1. Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining for Decent Work & Key Priorities for the ITUC Carolin Vollmann Economic Advisor & Research Officer International Trade Union Confederation

2. Structure 1.ILO Conventions 2.National Institutions 3.The Long and Short-term Development 4.The Economic Impact 5.Group work

3. ILO Conventions C-87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1949 C-98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 C-29 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 C-105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 C-100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 C-111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 C-138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 C-182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 1

4. ILO Conventions Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention ( Convention 87, 1948) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention ( Convention 98, 1949) The freedoms to associate and to bargain collectively are fundamental rights. They are rooted in the ILO Constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 annexed to the ILO Constitution. Their core value has been reaffirmed by the international community, notably at the 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen and in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These enabling rights make it possible to promote and realize decent conditions at work and are important for the attainment of all ILO strategic objectives. 1

5. ILO Conventions Convention 87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (1948) Article 2: Workers have the right to establish and join a union Article 3: Unions have to be able to establish their own framework of rules and their own action plans Article 4: Governments are prohibited to dissolve or suspend unions Article 5: Unions have the right to establish and join federations and confederations Article 6: The same rights(2, 3 and 4) apply to confederations and federations Article 7: The conditions for public recognition of a union shall not violate Art 2, 3 and 4 1

6. ILO Conventions Convention 98: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949) Article 1: Workers shall be protected from any anti-union discrimination Article 2:Workers’ and employers’ unions shall be protected from any interference by each other Article 3: National Institutions shall ensure the right to organise Article 4: National Institutions shall encourage and promote the use of collective bargaining procedures 1

7. National Institutions Ideally the relationship between Government, trade unions and worker’s association is organised in a way that… The government provides a national framework that gives both parties (employers and workers) a similar empowerment … so that employers and workers bargain independently from the Government and independently from each other 2

8. National Institutions Membership of trade unions and employer’s association The Government can provide incentives to join a union and hamper their representative power: Handing over responsibility (Ghent system as it is in place in Sweden and Belgium; trade unions are entitled to administer the unemployment insurance which creates a high incentive to join a union) Making the membership for firms obligational (This is the case in Austria, where all employers have to join; as a consequence they are all covered by the national collective bargaining agreement) Regulations of representation (Germany and Austria are characterized by work councils which compete with trade unions; in Romania unions have to comprehend at least 15 employees accounting for at least 50%+1 of the employees within the same company to be able to bargain) 2

9. Latest Data Available for Trade Union Membership (2008-2011) Source: OECD Database, 2013. 2

10. National Institutions The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements Thresholds for bargaining (like in Romania: The negotiation of a collective agreement is only mandatory when a company has more than 21 employees) 2

11. National Institutions The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements Thresholds for bargaining (like in Romania: The negotiation of a collective agreement is only mandatory when a company has more than 21 employees) Extensions (the application of a collective agreement beyond the actual bargaining partners; this can refer to the extension to non-union workers in the same enterprise; to a region or all firms of a specific sector) 2

12. CountryExistenceExtension requirementsUse in practice Australia Yes Fair Work Commission can decide on awards applicable to all workers and employers in the sector. Frequently BelgiumMinistry of Labour (MoL) decides on erga omnes application to all employers in the sector on request of sectoral joint committee or by one organisation represented in the committee. Frequently FinlandPublic commission decides on erga omnes application after evaluation based on statistics that measure the general applicability of collective agreements, the established practices of agreements in the field and the organisation rate of the negotiating parties. Frequently FranceMoL can extend agreements to workers and employers in similar sectors. Frequently GreeceMoL decides to extend a collective to all workers in a certain sector of economic activity if the agreement is already binding to employers employing 51 per cent of the sector’s or profession’s workers. Frequently Nether- lands MoL decides on extension based on 1937 Act on Administrative Extension and non-Extension of Collective Labour Agreements; minimum requirement for extension is that the agreement must cover at least 55 per cent of relevant employees. Frequently SpainAutomatic extension to all employers and workers at the bargaining level. Frequently NorwayAct 58 of 1993 permits extension to foreign workers if it becomes evident that foreign workers are subject to wage and working conditions that are inferior to normal conditions in the relevant agreement. Increasingly PortugalMoL can extend an agreement if subscribed by employers' associations representing at least 50 per cent of workers in a sector. Frequently (before 2012) Extension Mechanisms of Collective Agreements 2

13. CountryExistenceExtension requirementsUse in practice Germany Yes MoL can decide on extension, if: both employers and workers request an extension; employers bound by the collective agreement employ at least 50 per cent workers; extension is in public interest. MoL can exceptionally extend by ministerial decree. Rarely AustriaFederal Arbitration Board may extend agreements to include employment relationships of essentially the same nature. Rarely IrelandLabour Court may extend agreement to all workers in the sector at request of both parties Rarely Switzer- land MoL may extend agreement to whole sector or occupation at the request of all parties if agreement covers at least 50 per cent of employers and 50 per cent of workers and if it is in the public interest Rarely Japan Not used Italy No Denmark Sweden UK New Zealand US Canada Extension Mechanisms of Collective Agreements 2

14. National Institutions The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements Thresholds for bargaining (like in Romania: The negotiation of a collective agreement is only mandatory when a company has more than 21 employees) Extensions (the application of a collective agreement beyond the actual bargaining partners; this can refer to the extension to non-union workers in the same enterprise; to a region or all firms of a specific sector) Opt-out clauses (regulations that permit an employer to deviate from a collective agreement in a negative way) and legal status of the collective agreement; opt-out can be linked to economic conditions or certain firm characteristics like the size. 2

