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The Wilderness May 5-7, 1864 Strategic Context After disagreeing on key issues for too long, the political conflict in the United States between the North.

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Presentation on theme: "The Wilderness May 5-7, 1864 Strategic Context After disagreeing on key issues for too long, the political conflict in the United States between the North."— Presentation transcript:

1 The Wilderness May 5-7, 1864 Strategic Context After disagreeing on key issues for too long, the political conflict in the United States between the North (Union) and South (Confederacy) reaches a critical point following the election of Abraham Lincoln, leading to the secession of many Southern states. The economically superior Union implements a naval blockade and marches south to pacify the South. While the war does not go well for the Union in the early years, by 1863 it clearly possesses the initiative. By 1864, Ulysses S. Grant, newly promoted to command all Union land forces, executes a grand strategy based on the assumption that continuous pressure on all fronts will defeat the smaller Confederacy by mere attrition. Two major Confederate armies remain in the field for the 1864 campaign: the Army of Tennessee led by Joseph E. Johnston in the west and the Army of Northern Virginia led by the feared Robert E. Lee in the east. Grant assumes personal command of George G Meade’s Army of the Potomac to take on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Lee positions his army in the dense, familiar terrain of the Wilderness. Grant races to make it through the Wilderness before Lee can interfere but fails. A fierce skirmish erupts when Lee forces Grant’s troops to turn and defend their right flank. Grant realizes he cannot simply march through the Wilderness and turns to fight Lee. Stakes + A Union victory would allow Grant to push nearly unopposed further into Confederate territory and erode its fragile economy. + A Confederate victory would check Grant’s advance and demoralize the Union soldiers, reminiscent of past campaigns south. By Jonathan Webb, 2009 To view animation on PC: hit F5 To view animation on Mac: hit ⌘ + enter

2 The Wilderness, 1864 Strength  Union Army of the Potomac  Well  Confederate Army of Northern Virginia  Well  Ulysses S. Grant  63,000  114,000  Robert E. Lee By Jonathan Webb, 2009  George G. Meade

3 America c. 1861

4 The battlefield consists of the dense forest of the Wilderness. The only relatively clear, open terrain is the 600-800m-wide area west of the Wilderness Run, Saunders Field, and the small area around Wilderness Church. There are various small streams running through the battlefield. Major roads through the Wilderness are important to maintaining mobility: Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road run east-west, while Culpeper Mine Road, Germanna Plank Road and Brock Road run north-south. The key terrain is the major intersections between these roads. Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (Lee) Orange Plank Road Orange Turnpike Union Army of the Potomac (Grant/Meade) 0 2 4 km Saunders Field Flat Run Germanna Plank Road Culpeper Mine Road Wilderness Tavern Wilderness Church Wilderness Run Brock Road

5 Only a portion of each army is engaged in fighting on the first morning of battle. Ewell’s II Corps initiates contact with Warren’s V Corps along the Orange Turnpike with Sedgwick’s VI Corps en route, while Hill’s III Corps faces elements of Hancock’s II Corps along the Orange Plank Road. Lee is at a severe numerical disadvantage and Longstreet’s I Corps is not expected until nightfall. Grant awaits the full deployment by Sedgwick and Hancock plus the arrival of Burnside’s IX Corps, an independent corps as Burnside outranks the Army of the Potomac’s commander, Meade. Meade arrives on the scene before Grant and orders Warren to launch an attack; it develops slowly into a fierce charge against Confederate lines. Combat is confused and inefficient in the mess of thick vegetation, and Warren soon finds himself pushed back to his starting point until Sedgwick arrives in force to renew the attack. Grant reaches the battlefield and is trying to coordinate a general attack but lacks sufficient communication with Hancock. In the south, Hancock quickly deploys and launches a limited attack against Hill who is trying to develop a somewhat continuous line with Ewell. This attack is roughly handled by Confederates concealed in the wilderness but Hancock persists. VI Corps (Sedgwick) II Corps (Hancock) V Corps (Warren) IX Corps (Burnside) II Corps (Ewell) III Corps (Hilll) Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (Lee) Sedgwick carries the attack against Ewell’s left wing but it begins to falter at horrendous cost to both sides. In the south, Hancock receives reinforcements form his own III Corps and a few units from Warren’s V Corps. Hancock attacks Hill’s front while Warren probes his left flank. Lee frantically sends reinforcements, which arrive just in time to prevent Hill’s left flank from being overrun and a complete rout. As the sun falls, these engagements break down into less frequent skirmishes. As for reinforcements for each side, Burnside’s IX Corps advances from the north but Longstreet’s I Corps is yet to be seen. V Corps (Warren) Union Army of the Potomac (Ulysses. S. Grant/George G. Meade) 114,000 Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (Robert E. Lee) 63,000 Landmarks Union Army of the Potomac (Grant/Meade) Orange Plank Road Orange Turnpike Saunders Field Flat Run Germanna Plank Road Culpeper Mine Road Wilderness Church Wilderness Run Brock Road 0 2 4 km VI Corps (Sedgwick) Wilderness Tavern

