1. PHIL 340: ANCIENT ETHICAL THEORY BEN HOLE WINTER 2016 OFFICE HOURS AFTER CLASS.

2. AGENDA Admin / Where we are and what we’re doing Writing Assignments & Final Paper Review Republic, Book 1 Republic, Book 2 (Review & Discuss) Republic, Book 4 Thursday: Rep 4 & 8

3. WHERE WE ARE AND WHAT WE’RE DOING Week, DateRequired Reading 1, 1/5Syllabus for Phil 340 1, 1/7Apology (all) 2, 1/12Meno (70-86); Phaedo (all) 2, 1/14Republic Book 1 (all); Book 2 (357-376) 3, 1/19Republic Book 2 (357-376); Book 4 (all) 3, 1/21Republic Book 4 (all); Book 8 (all) 4, 1/26Nicomachean Ethics Book 1 4, 1/28Nicomachean Ethics Book 1-2 5, 2/2Nicomachean Ethics Book 2-3; Book 6.13 5, 2/5Nicomachean Ethics Book 3-4 6, 2/9Nicomachean Ethics Book 4 6, 2/11Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Nussbaum, “Non- Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” 7, 2/16Euthydemus (278-281); Irwin on the Stoics (PDF) 7, 2/18Stoics (Primary texts excerpts in PDF form) 8, 2/23Hursthouse, OVE Chapter 9; Annas, “Virtue Ethics: Which kind of naturalism?” 8, 2/25Driver, “Virtue Theory”; Hursthouse, “Are the Virtues the Proper Starting Place for Morality?" 9, 10In-Class Paper Conference Participation & Reading Philosophy Writing Assignments & Final Paper

4. WRITING RESOURCES 1.Jim Pryor’s Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper (link)link 2.Mark Woodhouse’s Writing Philosophy (POSTED) 3.The Odegaard Writing and Research Center (link): “This is the place to come and chat with peer tutors and librarians, to grow as a writer in the context of whatever project is foremost in your mind.”link 4.The UNC Writing Center’s Handouts (link): for general writing help.link 5.Philosophy Writing Center! (https://phil.washington.edu/philosophy-writing-center)https://phil.washington.edu/philosophy-writing-center

5. PHILOSOPHICAL WRITING Writing Assignments (20%) The point of the weekly writing assignments is to serve as lower stakes opportunities for assessment and to provide you with practice of the philosophical skills you will need to master for the final paper. Final Paper (50%) The point of the paper is for you to demonstrate that you are familiar with a major view in ancient ethical theory and are able to critically evaluate that view with philosophical rigor. Your critical evaluation is an opportunity for you to demonstrate your mastery of the philosophical skills you have practiced throughout the quarter. Interpretation and Analysis: be able to analyze, interpret, and understand philosophical texts and discourse. Argumentation: be able to effectively identify, evaluate, and formulate arguments. Philosophical Knowledge and Methodology: be able to demonstrate a high degree of fluency with the major traditions, figures, concepts, and methods of philosophy. Communication: be able to develop, organize, and express ideas in a precise, clear, effective, and systematic manner in writing and discussion. http://writingcenter.unc.edu/handouts/understanding-assignments-demo/

6. FINAL PAPER (35%)

7. REVIEW OF BOOK 1 Cephalus. Justice is paying your debts or giving to each what is owed. (327a-331d) Polemarchus. Justice is doing good to friends and harm to enemies. (331e-336a) Thrasymachus. Justice is the advantage of the stronger. (336b- 347e) What is justice (δικαιοσύνη)?

8. MAIN ARGUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC We are happier being just than unjust What is justice? What is happiness? Plato’s theories of the forms End of Book 1 “So now the whole conversation has left me in the dark; for so long as I do not know what justice is, I am hardly likely to know whether or not it is a virtue, or whether or makes a man happy or unhappy” (Rep. 354)

9. “THE SACHS FALLACY” “My aim is to show that Plato's conclusions are irrelevant to what he sets out -and purports- to establish. The fallacy of irrelevance that, in my judgment, wrecks the Republic's main argument is due to the lack of connection between two conceptions of justice that Plato employs.” (Sachs, 141) “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.” Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 39

10. TRANSITION: PLATO’S REPUBLIC, BK.II Review Discuss See Republic Book II handout (in Miscellany files)

11. BOOK 2 “Glaucon introduces a sophisticated division of goods into three classes and asks Socrates to which class justice belongs. Socrates places it in the highest class, consisting of things valued both because of themselves and because of their consequences (357a-358a). This conflicts with the general view that justice belong in the lowest class, consisting of things harsh in themselves and valued only for their consequences. It is this view that Glaucon, with the help of Adeimantus, challenges Socrates to defeat. He is to show that justice itself (justice stripped of its consequences) makes its possessor happier than injustice itself (injustice stripped of its consequences), for this is what the general view denies. Socrates does not complete his response to the challenge until the end of Book IX.” (Reeve, 23)

