1. Jaap-Henk Hoepman Security of Systems (SoS) Radboud University Nijmegen The Netherlands jhh@cs.ru.nl www.cs.ru.nl/~jhh Jaap-Henk Hoepman TNO Information & Communication Technology Groningen The Netherlands jaap-henk.hoepman@tno.nl RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures An introduction to the PEARL project (www.pearl-project.org)

2. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 2 ContentsContents  A typical RFID system  Applications of RFID  Privacy & security risks  Possible solutions: the PEARL project

3. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 3 A typical RFID system  Transponder/tag  active / passive  1 bit – 64 kB (EEPROM/SRAM)  controller / CPU  read-only / read- write  Reader  LF / UHF  Communication range  Coupling backoffice database(s)

4. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 4 Reading distance  For passive tags  Low frequency (LF) ~ 1.2 meter better penetration of objects  Ultra High Frequency (UHF) mostly: ~ 2 meter latest product: ~ 3.3 meter in the labs: ~ +10 meters  Higher for active tags Limited by power consumption of controller/CPU on tag

5. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 5 We now face the imminent expansion of cyberspace into physical space in the form of ■ networked cameras, ■ biometric identification devices, ■ RFID tags on consumer goods, ■ and a wide variety of sensors. The issue The Internet of Things

6. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 6 Applications (1)  Home  Neighbourhood garbage depots  Tactile user interfaces “real” gaming (cf GPS based stuff)  Work  Alcatel Rijswijk linking laptops to owners  Fun / Shopping  Metro store  Prada  Legoland kidspotter  Apenheul (crowd performance)  Madesjki Smart Stadium (crowd control)

7. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 7 Applications (2)  Infotainment  Tagged billboards  Science museum LA  City tours  Travel  KLM baggage handling  OV chipcard (vs London Oyster card)  Biometric passport  Healthcare

8. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 8 Current RFID systems unsafe  No authentication  No friend/foe distinction  No access control  Rogue reader can link to tag  Rogue tag can mess up reader  No encryption  Eavesdropping possible  Predictable responses  Traffic analysis, linkability  No GUI…  … and “distance” not enforced by tag

9. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 9 RFID Risks: Consumers  User profiling  Possible robbery target  Possible street-marketing target  Personalised loyalty/discounts  Refuse/grant access to shop/building Even for tags without serial no#  Loss of location privacy By tracking same user profile  Fake transactions / Identity theft  No protection by privacy laws…

10. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 10 RFID Risks: Companies  Corporate espionage  Scanning competitors inventory (or customer base) Eavesdropping tags Querying tags  Unauthorised access Fake RFIDs  Derived/competing services  Using competitors installed base  Denial of service attacks  Supply chain failure Jamming signals Fake RFIDs

11. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 11 RFID countermeasures:  Blocker tag  RFID Guardian  PIN/pass/hashcodes  Private handshakes

12. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 12 Spot the Fed

13. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 13 Private handshake

14. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 14 State of the art  [BG85] Baldwin, R. W., and Gramlich, W. C. Cryptographic protocol for trustable match making. In IEEE Security & Privacy (Oakland, CA, USA, 1985), IEEE, pp. 92–100.  [ZN] Zhang, K., and Needham, R. A private matchmaking protocol. http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/71955.html.  [BDS+03] Balfanz, D., Durfee, G., Shankar, N., Smetters, D. K., Staddon, J., and Wong, H. C. Secret handshakes from pairing-based key agreements. In IEEE Security & Privacy (Oakland, CA, USA, 2003), IEEE, pp. 180–196.  [CJT04] C. Castelluccia, S. Jarecki, and G. Tsudik. Secret handshakes from ca-oblivious encryption. In P. Lee, editor, Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2004, Springer, 2004.  [XY04] Xu, S., and Yung, M. k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials. In 11th CCS (Washington D.C., USA, 2004), ACM, pp. 158–167.

15. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 15 Match making  Allows users sharing “wish” W /credentials to find each other

16. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 16 Secret handshake  Same-group discovery  Impersonation resistance  Detection resistance  Traceability  Forward repudiability  Collusion resistance  No fairness

17. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 17 Secret handshake - discussion  Two protocols [BDS03, CJT04]  Users need pool of single-use pseudonyms  Multiple groups: time  Traceability vs privacy?  Group owner “sees” everything

18. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 18 Private handshake  More private: no traceability  And also no collusion resistance  Extension to multiple groups  A and B learn  No pool of pseudonyms required

19. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 19 Handling single groups

20. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 20 Multiple groups

22. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 22 Project partners  Academic team  TU Eindhoven  TU Delft  University of Twente  Radboud University Nijmegen  Business partners  Philips Research  TNO Inform  ECP.NL

23. 30-10-2007 J.H. Hoepman RFID: Applications, Risks & Countermeasures 23 Project structure Design (RU, TUD)  Cryptographic algorithms  Security protocols Assessment (TU/E,UT)  Modelling properties  Policies  Modelling systems  Verification