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Electronic Combat. Objectives Outline the electronic combat mission of ES, EA, and EP. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of ES and EA List methods.

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Presentation on theme: "Electronic Combat. Objectives Outline the electronic combat mission of ES, EA, and EP. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of ES and EA List methods."— Presentation transcript:

1 Electronic Combat

2 Objectives Outline the electronic combat mission of ES, EA, and EP. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of ES and EA List methods of soft and hard-kill types of EA and their principle targets. Explain burnthrough and lookthrough Distinguish between soft kill and hard kill EA methods and list the methods Describe the jamming techniques of spot, barrage, swept spot and deceptive jamming. List methods of EP Outline the electronic combat mission of ES, EA, and EP. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of ES and EA List methods of soft and hard-kill types of EA and their principle targets. Explain burnthrough and lookthrough Distinguish between soft kill and hard kill EA methods and list the methods Describe the jamming techniques of spot, barrage, swept spot and deceptive jamming. List methods of EP

3 Command & Control Warfare (C2W) C2W is a military strategy which seeks to integrate the use of Information Warfare, OpSec, OpDec, PsyOps, EC, and physical destruction EC is a component of Command & Control Warfare (C2W) C2W is a military strategy which seeks to integrate the use of Information Warfare, OpSec, OpDec, PsyOps, EC, and physical destruction EC is a component of Command & Control Warfare (C2W)

4 Electronic Combat Military action involving the use of Electro- Magnetic energy to determine, exploit, and reduce (or prevent) an enemy’s use of the EM spectrum, and actions which retains friendly use of the EM spectrum Military action involving the use of Electro- Magnetic energy to determine, exploit, and reduce (or prevent) an enemy’s use of the EM spectrum, and actions which retains friendly use of the EM spectrum

5 Three Components of EC Electronic Support (ES) Electronic Attack (EA) Electronic Protection (EP) Electronic Support (ES) Electronic Attack (EA) Electronic Protection (EP)

6 Electronic Support (ES) Passive surveillance of EM spectrum Platform examples: EA-6B, SSES (Ships Signal Exploitation Space), Satellites Tactical surveillance of enemy’s position Strength Intention Warning of targeting/homing Advantages & limitations of passive ES Covert Passive detection typically well beyond active detection Difficult to determine range passively Susceptible to OpDec Passive surveillance of EM spectrum Platform examples: EA-6B, SSES (Ships Signal Exploitation Space), Satellites Tactical surveillance of enemy’s position Strength Intention Warning of targeting/homing Advantages & limitations of passive ES Covert Passive detection typically well beyond active detection Difficult to determine range passively Susceptible to OpDec

7 Electronic Support (ES), cont Platform examples: EA-6B, EP-3, RC-135, Satellites, UAVs Strategic surveillance (Intel) for threat recognition & avoidance, EA techniques and warnings Signals Intelligence (SIGINT ) Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) - info derived from emissions other than comm (emphasis on radar) Communications Intelligence (COMINT) - info derived from communications Platform examples: EA-6B, EP-3, RC-135, Satellites, UAVs Strategic surveillance (Intel) for threat recognition & avoidance, EA techniques and warnings Signals Intelligence (SIGINT ) Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) - info derived from emissions other than comm (emphasis on radar) Communications Intelligence (COMINT) - info derived from communications

8 ES System Design Requirements Wide RF spectrum Wide dynamic range (controllable sensitivity) High Selectivity (narrow bandpass) Multiple channels for Angle-of-Arrival measurement (DF) Graphical displays (operator interface) Recording capability Most common type of Receiver Superheterodyne Wide RF spectrum Wide dynamic range (controllable sensitivity) High Selectivity (narrow bandpass) Multiple channels for Angle-of-Arrival measurement (DF) Graphical displays (operator interface) Recording capability Most common type of Receiver Superheterodyne

