frauds on the final outcome of elections. o Small number of „intentional biases” changes the outcome of elections Voting by post opens up great opportunities for falsifying data o No control of the voting by a particular voter o Postal voting of immigrants No control of the integrity of the voting taking place abroad o Important in presidential and parliamentary elections o Is there a possibility of a practical introduction of trustees and observers in the committees abroad? o Where should the voting stations be located abroad?

12. Fraud techniques in the voting process ”Tossing in votes” o Before start of voting – adding pre-filled ballot papers to the ballot box o During voting hours – in the absence of reliable trustees or observers o After close of voting – adding ballot papers during the confusion at the opening of the ballot boxes and "sorting out" ballot papers ”Syndrome of the last quarter of an hour” o Votes cast by the committee officials for the electors who did not attend the elections, usually just before the close of voting (possible in the absence of trustees) ”Removing the traces” o Delivery and storage of ballot papers with votes cast in the form, which makes ex post control impossible (e.g. the ballot papers in bags thrown into the basement through a window)

13. Fraud techniques at the stage of counting votes "Wrong" sorting out ballot papers "by mistake" during their sorting per each candidate and counting "Mistakes" in recording vote counting results and in dictating the votes cast for a particular candidate by a "trusted" committee official to the person who takes notes (in practice impossible to grasp by the trustees) "Invalidating" votes cast for the candidates of the opposition by marking one more cross for another candidate on the ballot paper- during the counting of votes after the close of voting Qualifying the ballot papers correctly completed as invalid votes, if the vote was cast for a candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)

14. Techniques for generating intentional errors in District Electoral Commission (OKW) "Errors" in the process of counting votes – sorting the votes per particular candidate regardless, which square was marked "Errors" in counting the sorted ballot papers "Errors" in manual completion of the voting protocol (usually by a ”trusted” member of the committee) "Errors" at the stage of copying data from the hand-written protocol to the electronic format ”by the IT worker” (lack of supervision over this phase of electoral process)

15. Fraud techniques in Constituency Electoral Commissions at the stage of aggregating protocols from District Electoral Commissions Potential possibilities of free creation of aggregate data in the process of calculating data in Constituency Electoral Commission based on the protocols from District Electoral Commissions o No effective external control of this process by the experts from outside Constituency Electoral Commission o ”Manual” counting results in a mess facilitating „errors”

16. Techniques of „creating results” in the National Electoral Commission The freedom of creating aggregate data in the National Electoral Commission, especially in the process of ”manual” calculation of aggregate data based on protocols from Constituency Electoral Commissions o In the National Electoral Commission there is no effective external control of the process of calculating aggregate results of voting by the observers from outside National Electoral Commission Techniques of processing

17. Potential strategy of manipulation in 2015 election Smaller share of "invalid” votes in the presidential and parliamentary elections (compared to local government election) o Increased activity of „invalidating" votes cast for certain candidates ”Errors” in counting votes cast for some candidates in District Commission o ascribing the votes cast for candidate X to candidate Y ” Errors” in completing District Commission protocols ”Errors” in aggregating votes from protocols in Constituency Commission

18. Control of election process in District Electoral Commissions in 2015 Election Control of readiness of the District Commission, voting process and counting votes in District Electoral Commission o In all committees, at least one member representing the Law and Justice (PIS) party, two trustees – observers o Presence of external observers throughout the work of the commission (from checking the ballot boxes before the voting to signing the protocol of the commission and making its copies) Firmly reacting with any irregularities of the commission work o If any doubt, a commission official should not sign the protocol but report the protest

19. Control of election process in District Electoral Commission The attention should be paid to: o Voting for the electors who did not attend (by the close of voting) – syndrome of the last quarter of an hour o Special control of postal votes – no external control who the ballots were delivered to and who cast a vote (especially abroad) o Organisation of counting ballots given out and votes cast – creating an atmosphere of hurry, mess o Completing and printing of a protocol Note: o According to statistical standards the share of invalid votes should not exceed 1 – 2 %

20. Calculation of 2015 election results The condition for the effective control of the election is to separately calculate the voting results based on the copy of District Commissions protocols (ca. 27000)

21. Alternative calculation of 2015 election results Immediately after signing the protocol by District Electoral Commission, min. 2 copies of the protocol must be made (if possible): o Scan of the protocol o Photocopy of the protocol o Photo of the protocol o If the photo is not very clear, a copy of the protocol should also be made by hand Based on the data from the copies of protocols the protocol data extract should be made and sent to the Central Database of Protocols o Via internet – directly to the Database o Via SMS – to the indicated telephone number o Dictated to the person on the indicated telephone number

22. Scope of the data extract from District Electoral Commission protocol – presidential election 1. Territorial municipal code 2. Number of voting district 3. The number of ballot papers removed from the ballot box 1.Including number of envelopes (postal votes) 4. Number of valid ballot papers 5. Number of invalid ballot papers 6. Number of invalid votes (from among valit ballot papers) 7. Number of valid votes 8. Number of votes cast per each candidate (order as on the ballot card) 1.……… 2.…….. 3.……..

23. Framework scheme of counting votes based on District Electoral Commission (OKW) protocols OKW1OKW2OKW3 OKW 28000 Central Database of Protocols from OKW

24. Calculation of election results from the Central Database of District Electoral Commission (OKW) Protocols Number of votes cast o Valid o Invalid Number of postal votes cast o Valid o Invalid Number of votes cast per each candidate 1.……….. 2.……..... The results should be made available to the public before the official communications of the National Electoral Commission (PKW)

25. IT and information conditions for efficient electoral system 1. National Electoral Commission (PKW) – political and social representativeness 2. Organization of the electoral process entrusted to the administration office equipped with the know-how and organizational and technical potential o Courts (National Electoral Commission composed of judges is a peculiar court ) are not competent organizers of large statistical studies 3. Exclusion of the courts from resolving complaints regarding election results 4. Standardisation of election information 5. Responsibility of electoral committees for the compliance with the information standards 6. Transparent ballot papers 7. Centralized voting IT system 8. Management of data processing by the competent authority 9. Certification of the hardware and software for voting and processing of the election results

26. Thank you for your attention. Your comments are welcome.