1. The Theoretical Frame of Social Rights Fabrizio Sciacca University of Catania fsciaccaunict@gmail.com

2. A philosophical approach to rights There are many reasons that justify the setting up of a sort of philosophical approach to rights. They are mainly linked to the peculiarities offered by the subject area in which this approach takes place: in the field of political and philosophical theory, the relation between the foundation and the philosophical justification of rights and their concrete application can be fully tackled. Political philosophy seems to be a suitable context to focus both of the problems of foundation of human rights (their ethical background and the historical building up of the idea of these rights) and the problem of justification (the issue of the universalism of rights in relation to the pluralism and regionalism of cultures).

3. Rights and Europeans: a common heritage I try to show here a sketch concerning the analysis of basic rights in relation to the “fact of pluralism” – as first described by John Rawls – in Europe. The main reasons for the setting up of a theory on rights, pluralism and justice are linked to the peculiarities of the subject area in which my topic is embedded, namely political philosophy. Political philosophy may provide the proper framework to focus both on the problems of foundation of rights (their ethical background and the historical building up of the idea of these rights) and the problems of implementation (the issue of the universality of rights in relation to the pluralism and regionalism of European cultures). Europeans (as Westerners) are moral bearers of specific cultures and ways of life, but also share a common constitutional heritage. Both matters are highly relevant in the field of political philosophy and political theory since both dealing with basic aspects of the complex relation between ethics and politics: a relation that also EC law has highlighted in several occasions.

4. Education and rights I try here to provide students with an opportunity of increasing their expertise and their knowledge of the debate on rights, pluralism and justice within the European integration process through an high-level academic activity which will bring together students, academics and practitioners. Furthermore, it addresses the current debate of the scientific community on the impact of migration flows on the perception of rights from European themselves. In a sense, this challenges the modern meaning of rights, typically belonging to the liberal western community, and based on the conception of rights as individual rights of freedom. Individuals – students and academics – should be educated and trained both on the theoretical and practical aspects of the implications of the debate and reflection on rights, pluralism and justice, and the way this affects the building up of a European Identity, and to be stimulated in fostering their academic capability on current theoretical priorities in the field of European Union policy processes.

5. ‘Right’ comes in a variety of tipes Human rights vs. Fundamental rights Liberty rights vs. Social rights

6. Human rights What are human rights? If rights come in a variety of types, I refer here to human rights as the rights that everyone holds.

7. Fundamental rights Fundamental rights are constitutional rights: legal regulations upon which the legal system turns. Therefore, the idea appears to be acceptable that human rights cover a global space, where fundamental rights seem to register themselves more on a local dimension, given that they are also expressions of the values, culture and concepts of a specific legal system.

8. Liberty rights Liberty rights as fundamental liberties: liberty as “independence from the constricting power of the others” (Kant). The individual right-holder as very strongly protected against the collective.

9. Social rights Most of social rights are 'subsistence rights'. It is enough to observe that amongst some of the so-called ‘subsistence rights’, even in the light of important provisions of the law, there are surely (though theoretically) human rights. Without institutionalisation of assistance duties, it is (sometimes) extremely unclear in whose reasoning a person-needing-assistance should play a prominent, ought- determining role. But if there is nobody for whom the needy individual should be ‘foregrounded’ – i.e. nobody they can legitimately resent for failing to assist them, nobody who wrongs them by failing to assist – then it is unclear that they have a genuine right to support for their need.

10. Social rights as human rights? Concerning the general problem of the relationship between social and human rights, it seems to me sufficient to observe that amongst some of the so-called public service rights, even in light of significant provisions of the law, are surely human rights. In particular, I refer to the following cases: (a) right to work and right to free choice of employment, to an equal salary for equal work, to a fair and satisfying remuneration; (b) right to a sufficient standard of living; (c) right to education; (d) right to health; (e) right to dwelling. However, other subsistence rights – as rights to services – could be configured as human rights. If you think of the following cases: (a) general right to public healthcare and medical care (that could be considered an implicit case of the general right to health); (b) right to nourishment; (c) right to rest and free time; (c) right to social security insurance; (d) right to information; (e) right to social security; (f) right to indemnification; (g) right to a healthy environment; h) right to cultural benefits; (i) right to food safety and security of the consumer rights (that could be considered an implicit case of the general right to food).

11. Subsistence rights as human rights? The discussion concerning ‘subsistence rights’ intended as ‘human rights’ is certainly not self-evident. It can be said that the problem of the equalisation between subsistence rights (as social rights) and patrimonial rights did not lead either to narrow distinctions or to acceptable solutions. In fact, if subsistence rights, as many affirm, are social rights entailing duties of assistance from others, the second point should also be self-evident, that is to say, every subsistence right would determine the equal distribution regarding the relation between social services and patrimonial rights. However, this is not the case.

12. Social rights: four unresolved points

13. Weakness (1) Subsistence rights, unlike from liberty rights as noninterference rights (rights entailing duties of noninterference from others), could be negotiable and/or derogable, given that they are social rights (assistence rights: rights to specific welfare services): weakness of the social rights.

14. Asset (2) How do we resolve the problem of the identification of the asset to be safeguarded? Probably, in a positive sense, and, hence, social rights safeguard some sort of asset in relation to individual expectations, like minimum income, housing, food, healthcare, and education

15. Guarantees (3) How are subsistence rights effectively guaranteed, seeing that at a domestic level the service is not typically clarified? It is reflected by the fact that it cannot be expected that the protection agencies could/should register themselves completely on a public dimension. Think of the funds for each category, insurance contracts or something else: it is this private dimension of allocation of rights that could give rise to new problems for the definition of the concept of ‘citizenship’; if, therefore, the ‘social right’ is something that is non-derogable, de plano also the specific and correlated assistance becomes the same thing

16. Risk (4) Lastly, it is necessary also to reflect on how much, on a global level, it could be considered as harmful, if guaranteeing a set of social rights were to equal the ratification of a paternalistic assistance policy aimed at the allocation of the rights of somebody, without bearing in mind the urgent necessity of others. Therefore, the urgent question remains to safeguard the principle that the entire class of human rights, including social rights, cannot set aside the consideration of the right of every individual to live in an acceptable manner, that is to say, decently.