12. BOOK 2 TRANSITION Immoralist Challenge (Thrasymachus at the end of Book 1) Justice by Agreement (Glaucon & Adeimantus in Book 2) Platonic Justice (Socrates in Books 2-10)

13. THRASYMACHUS “Don’t you know that some cities are ruled by tyranny, some by democracy, and some by an aristocracy? Of course. And in each city this element is stronger, namely, the ruler? Certainly. And each makes laws to its own advantage… And they declare what they have made –what is to their own advantage– to be just for their subjects, and they punish anyone who goes against this as lawless and unjust. This, then, is what I say justice is, the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule. Since the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who reasons correctly will conclude that the just is the same everywhere, namely, the advantage of the stronger.” (338e-339a)

14. GLAUCON, READ 358E-359C.FF Social Contract Theory? State of Nature Circumstances of Justice Minimal Agreement

15. DISCUSSION Suppose that Gyges finds, not one ring, but two. Both rings have the same magic power. Put yourself into Gyges’ sandals, and imagine that your conception of happiness is the same as his. What would you do with the second ring? Explain. You will need to begin by considering how Gyges’ conceives of happiness. Note: Gyges’ ring will never leave his finger; so he doesn’t need a spare ring.

16. H.A. PRITCHARD’S DILEMMA Why not be immoral? a.Because the fact that it is wrong is a reason not to do it? b.Because avoiding wrongdoing promotes self-interest? “Plato certainly did not underrate his task. Indeed, in reading his statement of it, we wonder how he ever came to think that he could execute it.” Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, HA Pritchard

17. “THE SACHS FALLACY” “My aim is to show that Plato's conclusions are irrelevant to what he sets out -and purports- to establish. The fallacy of irrelevance that, in my judgment, wrecks the Republic's main argument is due to the lack of connection between two conceptions of justice that Plato employs.” (Sachs, 141) “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.” Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 39

18. “THE SACHS FALLACY” “Sachs took it for granted that Plato’s defense of justice had to answer Thrasymachus’ and Glaucon’s challenge, that one would be better off or happier being unjust rather than just (if one could get away with injustice by deception or violence). But, Sachs argued, the way Plato defines a just person – as one whose soul is so constituted that reason rules, spirit helps reason carry out its decisions, and appetite is obedient to reason – provides no assurance that such a just person would refrain, to begin with, from the unjust actions that Thrasymachus and Glaucon argued would be profitable if one could get away with it. Even if it is better for a person to have a soul so constituted, this is irrelevant to Thrasymachus’ and Glaucon’s challenge.” (Santas 202-3)

19. BREAK Then Republic 4

20. REPUBLIC BOOK 3 -> BOOK 4 Bk. 3 Education of the Guardians Myth of the Metals / Noble Lie Bk. 4 Describing the kallipolis Tripartition of the Soul Psyche-Polis Analogy

21. UNHAPPY GUARDIANS IN THE KALLIPOLIS? “Everyone is supposed to be happy in the kallipolis (420b, 519e), yet the guardians, who have the most power, do not seem to have been made happy at all. Socrates’ response (420b-421c) is complex and should be read together with 465e.ff. The goal of the kallipolis, he says, is not to make any one group of the city outstandingly happy at the expense of others, as Thrasymachus claimed, but to make everyone as happy as his nature allows (421c). This will be accomplished, he argues, if everyone in it practices the craft for which his natural aptitude is highest, whether it is producing guarding, or ruling (434a-c).” Reeve, 94

22. “The kallipolis is pronounced established (427d). Since it is completely good (427e), it must have all the virtues of a city (see 352d-354a), namely, wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice. Therefore the search for justice in it is guaranteed not to be futile. By the time that search has concluded (434d), wisdom, courage, moderation and justice have each been identified with distinct structural features of the kallipolis, but those identifications will not be secure until the very same features are shown to be identical to those virtues in the individual soul (434d-435a). This leads to the argument for division of the soul into three parts – appetitive, spirited, rational – corresponding to the three major classes in the kallipolis – producers, guardians, rulers (435c-441c). Once this argument is complete, it remains to find the virtues in the soul and to show that they are the same structural features of it as of the kallipolis (441c-444a).” Reeve, 94-5

23. CHARIOT ALLEGORY “First the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome” (Phaedrus 246b)Phaedrus 246b

24. PSYCHE-POLIS ISOMORPHISM (KEYT) “if (i) two systems have the same number of parts, if (ii) the parts of the one system can be paired one to one with the parts of the other on the basis of the kinds to which the parts belong, if (iii) these kinds of parts are the seats of certain affections, and if (iv) the one system has a quality in virtue of its parts having such an affection, then (v) the other system has the same quality if its parts have the same affection” (Keyt, Plato on Justice, 2006, 349)

25. PSYCHE-POLIS ISOMORPHISM: BASIC QUESTIONS 1.Does the human psyche have in it different natural psychic parts, three in number and the same in kind as the three natural social parts of the city? 2.Does the human psyche have psychic functions that correspond to the general social functions of the city? 3.Finally, if the psyche has three natural psychic parts and if it does have three general psychic functions, which psychic activity is the optimal function of which psychic part?