6 II Corps (Hancock) IX Corps (Burnside) II Corps (Ewell) III Corps (Hilll) I Corps (Longstreet) VI Corps (Sedgwick) V Corps (Warren) Dawn begins to break, revealing a number of changes to the battlefield. Both sides have constructed light fortifications in the north, further inhibiting mobiliyu to offset the reinforcements Sedgwick and Warren have received. In the south, Hill remains in great danger of being cut off from Ewell and destroyed but Longstreet has at last arrived in the Confederate rear. Burnside has also arrived in the Union rear, but is lazily approaching the front. Lee only wishes to hold out until Longstreet can enter the fray while Grant plans a massive offensive. Lee anticipates Grant’s offensive and succeeds in upsetting it. Lee orders Ewell forward in a spoiling attack, stunning Sedgwick and Warren. Hancock drives Hill back but Lee steers Longstreet east to smash the Union left flank and violently halt the attack. Grant’s hopes are further frustrated when Burnside runs ninety minutes late getting into position and then fails to exploit the gap between the two Confederate forces. Ewell lacks the manpower to exploit Sedgwick and Warren’s initial surprise; the attack breaks down and is driven back to its starting position. In the south, Longstreet’s attack breaks Hancock’s center while Hill rallies his routed units to form a defensive screen against any belated attack by Burnside. Burnside contains the attack on his front but it is a dangerous wedge; Hancock is unsure where or if he can reestablish a defensive line. However, the Confederate advance is blunted when Longstreet is accidentally wounded by one of his own men. Field replaces Longstreet but Lee lacks the confidence to continue the offensive without Longstreet managing it; Field is ordered to hold back and face Hancock’s incoming reinforcements. Despite the fatigue and losses to his already inferior army, Lee attempts two maneuvers to decide the battle. The first is a limited attack against Sedgwick’s right flank; there is some initial panic in the Union ranks but Grant quickly settles the issue with reserves. The second is a stiff attack against the center of Hancock’s reorganized line; the attack is suicidal from the onset and the Confederate assaulters are slaughtered. Field withdraws under pressure from Hancock as darkness begins to set in. I Corps (???) I Corps (Field) Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (Lee) Union Army of the Potomac (Ulysses. S. Grant/George G. Meade) 114,000 Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (Robert E. Lee) 63,000 Union Army of the Potomac (Grant/Meade) Both sides are too exhausted to maintain the intensity of the two days of battle. Grant sees no value in battering Lee’s entrenched force in such defensive-friendly terrain. Grant instead decides to just continue marching south rather than take the indecisive clash as a dispiriting check. Landmarks Orange Plank Road Orange Turnpike Saunders Field Flat Run Germanna Plank Road Culpeper Mine Road Wilderness Tavern Wilderness Church Wilderness Run Brock Road 0 2 4 km

7 The Wilderness, 1864 Casualties & Aftermath Union Army of the Potomac: Confederate Army of Northern Virginia: 17,666 or 15% 8,700 or 14% By Jonathan Webb, 2009 Grant utilized a sequence of side-stepping maneuvers to march the Army of the Potomac south to the delight of Union veterans of past campaigns, so accustomed to giving up against Lee’s clever use of the Army of Northern Virginia. Grant’s march forced Lee to race him to the same objective. Lee won the race and dug in at Spotsylvania Court House, leading to another inconclusive, costly battle. This pattern continued until the Union strategy to wear down the Confederacy paid dividends, leading to Lee’s surrender at Appomattox in April 1865.

8 The Art of Battle: Animated Battle Maps http://www.theartofbattle.com By Jonathan Webb, 2009


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