1. Democratization/ Transition Politics Theoretical Framework G. Pridham: no coherent body of work H. Welsh: studies on causes of regime change studies on pre-reqs for democratization (socio-ec factors, political culture, civil society) A. Przeworski - typology: studies that focus on the objective conditions of regime transformation studies that concentrate on political strategies and choices

2. Definitions and concepts Conceptualization: -regime change -causal processes Examples of existing definitions of ‘political regime’: IR theorists Krasner “principles, norms and decision-making procedures around which actors converge around issue areas” Domestic politics? Lawson Regime = the way power is used how and under what conditions and limitations the power of the state is exercised incorporate the norms and principles of the political organization Linz and Stepan What they mean by “political regime” is left unclear They use the term to differentiate btw types of regimes without first clarifying its meaning

3. Process of regime change How does regime change work?  Internal & external processes;  Path-dependency - by previous regime type (Linz & Stepan) TotalitarianismPost-Totalitarianism SultanismAny way out?DemocracyTot/ Auth/Sult? Totalit/AuthDemocracy Authoritarianism Totalitaria nism Post-totalitarianism Sultanism

4. Relevant concepts to transitional politics elite negotiation / elite bargaining – hard-liners/soft-liners power vacuum – ersatz political class regime collapse democratization – transition vs consolidated democracy (Linz, Stepan) – criteria of consolidated democracy institution-building; institutional reform (state building; nation building)

5. Explanatory variables Regime Change Structural Conditions Institutional Context Political economy Individual elites

6. Structure oriented approaches pioneered by Lipset, Almond, Moore – focus Latin America, Southern Europe (60s, 70s) – pre-reqs for democracy + stability of democratic regimes paradigm: outcome of transition determined by ec. development, political culture, social structures assumption: certain social and political structures had to be in place before democracy Lipset: causal influence of level of industrialization, wealth, urbanization, education Almond, Verba: role of civic culture, interest groups O’Donnell, Schmitter: explaining collapse of democracy – variables – ec. development, class conflict method: large cross-country comparative studies

7. Strategic choice approaches micro level analysis focus: critical role of elites, splits within authoritarian/totalitarian regimes, compromises between hard-liners, soft-liners LINZ, STEPAN O’Donnell, Schmitter concentrate on the interaction of elite strategic choices as possible explanation for success or failure of democratic transition Di Palma: negotiated agreements btw ruling and opposition elites moved common perceptions of “self interest” towards accepting democracy as best possible regime (win-win) Kitschelt: skilful crafting and tactical devices facilitating transition elite calculations determinants of outcomes autonomy of political process (ec factors not denied)

8. Institutionalist approaches explanatory variable for variations in regime transitions = insitutionalisation of the regime – O’Neil on Hungary: correlation between institutional forms and type of regime collapse studies focus on: civil society relations between state-society (state as ultimate centre of power reduces chances of peaceful transition) preexisting structures and institutions determined parameters of political action

9. H. Welsh – types of conflict resolution during authoritarian rule, transition politics, democratic politics: - command and imposition - bargaining and compromise - competition and cooperation Bargaining in authoritarian regimes: - state-initiated, state-controlled - aimed at protecting and consolidating monopolistic power Bargaining in democratic regimes - competitive, diverse - grounded in an environment functioning on mutual trust and cooperation

10. Political Economy approaches assumptions: – correlation between economic crisis and regime change – correlation between economic performance and democratic consolidation See for ex Haggard, Kaufman focus: effect of short-term economic conditions, economic crises on terms of transition and the nature of new political re-alignments draw attention to the sequencing of economic and political reforms (dual transitions) – socioeconomic conditions shape policy preferences and social conflicts – backlash against economic reforms when costs of structural adjustment felt (early 1990s Poland, Hungary) – the quicker the consolidation of democracy the lower the risk of political instability (by the time economic reforms implemented, democracy insitutionalised)

11. Critical Review structuralist approaches: – value: explaining why old regime threatened/challenged – limitation: why elites make the change social and structural approaches: – value: explain dynamics of social change – limitations: choices/preferences strategic choice approaches – elitist (difficult to gain access to the decision making process) - missing context (socio-ec structure) institutionalist approaches – value: empirical; structural constraints – limitation: missing generation changes, leadership impact political economy approaches:

12. Regime change: Constitutional design  not initiation, but consolidation of regime change  institutions & constitutions = have ‘lock-in’ effect  establishes the rules & procedures, the limitations of power  beyond re-establishing former institutions? (Horrowitz)  not everything can be factored in Parliamentarian vs. presidential System of govt (Dawisha & Parrott: Direct vs. indirect presidential election Parliamentary electoral system: PR, FPTP, mixed Exceptions: minority protection rules (quotas?) Frequency of elections Electoral system: (Dawisha & Parrott) Bicameral vs. unicameral Type of Parliament: Federal vs. unitary; power-sharing Centralized vs. decentralized State organization Multipartitism (Lawson) Separation of power Franchise codifying rights and responsibilities of citizens and government Principles of organization Features of Constitutional Design

13. Causal factors plural causation (Linz and Stepan) excluded variables: – historic conditions path- dependency – preconditions – political culture structure vs. agency debate - legacy of previous regime(s) – political culture, residual ideology -ethnic cleavages -politics of exclusion (Horowitz) -Whitefield, Evans CEE peculiarity: external factor (EU conditionality – Vachudova, Grabbe)

14. Facilitating factors Previous favorable constitutional structure Legacy of democratic norms and practices (pluralism, contestation) Experience with democracy federal (where ethnic divisions) – Horrowitz State structure Input of leaders (in constructivist and sociological theories) Leadership Legal and symbolic Re-institutes rule of law Reconciliation? Transitional justice