1. Time, Self and Mind (ATS1835) Introduction to Philosophy B Semester 2, 2015 Dr Ron Gallagher ron.gallagher@monash.edu Week 11: Knowledge and Scepticism and Exam

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3. WeekBeginningTopicAssessmentReadings W127-Jul-14 Time - Introduction and Time Travel Readings 1.1 & 1.2 W203-Aug-14 Time Travel; Freedom, Determinism, and Indeterminism Readings 1.5 & 1.6 (sections 1-2 & 6-10) W310-Aug-14 Logic Primer AT1 Mon August 10, 10amReadings 2.1-2.2 W417-Aug-14 Mind- Dualism versus Materialism about the Mind Readings 3.1-3.2 W524-Aug-14 Mind - Can Machines Think? Computationalism and the Turing Test Readings 3.3 W631-Aug-14 Mind - Can Machines Think? Objections to Computationalism AT2 Mon Aug 31st, 10am Reading 3.4 W707-Sep-14 Self - Lockean Psychological Theory and Identity Readings 4.1-4.3 W814-Sep-14 Self - Identity, the Body & Person Stages Readings 4.4-4.5 W921-Sep-14 Knowledge What is Knowledge and Gettier's Account AT3 Mon Sep 21st, 10amReadings 5.1-5.2 28-Sep-14 Mid-semester Break W1005-Oct-14 Knowledge - Nozick's Account and Scepticism Readings 5.3-5.4 W1112-Oct-14 Knowledge - The Moorean Response AT4 Essay Mon Oct 12th Readings 5.5 W1219-Oct-14 Revision (no lectures, no tutorials)

4. Hurdle Requirements to Pass this Unit Your overall grade for the unit must be at least 50% You must achieve a grade of 40% or more on the final exam You must not fail more than one assessment task (not including Reading Quizzes) You cannot miss more than 3 tutorials Assessment Due DateAssessment TaskValue Mondays 10amReading Quizzes (10)5% (bonus) Mon Aug 10thAT1 (@600 words)10% Mon Aug 31stAT2 (@600 words)10% Mon Sep 21stAT3 (@600 words)10% Mon Oct 12thAT4 Essay (@1250 words)30% TBA Exam40%

5. Intro to Philosophy B: Time, Self, and Mind (ATS1835) Exam: 2hours 40% Where and When? Exam Format: The real exam will be 2 hours and have two parts: (a)20 multiple-choice questions (worth 2 marks each) (b) 2 short essays (worth 30 marks each). The short essays should be about 300 words each (about 3 average- sized paragraphs) and you will be choosing to write two from four chosen for the exam.

6. From Sample Exam - on Moodle MULTIPLE CHOICE 1.A functionalist believes which of the following? (A) Minds are multiply realisable. (B) Minds are functional types. (C) (A) and (B) (D) None of the above. 2. According to David Lewis which of the following is correct? (A) External time corresponds to the temporal ordering of events and Personal time always corresponds to the causal ordering of events for the time-traveller. (B) External time always corresponds to the causal ordering of events for the time traveller and Personal time corresponds to the temporal ordering of events. (C) External time corresponds to Personal time and the temporal ordering of events always corresponds to the causal ordering of events for the time-traveller. (D) External ordering of events corresponds to temporal time and the Personal ordering of events always corresponds to causal time.

7. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle 3. In which of the following ways do the concepts of identity and survival differ: (A) Identity is necessarily one:one, but survival can be one:many. (B) Identity is matter of degree, but survival is all or nothing. (C) All of the above. (D) None of the above 4. What do the Gettier examples show? (A) That knowledge is justified true belief. (B) That having a justified, true belief is sufficient for knowledge. (C) That having a justified, true belief is necessary for knowledge. (D) None of the above.

8. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle 5. Consider the following argument. P1. If the current Prime Minister is a student at Monash, then the current Prime Minister lives in Victoria. P2. The current Prime Minister is a student at Monash. C. The Prime Minister lives in Victoria. The argument has… (A) Good form (valid) – its premises are true. (B) Bad form (invalid) – The current Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, is not a student at Monash. (C) Good form (valid) – if its premises were true then its conclusion would be inescapable. (D) Bad form (invalid) – the argument is fallacious.

9. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle SHORT-ANSWER QUESTIONS Part 1 (Time): 1. There is an apparent tension between time travel and personal identity. What is the problem and how does Lewis resolve it using his four dimensionalist account of time? 2. What is the difference between personal time and external time according to Lewis? And how does it help explain the way in which time travel can take “time”? 3. What is the difference between incompatibilism and compatibilism? Discuss using some examples. What is soft determinism, and how is it related to either of these views? Part 2 (Logic): 4. What makes an argument different than a mere collection of statements? What is the crucial difference between a good inductive and a good deductive argument? Give an example of each. 5. What is the difference between an inconsistent set of statements and a contradictory set of statements? If two statements are contradictory, must one of the two be true? If two statements are inconsistent, must one of the two be true?

10. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle Part 3 (Mind): 6. Explain how functionalism allows for the multiple realisation of mental states, and how this might be viewed as an advantage over the view that the mind is the brain. 7. Explain Searle’s Chinese Room argument and how it presents a challenge for strong AI and computationalism. Part 4 (Self): 8. Locke’s theory of personal identity seems to employ a memory criterion. But Derek Parfit believes that even an improved and more generalized psychological theory is problematic. What exactly is the fission problem and why does it seem to undermine any psychological view of personal identity? 9. Explain why Parfit thinks that the experiments involving patients whose corpus callosum has been severed present a problem for certain theories of the self. How does Parfit propose to avoid the problem? 10. Why does Williams think identity matters in personal identity? How does he motivate the idea in terms of our attitudes toward our future?

11. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle 11. What is the traditional analysis of knowledge? Explain it and then provide a Gettier-style counterexample to it—either one of Gettier’s own counterexamples, one discussed in the literature, or one you have made up yourself (doing the latter of course is most impressive). Explain exactly how the counterexample is meant to work. 12. How does Nozick try to use his tracking theory to object to the “closure argument” used by skeptics who maintain we cannot know if there is an external world? (Note: If you use abbreviations or formal symbols, be sure to say what they represent.) 13. What is Cartesian skepticism? And how does Descartes’ line of reasoning support it?

14. See p.233 of TSM Reader for summary of Descartes argument. P1. If I know that P, then I know that I am not a brain in a vat P2. I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat Thus, I do not know that P. The Brain in a Vat Argument is usually taken to be a modern version of René Descartes' argument (in the Meditations on First Philosophy) that centers on the possibility of an evil demon who systematically deceives us. P1. If I know that P, then I know that I am not being systematically deceived by an evil demon P2. I do not know that I am not systematically deceived by an evil demon Thus, I do not know that P.

15. 12. How does Nozick try to use his tracking theory to object to the “closure argument” used by skeptics who maintain we cannot know if there is an external world? (Note: If you use abbreviations or formal symbols, be sure to say what they represent.) Note:- The argument referred to is the “epistemic closure argument”. See p233-234 TSM Reader. “Knowledge is closed under know logical entailment” E.g. You know you have hands only if you know you’re not a brain in a vat. Nozick argues that a belief counts as knowledge only if it tracks the truth. It’s probably best to outline closure argument first.

19. Nozick’s Tracking Theory (sensitivity conditions) S knows that p iff: 1.p is true. 2.S believes p. 3.If p were false, S would not believe p. 4.If p were true, S would believe p. Which is to say:- s knows that p when the following conditions hold p is true s believes p If p were the case then s would believe p If p were not the case then s would not believe it

20. The BIV hypothesis fails to satisfy condition 4. If p were true, S would believe p. Because:- If the envatted brain were not electrically stimulated to believe that it was in a vat by its envatters, it would not believe it was in a vat even if it remained true that it was in a vat. Hence, the following counterfactual is not true of the envatted brain: “If p were true, S would believe that p”.

21. 11. What is the traditional analysis of knowledge? Explain it and then provide a Gettier-style counterexample to it—either one of Gettier’s own counterexamples, one discussed in the literature, or one you have made up yourself (doing the latter of course is most impressive). Explain exactly how the counterexample is meant to work.

