1. IGTF Risk Assessment Team http://tagpma.es.net/wiki/bin/view/IGTF-RAT igtf-rat@eugridpma.org 5/11/091

2. MD5 MD5 hash collisions in X.509 certificates – Risk for new certificates issued using MD5 – IGTF should not have any of these… – http://www.eugridpma.org/newsletter/eugridpma-newsletter- 20090102.txt Also concern about MD5 weakness in general: – CA certificates (and subordinates) Old CNRS subordinate using MD5; new CNRS2 hierarchy using SHA1 released January – CRLs APACGrid, Grid-Ireland, UK eScience, KFKI RMKI, IUCC, Polish Grid, Grid Canada still using MD5 in CRLs Grid-Ireland and UK eScience will switch to SHA-1 by June – Proxy certificates (Globus, VOMS, MyProxy) Globus migrating away from MD5: http://bugzilla.globus.org/globus/show_bug.cgi?id=6613 5/11/092

3. (EC)DSA EE Keys OpenSSL client vulnerability Unlikely that IGTF CAs have certified (EC)DSA keys – http://www.eugridpma.org/newsletter/eugridpm a-newsletter-20090108.txt RAT requested CAs to audit – 2 CAs found (EC)DSA certificates 2 (EC)DSA certificates valid until August 5/11/093

4. Sanity Checking Requests RSA Exponent < 65537 – Hardware tokens (pkcs11-tool) tend to generate exponents 3 & 5 by default Known-weak (Debian OpenSSL) keys MD5 (EC)DSA 5/11/094

5. IGTF RAT Audit (2009-01) 5/11/095

6. IGTF RAT Audit (2009-01) http://tagpma.es.net/wiki/bin/view/IGTF- RAT/2009-01 Timeline: – 15 Jan: RAT begins drafting message – 11 Feb: Request sent to CA operators – 23 Feb: 57 of 80 CAs responded; reminder sent – 12 Mar: 75 of 80 CAs responded; reminder sent – 26 Mar: 77 of 80 CAs responded – 27 Apr: 77 of 80 CAs responded; reminder sent – 28 Apr: 78 of 80 CAs responded 5/11/096

7. IGTF RAT Audit (2009-01) Results: – 2 CAs issued certificates containing (EC)DSA keys, expiring by Aug 27 2009. – 10 CAs issued certificates using MD5. – No CAs are currently issuing certificates using MD5. – 17 CAs issued CRLs using MD5. 7 are currently issuing CRLs using MD5. – 29 CAs have implemented automated checks for RSA keys with weak exponents. – 30 CAs have implemented automated checks for known weak Debian OpenSSL keys. – 38 CAs have implemented automated checks for issued certificates using MD5. 5/11/097

8. IGTF RAT Audit (2009-01) Survey method – Email to CA contact address in distribution – Web survey (surveymonkey.com) One objection received; response sent by email instead – Responses considered private – Summary results published – Also publish response times for each CA? 5/11/098

9. SHA-1 -> SHA-2 MD5 weaknesses remind us about weaknesses in SHA- 1 – NIST advises to replace SHA-1 by end of 2010. – SHA-1 Collision search: http://www.iaik.tugraz.at/content/research/krypto/sha1/ What is our level of concern about SHA-1? Path forward: – Understand software support for SHA-2 – Work with middleware providers to support SHA-2 – Encourage upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.8 – When relying parties support SHA-2 (in 2010?), begin issuing SHA-2 certificates 5/11/099

10. RPs Not Updating CRL URL DOEGrids CA reported (Apr 11) that about 25% of CRL requests are to the old URL – URL changed in IGTF distribution a month earlier Is this a concern? What action should we take? 5/11/0910