1. Regime survival – Strategy 2 The move away from repression and towards political openings to manage the opposition has led to the strengthening of forms of co-optation. Thus, in the new ‘democratic era’ Arab regimes have been able to use co-optation to increase their legitimacy. –Attracting some opposition forces to the ‘winning coalition’ in exchange for some minor policy or material benefits. Cooptation has been widely used with secular parties/movements. Islamist parties have however also been co-opted in a number of countries. –Jordan until 1994 –Morocco since 1997 –Egypt intermittently

2. Why does co-optation work? Co-optation is a tried and tested strategy to defuse dissent by guaranteeing access to policy-making power to opposition movements. –This policy-making power is limited to areas of ‘low politics’ –It permits some movements to gain visibility and results. –It increases external support as the regime is percived to be changing.

3. Political Islam and co-optation Contrary to expectations, over the years a number of Islamist movements accepted to cooperate with the regime in place. –Ideological proximity Some regimes are ideologically close to Political Islam and on specific reforms political Islam supports the rulers. The Saudi case. –Tactical rapprochement In order to marginalise more extreme forces, political Islam accepts to collaborate with the regime hoping to expand through the state’s institutions – Coincidence of interests Policy decisions made at regime level are popular and follow what Political Islam also wishes for.

4. Islamists vs. Seculars While it is a simplification, the division of the opposition in two different camps can be quite useful to explain their inability to remove authoritarian leaders. There most significant dividing line is between those who want to make central to policy-making and those who want to take religion completely out of policy-making.

5. Regime Survival –Strategy 3 In light of the divisions within opposition it is no surprise that regimes have been using divide and conquer tactics. Opposition groups are very divided in the Arab world and unable to form strong coalitions capable of demanding change. Ideological differences between the two are very sharp. Policy distance is wide Strategic concerns set them apart …the regime plays on these divisions to its advantage. –Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Syria, Egypt.

6. Dawa Given the impossibility of both violence and participation to lead to political power, many Islamists have retreated to social activism without linking it specifically to politics. –Charity work is of primary importance –Living a good Muslim life to influence others is also crucial.

7. Social activism and political power Mainstream Islamist parties increasingly use dawa to gain prominence in society: –The provision of basic social services that the state is no longer able to provide. The state loses legitimacy. –The commitment to live a good Muslim life and therefore benefit the community as a whole. Leading by example. –The denunciation of violence to bring about political change. The peaceful road to power.

8. Regime survival – Strategy 4 Regimes consider dawa quite dangerous because it does have political side-effects, demonstrating the distance of the state from its citizens. Contesting the terrain of social services: –Creation of state-led development NGOs… –Letting foreign NGOs operate in the field of development