22. 1. Knowledge as Justified True Belief There are three components to the traditional (“tripartite”) analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge: S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p. The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the “JTB” analysis, for “justified true belief”. From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/index.htmlhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/index.html

23. Epistemic Luck (Russell)

24. Gettier and Propositional Knowledge Gettier argues that one could have a true justified belief which is not knowledge in a situation in which one reasons from some already justified beliefs to a new belief that, as it happens, is coincidentally true. Since it would then be a matter of coincidence that one’s belief was correct, it would not count as knowledge, even though it was a justified belief because it was knowingly inferred from already justified beliefs.

25. 3. The Gettier Problem In his short 1963 paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Edmund Gettier presented two effective counterexamples to the JTB analysis (Gettier 1963). One of these goes as follows. Suppose Smith has good evidence for the false proposition Jones owns a Ford. Suppose further Smith infers from (1) the following three disjunctions: Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. Since (1) entails each of the propositions (2) through (4), and since Smith recognizes these entailments, his beliefs in propositions (2)–(4) are justified. Now suppose that, by sheer coincidence, Brown is indeed in Barcelona. Given these assumptions, we may say that Smith, when he believes (3), holds a justified true belief. However, is Smith's belief an instance of knowledge? Intuitively, Smith's belief cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that it is true.

26. Most epistemologists have accepted Gettier's argument, taking it to show that the three conditions of the JTB account—truth, belief, and justification—are not in general sufficient for knowledge. How must the analysis of knowledge be modified to make it immune to cases like the one we just considered? This is what is commonly referred to as the “Gettier problem”. Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. A lesson of the Gettier problem is that it appears that even true beliefs that are justified can nevertheless be epistemically lucky in a way inconsistent with knowledge. Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge- analysis/index.htmlhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge- analysis/index.html

27. Structure of the Counterexample Reminder: Traditional account says JTB is necessary & sufficient for knowledge. Question: What does this counterexample teach us about the JTB account of knowledge? JTB is… (a) Not necessary for knowledge. (b) Not sufficient for knowledge. (c) Neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. Structure of the Counterexample: S has JTB But: S doesn’t know that p So: JTB is insufficient for knowledge How to Proceed: S knows that p iff JTB + ? Any guesses as to what should be added? 27

28. Nozick’s Tracking Theory (sensitivity conditions) S knows that p iff: 1.p is true. 2.S believes p. 3.If p were false, S would not believe p. 4.If p were true, S would believe p. Which is to say:- s knows that p when the following conditions hold p is true s believes p If p were the case then s would believe p If p were not the case then s would not believe it

29. The Sheep Case (NTA): S knows that p only iff: 1.p is true. 2.S believes p. 3.If p were not true, then S would not believe p. 4.… Question: Is condition 3 satisfied in the Sheep Case? That is, is the following true: (A) If there were no sheep in the field, S would not believe that there are sheep in the field. NO! I.e., S would still believe it. – So condition 3 is not satisfied. – So according to Nozick’s theory, one does not know that there is a sheep in the field. This is exactly the conclusion we want.

30. Imagine the following situation: (a) you are a brain in a vat stimulated by scientists who have fed you all your experience so far in life, (b) the scientists have made you aware of this, (c) you are familiar with Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge. According to Nozick, why is it still the case that your belief in the proposition “I am a brain in a vat” (call it P) will not count as knowledge? Nozick's Tracking Theory S knows that P iff (i) P is true (ii) S believes that P (iii) If P were false, then S would not believe that P. (iv) If P were true, then S would believe that P. (A) Condition (i) of Nozick’s Tracking Theory is not satisfied. (B) Condition (ii) of Nozick’s Tracking Theory is not satisfied. (C) Condition (iii) of Nozick’s Tracking Theory is not satisfied. (D) Condition (iv) of Nozick’s Tracking Theory is not satisfied.

32. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle SHORT-ANSWER QUESTIONS Part 1 (Time): 1. There is an apparent tension between time travel and personal identity. What is the problem and how does Lewis resolve it using his four dimensionalist account of time? 2. What is the difference between personal time and external time according to Lewis? And how does it help explain the way in which time travel can take “time”? 3. What is the difference between incompatibilism and compatibilism? Discuss using some examples. What is soft determinism, and how is it related to either of these views? Part 2 (Logic): 4. What makes an argument different than a mere collection of statements? What is the crucial difference between a good inductive and a good deductive argument? Give an example of each. 5. What is the difference between an inconsistent set of statements and a contradictory set of statements? If two statements are contradictory, must one of the two be true? If two statements are inconsistent, must one of the two be true?