26. PLATONIC MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Three Stages of Argument 1.Individual psychic activities can be collected and divided naturally into three kinds, “desiring”, getting angry, and reasoning 2.Examples are given of evident conflicts among such activities 3.From these conflicts, the principle of contrariety, and the unspoken assumption that psychic activities of a given kind imply psychic powers of that kind, the non identity of three powers is inferred, each power being named after the kind of activity it uniquely performs: “naming that by which reasons the reasoning, that by which it erotically loves, hungers, thirsts and feels the flutter and titillation of other appetities, the a-rational and appetitive… and that by which we feel anger, spirit (439d.ff).” (Santas, 80)

27. PLATONIC MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Principle of Contraries: “the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time” (436b) Santas: “evidence of psychic conflicts within the following pairs of psychic activities: (1) between desiring food, drink, or sex and refusing to indulge due to reasoning, from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and of desiring these things is inferred (439); (2) between desiring something and being angry at one’s desiring it (the case of Leontius who desired to see dead bodies and was angry at himself for that (439- 441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of desiring and of feeling angry is inferred; (3) between feeling angry at something and calculating that it is best not to act on one’s anger (the case of Ulysses who became furious at his betraying servants but was held back from punishing them at one by reasoning about what is better to do (441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and feeling anger is inferred.” (80)

28. PLATONIC MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Principle of Contraries: “the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time” (436b) Santas: “evidence of psychic conflicts within the following pairs of psychic activities: (1) between desiring food, drink, or sex and refusing to indulge due to reasoning, from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and of desiring these things is inferred (439); (2) between desiring something and being angry at one’s desiring it (the case of Leontius who desired to see dead bodies and was angry at himself for that (439- 441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of desiring and of feeling angry is inferred; (3) between feeling angry at something and calculating that it is best not to act on one’s anger (the case of Ulysses who became furious at his betraying servants but was held back from punishing them at one by reasoning about what is better to do (441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and feeling anger is inferred.” (80)

29. PLATONIC MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Principle of Contraries: “the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time” (436b) Santas: “evidence of psychic conflicts within the following pairs of psychic activities: (1) between desiring food, drink, or sex and refusing to indulge due to reasoning, from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and of desiring these things is inferred (439); (2) between desiring something and being angry at one’s desiring it (the case of Leontius who desired to see dead bodies and was angry at himself for that (439- 441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of desiring and of feeling angry is inferred; (3) between feeling angry at something and calculating that it is best not to act on one’s anger (the case of Ulysses who became furious at his betraying servants but was held back from punishing them at one by reasoning about what is better to do (441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and feeling anger is inferred.” (80)

30. PLATONIC MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Principle of Contraries: “the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time” (436b) Santas: “evidence of psychic conflicts within the following pairs of psychic activities: (1) between desiring food, drink, or sex and refusing to indulge due to reasoning, from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and of desiring these things is inferred (439); (2) between desiring something and being angry at one’s desiring it (the case of Leontius who desired to see dead bodies and was angry at himself for that (439- 441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of desiring and of feeling angry is inferred; (3) between feeling angry at something and calculating that it is best not to act on one’s anger (the case of Ulysses who became furious at his betraying servants but was held back from punishing them at one by reasoning about what is better to do (441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and feeling anger is inferred.” (80)

31. NEXT TIME Week, DateRequired Reading 1, 1/5Syllabus for Phil 340 1, 1/7Apology (all) 2, 1/12Meno (70-86); Phaedo (all) 2, 1/14Republic Book 1 (all); Book 2 (357-376) 3, 1/19Republic Book 2 (357-376); Book 4 (all) 3, 1/21Republic Book 4 (all); Book 8 (all) 4, 1/26Nicomachean Ethics Book 1 4, 1/28Nicomachean Ethics Book 1-2 5, 2/2Nicomachean Ethics Book 2-3; Book 6.13 5, 2/5Nicomachean Ethics Book 3-4 6, 2/9Nicomachean Ethics Book 4 6, 2/11Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Nussbaum, “Non- Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” 7, 2/16Euthydemus (278-281); Irwin on the Stoics (PDF) 7, 2/18Stoics (Primary texts excerpts in PDF form) 8, 2/23Hursthouse, OVE Chapter 9; Annas, “Virtue Ethics: Which kind of naturalism?” 8, 2/25Driver, “Virtue Theory”; Hursthouse, “Are the Virtues the Proper Starting Place for Morality?" 9, 10In-Class Paper Conference