9 Electronic Attack (EA) “…to deny an enemy’s use of the EM spectrum.” Use active EM jamming (soft-kill) Noise Jamming False Target Jamming Deception Jamming Expendables Use EM guided weapons (hard-kill) Home-On-Emitter (HARM) Home-On-Jam Advantages & limitations of active EW Neutralize victim radar as an effective sensor Slow weapons engagement timelines Overt Temporary effect “…to deny an enemy’s use of the EM spectrum.” Use active EM jamming (soft-kill) Noise Jamming False Target Jamming Deception Jamming Expendables Use EM guided weapons (hard-kill) Home-On-Emitter (HARM) Home-On-Jam Advantages & limitations of active EW Neutralize victim radar as an effective sensor Slow weapons engagement timelines Overt Temporary effect

10 EA – Noise Jamming Unsophisticated technique, employed against all type radars Transmission of “electronic” noise Jammer transmits CW Noise signal competes with radar return for S min Mask valid radar returns by saturating receiver with noise clutters radar display Unsophisticated technique, employed against all type radars Transmission of “electronic” noise Jammer transmits CW Noise signal competes with radar return for S min Mask valid radar returns by saturating receiver with noise clutters radar display

11 Noise Jamming Techniques Spot Swept Spot Barrage

12 Jamming Graphic – Spot, All lobes Jamming entering thru mainbeam, sidelobes, and backlobe Complete receiver saturation Jamming entering thru mainbeam, sidelobes, and backlobe Complete receiver saturation

13 Spot vs Barrage Jamming Power Frequency Rcvr BW Spot Jamming Barrage Jamming Jammer power output remains constant Jamming effectiveness is function of jammer signal BW (J/S) Jammer power output remains constant Jamming effectiveness is function of jammer signal BW (J/S)

14 EA – False Target Jamming Principle victims are Search radars Radar receiver responds to synthesized RF pulses Jamming signal mimics radar return Signal is pulse envelope (PW) Signal timed to radar Rest Time Projects multiple false range returns on display Principle victims are Search radars Radar receiver responds to synthesized RF pulses Jamming signal mimics radar return Signal is pulse envelope (PW) Signal timed to radar Rest Time Projects multiple false range returns on display

15 False Target Jamming False Target Jamming

16 EA – Deception Jamming Principle victims are Fire Control radars Radar receiver responds to timing of synthesized RF pulses Jamming signal needs to mimic radar return Signal captures gate (range or velocity) by transmitting marginally stronger return Signal progressively delayed to produce gate error Principle victims are Fire Control radars Radar receiver responds to timing of synthesized RF pulses Jamming signal needs to mimic radar return Signal captures gate (range or velocity) by transmitting marginally stronger return Signal progressively delayed to produce gate error

17 Rcvd Signal Amp Time Insufficient jamming strength Effective jamming strength PW PRT Signal Burnthrough As radar range decreases, the power of the target return becomes stronger than the power of the jamming signal As radar range decreases, the power of the target return becomes stronger than the power of the jamming signal Radar Return

18 Lookthrough Jamming attacks victim radar receiver and your ES receiver To maintain “situational awareness”, the jamming is interrupted periodically Has the target changed RF ? Has the target changed operating modes ? Has the target shut-down ? Jamming attacks victim radar receiver and your ES receiver To maintain “situational awareness”, the jamming is interrupted periodically Has the target changed RF ? Has the target changed operating modes ? Has the target shut-down ?

19 Electronic Attack Expendables Chaff is a radar countermeasure Aluminum coated fiberglass filaments released into atmosphere to produce larger RCS than target Flare is IR a countermeasure Alternate [chemical] IR source to mimic target signature but higher power Decoys are transmitters that use deception techniques, usually against radar. Chaff is a radar countermeasure Aluminum coated fiberglass filaments released into atmosphere to produce larger RCS than target Flare is IR a countermeasure Alternate [chemical] IR source to mimic target signature but higher power Decoys are transmitters that use deception techniques, usually against radar.

