1. From violence to social activism to politics The multiple facets of Political Islam

2. A few markers before we begin… When it comes to political Islam and the ideology it espouses and the methods it utilises, it is impossible to talk about a unified international radical Islamic movement. The spectrum of Islamism is wide both in terms of methods of action and in terms of ideology. While some of the references might be the same (Qutb, al-Banna, Mauwdudi) and the objectives nominally similar (Islamic state and Islamic law), the differences are extremely significant. The current wave of radicalism has been going on for the last 40 years and has gone through numerous phases. The ideological discourse and the methods of action also change over time because the external environment changes. The same movements might in fact go through different phases. Radical Islam is dynamic because it is not only pro-active, but also reactive to the surrounding conditions.

3. The actors of radical Islamism It is very difficult to proceed to a classification of radical Islamist actors because each one has its own specificities in terms of ideology, methods of action, leadership and surrounding environment. However, there are three clusters that can be identified (Coffman-Wittes, 2008): Social and political actions coupled with national liberation struggle and therefore violence (i.e. Hamas). These movements have a very adaptable ideology and multiple ideological references which they tailor to specific situations. This what allows them to be very flexible when it comes to put in practice such an ideology. The Brothers’ Islamism (i.e. Egyptian Al Ikhwan). These movements reject the use of violence of achieve political objectives at the domestic level and have a rather flexible ideology allowing them to combine social and political activism. The jihadi salafi groups (i.e. Al Qaeda Maghreb). These movements have fixed ideological references and tend to adopt one method of action and stick to it. In this case it is the use of violence to achieve political objectives. It is quite irrelevant how unrealisitic such objectives might seem from the ‘outside.’

4. The issue of political violence (M. Hafez, 2003 and 2004) Today we explore the choice of violence that some movements make at a particular point in time and examine why their either stick to it and why they abandon the idea of armed struggle. Generally speaking the most common explanations for the choice of violence that are given in the literature are: The authoritarian nature of the political system, which does not allow for the formal institutionalisation of alternative voices and therefore leads to progressive radicalisation which eventually finds an outlet in the use of violence. This broadly includes the question of occupation from external powers, although this is a different issue in the sense that most political movements in the Arab world, including secular ones, agree that occupation should be fought also through armed struggle. Jihadi Salafism ideological tenets are particularly virulent in their opposition to current regimes: no compromise is possible. Change has to come through the gun: society needs to be purified.

5. Jihadi Salafism Subscribe to the idea of the ‘cosmic struggle’ against unbelief and injustice. The basic idea is to return to a puritanical and literal interpretation of the Sacred Texts and to make sure that such interpretation becomes the only one in society. In order to do this controlling the structures of political power is crucial. The logical outcome of this is the imposition of the Islamic state from above. The Al-Qaeda Maghreb today and Islamic Jihad in the past (Egypt) are the classic examples. Research question: what explains the choice of violence? More specifically, what explains the high level of anti-civilian violence?

6. The issue of anti-civilian violence The previous explanations (slide 4) are necessary for the choice of violence. Usually radical violent ideas are appealing in contexts where there is very little or no space for the circulation of ideas and for debate. In addition, the very ideological tenets of Salafi Jihadism lead to the adoption of violence because the cosmic struggle requires readiness for battle. If Muslims deviate from what they are perceived to be their duties, they have to be ‘corrected’. These two explanations are necessary to explain the use of violence on the part of these groups, but they are not sufficient to explain the degree of anti-civilian violence, which seems both nihilistic and counter-productive. Hafez suggests that he nature of state repression has to be taken into account if one wants to explain why certain ideas take hold and why certain methods of action are then adopted. Specifically Hafez looks at Timing Targeting

7. The timing and targeting of repression The timing of repression is very important in determining how the targeted movement will react: Pre-emptive repression takes place before the movement is fully organised and mobilised. This means that when an Islamist movement becomes a threat the authorities deal with it through pre-emptive repression in order to stop it from build a coherent institutional structure. Reactive repression takes place after the movement is in the ascending phase and activists are fully mobilised. The regime is forced to let the Islamist movement organise and intervenes only at the last minute when the ruling elites are truly threatened. The targeting of repression is equally important in determining how activists will react: Selective repression only targets the leaders and the committed activists, leaving sympathisers out of the picture. ‘Cut the head off.’ Indiscriminate repression targets anyone associated, no matter how loosely, with the movement.

8. Targeting and timing of repression To be successful repression should be pre-emptive and selective (Tunisia, 1989-1991). When repression is reactive and indiscriminate, it is usually unsuccessful and leads to the further radicalisation of the movement, which in turn develops exclusive organisational methods and anti-system frameworks (Algeria, 1990s). This leads to the adoption of different ideological referents and the rise in anti-civilian violence. This means that violence is not only the domain of salafi Islamism, but, in different circumstances, can be the choice of groups whose primary ideological references are in other forms of Islamism.

9. Conclusion The choice of violence is not simply the outcome of the inability to access political institutions. The choice of violence is not simply due to the inherently violent ideology that some movements adopt. Moderation can take place Political opportunities and nature of repression matter: the rationality of Islamist violent movements. Anti-civilian violence is the product of exclusive organisations with an anti-system framework.