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Centrally Located “Urban Village” Hao WU University of Melbourne Australia ERES 2016 the University of Regensburg Germany 11 June 11am-12:30pm VG 004 Session 68
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Theory/Literature Tenure security “Market” Chinese study, international, empirical Migration welfare, poverty/ethics, power, and economic analysis of externality Land acquisition and compensation “Indigenous right”
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Core and Periphery Urban core – Non-farm production use confirmed – High social cost for development – Labour focused i.e. use value Urban periphery – Emerging urban land use – Opportunity cost low – Rural-urban transition by price
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Low-cost housing Comparative location advantage “Small property rights” Lower rental price ‘Informal’ leasing market
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No “slum” Collective land ownership Village collective enforcer Culture and social norm enforcement State enforcement – e.g. company & criminal laws
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Redevelopment Acquisition/compensation mechanism Top-down approach – E.g. Beijing and Shanghai “Collective game” approach – E.g. Guangzhou and Shenzhen
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“Re-integration” Lagged urbanisation “Collective redevelopment” – Governance and enforcement – “informal economy and markets” Integration and/or diversity?
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The “social groups” Indigenous villagers Village collective (‘local government’) Renters City/district government Developer
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“Lei-de” Over 70% in dividend income in early 2000s – Average household dividend approx. 4000 RMB – Rental income Over 25% from rental income in early 2000s Over 80% without formal employment Part of CBD development since late 1990s Result: high-end residential neighborhood
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“Shi-pai” Shared dividend $40-50 million in early 2000s. – Average household dividend approx. 50,000 RMB. – Rental income Shop, hotel, warehouse, office Village management committee – Welfare, infrastructure (local), security Result: low-cost rental neighborhood
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“Xian-cun” Demolition, relocation and redevelopment process was started in 2011 Corruption charge: village collective Result: idle assets and social problems
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Source: www.douban.com
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Some Propositions The “Health” of urban core village History matters Allocation efficiency Tragedy of the commons Tri-layer interest group bargaining Active capital and rental market Uncertainty and entrepreneurship
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Empirical treatment Performance Rural-urban conversion – Competition – Enforcement – Interaction
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THANKS & QUESTION. Hao WU haow@unimelb.edu.au
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