20 AN/SLQ-49 Chaff Buoy Decoy System RUBBER DUCKS

21 Aircraft Expendables Chaff Flares Transponder Chaff Flares Transponder

22 ALE-50 Towed Decoy

23 TALD Tactical Air Launched Decoy Radar Decoy

24 Self Protection Jammers SLQ-32 ALQ-126 ALQ-165 SLQ-32 ALQ-126 ALQ-165

25 EA – Hard Kill Weapons AGM-88 HARM – High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile Principle target Fire Control radars Uses compact receiver to passively detect and classify radars Missile homes in on victim radar Fragmentation warhead obliterates antenna AGM-88 HARM – High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile Principle target Fire Control radars Uses compact receiver to passively detect and classify radars Missile homes in on victim radar Fragmentation warhead obliterates antenna

26 SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Neutralize, destroy or degrade enemy air defenses to enable air operations to be completed OR keep the good guys safe so they can get to the bad guys and home again. HARD KILL – HARM, TLAM, Bombs, SPEC-OPS SOFT KILL – Jamming, HARM, Chaff Neutralize, destroy or degrade enemy air defenses to enable air operations to be completed OR keep the good guys safe so they can get to the bad guys and home again. HARD KILL – HARM, TLAM, Bombs, SPEC-OPS SOFT KILL – Jamming, HARM, Chaff

27 After Harm, AAGM DEAD Destruction Enemy Air Defenses GPS MMW Radar Damage Assessment DEAD Destruction Enemy Air Defenses GPS MMW Radar Damage Assessment

28 The Future of EC ? EF-18G – The Growler

29 Electronic Protection (EP) Protecting friendly combat capabilities against the undesirable effects of enemy Electronic Attack By considering our radar’s Operating parameters Signal processing techniques Design philosophy Protecting friendly combat capabilities against the undesirable effects of enemy Electronic Attack By considering our radar’s Operating parameters Signal processing techniques Design philosophy

30 EP – Radar Parameters Focused on the transmitter part of radar Power (more is better) Frequency (multi-RF or agility) PW (Pulse Compression enable) Difficult to alter/enhance parameters from original design Focused on the transmitter part of radar Power (more is better) Frequency (multi-RF or agility) PW (Pulse Compression enable) Difficult to alter/enhance parameters from original design

31 EP – Signal Processing Focused on the receiver part of radar By contrast, easy to incorporate post- detection receiver processing Literally > 100 anti-jam “fixes” for EP Doppler receivers (filters out jamming) Automatic Gain Control circuits (minimizes effects of jamming) Computer controlled synthetic video The absence of jamming does not mean No Jamming Focused on the receiver part of radar By contrast, easy to incorporate post- detection receiver processing Literally > 100 anti-jam “fixes” for EP Doppler receivers (filters out jamming) Automatic Gain Control circuits (minimizes effects of jamming) Computer controlled synthetic video The absence of jamming does not mean No Jamming

32 EP – Design Philosophy Make the operating parameters unpredictable RF diversity, hopping, spread spectrum Multi-modes Antenna Design (suppress side & back lobes) Scan Pattern (random like Phased Array) Emission Control (EMCON) Does not mean RF silence Example: varying P-3 radar power-out to reduced signature and limit enemy sub’s awareness Make the operating parameters unpredictable RF diversity, hopping, spread spectrum Multi-modes Antenna Design (suppress side & back lobes) Scan Pattern (random like Phased Array) Emission Control (EMCON) Does not mean RF silence Example: varying P-3 radar power-out to reduced signature and limit enemy sub’s awareness

33 PRF 1 PRF 2 PRF 3 PRF JITTER PRF JITTER PRF Jitter Electronic Protect (EP) Countermeasure PRF Jitter Electronic Protect (EP) Countermeasure True target range is present with each PRF, just not apparent. True target range is present with each PRF, just not apparent.

34 Objectives Outline the electronic combat mission of ES, EA, and EP. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of ES and EA List methods of soft and hard-kill types of EA and their principle targets. Explain burnthrough and lookthrough Distinguish between soft kill and hard kill EA methods and list the methods Describe the jamming techniques of spot, barrage, swept spot and deceptive jamming. List methods of EP Outline the electronic combat mission of ES, EA, and EP. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of ES and EA List methods of soft and hard-kill types of EA and their principle targets. Explain burnthrough and lookthrough Distinguish between soft kill and hard kill EA methods and list the methods Describe the jamming techniques of spot, barrage, swept spot and deceptive jamming. List methods of EP


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