15. Opt-out Regulations from Industry Level Collective Bargaining Agreements CountryOpt-out allowed by law MechanismUse/Relevance in practice AustraliaNoLaw prohibits opt-outsNot used FranceYes Opt-outs at enterprise level possible if sectoral agreement does not provide for explicit prohibition Rarely used – social partner often agree on prohibition Belgium No Social partners can agree in sectoral agreement on opt- outs Rarely used Austria Finland Netherlands Sweden GermanyFrequently used Poland Frequently used (even without consent of unions in violation of law) Ireland Yes Permission under certain conditions Use not identifiable yet; change in 2011 GreeceUse not identifiable yet; change in 2010 SpainUse not identifiable yet; change in 2010, 2011 and 2012 ItalyUse not identifiable yet; change in 2011 JapanNot relevant – no sectoral bargaining New Zealand No Law does not regulate opt-out framework at all Not relevant – sectoral bargaining is very limited US Not relevant – no sectoral bargaining Canada UKYes Collective agreements are not binding which makes opt-outs possible Not relevant – no sectoral bargaining (except in public sector) 2

16. National Institutions The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements Thresholds for bargaining (like in Romania: The negotiation of a collective agreement is only mandatory when a company has more than 21 employees) Extensions (the application of a collective agreement beyond the actual bargaining partners; this can refer to the extension to non-union workers in the same enterprise; to a region or all firms of a specific sector) Opt-out clauses (regulations that permit an employer to deviate from a collective agreement in a negative way) and legal status of the collective agreement; opt-out can be linked to economic conditions or certain firm characteristics like the size. Landscape of institutions and level of collective bargaining (most European countries have a national Economic and Social Council at which bargaining takes place) It normally consists of representatives from trade unions, employers, and sometimes also the government, academics, farmers association or further civil societies organisations. 2

17. Latest Data Available for Collective Bargaining Coverage (2007-2010) 2

18. Extension Mechanisms of Collective Agreements 2

19. National Institutions Further aspects that impact indirectly on the bargaining position of trade unions: The economic position of the country or within a specific sector (height of the total unemployment rate, growth prospects, export situation) The legal system: Protection by the labour code and its enforceability (employment protection, sick leave, inclusion of disabled persons, maternity leave, occupational safety and health) The social security system and its coverage: amount and conditions of social programs (old age and disability pension, social assurance, child allowance, etc…) Coordination and the ‘quality of relationship’ across different trade unions and within different levels (co-operation on different topics or in different areas of work, exchange of experience and information, joint lobbying of government and campaigning) 2

20. The Long-Term Trends in Industrialised Countries Trade union membership and collective bargaining coverage have decreased considerably since the late 1970s. The highest decrease in both figures appeared in Australia, the UK, and New Zealand after severe reforms during the 1980s. A decline of the role of collective bargaining occurred also in many other central European countries. The crisis renewed the attacks on these institutions. 3

21. Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining during the Crisis Changes to…RomaniaItalySpainGreecePortugal …national collective agreements …the regulations concerning sector-wide collective agreements …that allow non-union agents to bargain …to representativity criteria to establish a union or conduct collective bargaining …extension mechanisms …to opt out regulations Changes to Collective Bargaining Systems since the crisis started 3

22. The Economic Impact Looking at data on collective bargaining institutions and economic variables the following can be revealed: Trade union membership gives very mixed results regarding unemployment and employment but has a very strong impact on the vulnerable employment, exports and wage distribution. 4

23. The Economic Impact Unemployment rateEmployment rate Trade Union Membership (x-axis) 4

24. The Economic Impact Exports Trade Union Membership (x-axis) 4 D9/D1 Gross Earnings Ratio

25. The Economic Impact Looking at data on collective bargaining institutions and economic variables the following can be revealed: Trade union membership gives very mixed results regarding unemployment and employment but has a very strong impact on the vulnerable employment, exports and wage distribution. Collective bargaining coverage reveal similarly unclear correlations with employment variables but very strong correlation with exports and wage differentiation. 4

26. The Economic Impact Unemployment rateEmployment rate Collective Bargaining Coverage (x-axis) 4

27. The Economic Impact Exports Collective Bargaining Coverage (x-axis) 4 D9/D1 Gross Earnings Ratio

28. The Economic Impact Looking at data on collective bargaining institutions and economic variables the following can be revealed: Trade union membership gives very mixed results regarding unemployment and employment but has a very strong impact on the vulnerable employment, exports and wage distribution. Collective bargaining coverage reveal similarly unclear correlations with employment variables but very strong correlation with exports and wage differentiation. The Coordination and centralisation of trade union activities 4

29. The Economic Impact Unemployment rateEmployment rate Coordination and Centralisation (x-axis) 4

30. The Economic Impact Exports Coordination and Centralisation (x-axis) 4 Investment

31. The Economic Impact D9/D1 Gross Earnings Ratio Coordination and Centralisation (x-axis) 4

32. Break? 4

33. Group Work What do collective bargaining institutions look like in your home country? On which level does bargaining take place? Are trade unions respected adequately? Are collective agreements respected adequately? What are the conditions to reach a collective agreement in terms of minimum thresholds for representation? Are they enforceable? Is there the possibility of extensions? Is there a National Council? 5

34. Group Work Where do you see problems? What do you think could be changed and who would be in charge of these changes? What would be a helpful tool or institution to have in place to improve collective bargaining? What could be your contribution in your positon and from your trade union? 5