33. The Core Argument (1) If TT is possible, then you can be distinct from yourself (i.e., fail to be identical to yourself). (2) You cannot be distinct from yourself (for, by Leib’s Law, everything is identical to itself in every respect). Therefore, (3) TT is not possible. (Caveat: Study Guide presents this problem differently. But this is the basic issue.) 33

34. The Two-Times Paradox Time travel seems like it can take time – How long did it take Harry Potter to TT? Suppose it takes 1 hr to travel 1 year into the past. E.g., To TT, then, we’d have to be moving both forward (100hrs) & backward (100yrs) in time! Is this possible? Yes, if time is two dimensional 34 20151915 100hr Trip

35. Two Dimensional Time 35 Time II Time I Normal Progress Through Time 1915 2015 Damnit! I was trying to get over there! Time Traveler’s Progress

36. The Two-Times Objection (1) If TT takes time, then one cannot revisit exactly the same moment of time in the past. (2) If one cannot revisit exactly the same moment of time in the past, then TT of the sort we’re interested in is impossible. (3) TT takes time. Therefore (4) TT of the sort we’re interested in is impossible. What sort are we interested in? The sort that gets us back the exact moment of time we want. 36

37. 37 Compatibilism holds that there is no deep conflict between freedom of the will and causal determination...the compatibilist holds that not every causal influence on our behaviour leaves us unfree. For example, one simple compatibilist theory is: if the way my actions are caused leaves me able to act as I want, then I act freely. To say that I have acted freely is to say something like this: If I had wanted to do something other than what I did do, then I would have done something else. (This is the classical ‘conditional analysis’ of free will.) Where this is not the case...... an agent is not free. Where it is the case, an agent is free. This is a version of the view Taylor calls soft determinism, which states that determinism is true but it is compatible with free will. Tip: If you think that two things can exist at once you are a compatibilist about those two things. 3. What is the difference between incompatibilism and compatibilism? Discuss using some examples. What is soft determinism, and how is it related to either of these views?`

38. 38 Incompatibilism comes in two flavours The first form of incompatibalism holds that freedom of the will requires that an agent who acts freely must be able to act differently—in a very strong sense, one that requires multiple futures. If I do something freely (e.g., scratch my head)..... it means that I could have chosen differently—there was genuinely more than one option available. If we adopt this incompatibilist view, then there are two ways we might complete our position. We might defend the view that humans do sometimes act freely in this very strong sense; we might argue that free will does exist. This is the libertarian view; it is the conjunction of incompatibilism and the view that free actions do sometimes occur (and thus it rejects determinism). The second form of incompatibalism holds that if we are convinced of the truth of determinism, then we will conclude that humans never act freely. Freedom of the will is an illusion. This is often called hard determinism.

39. 39 Fatalism is the view that ‘whatever happens is unavoidable’. A compatibilist would emphasize that determinism doesn’t necessarily yield what fatalism must—namely, that events will happen no matter what you want, believe, choose, decide, etc. A determinist who is not a fatalist would emphasize that our futures are not inevitable - they depend on what we do as agents.

40. 40 Compatibilism Determinism and free will are true. (Soft Determinism) Incompatibilism Position 1. Free will is true determinism is false. (Libertarianism) Position 2. Determinism is true free will is false. (Hard Determinism) See TSM Reader P. 18

41. Compatibilism: Compatibilism: Free will and determinism are consistent. Adherents: – Stoics, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, J.M. Fisher, Dennett…. Recall The Conditions of Freedom: One is able to perform act A freely ONLY IF 1) there is no obstacle that prevents one from doing A, and 2) there is nothing that constrains or forces one to do A, and 3) one could have done otherwise, i.e., action A is avoidable. – Worry: can Determinists consistently ever claim that “I could have done otherwise”?

44. 4. What makes an argument different than a mere collection of statements? What is the crucial difference between a good inductive and a good deductive argument? Give an example of each.

45. DEDUCTIVE REASONING (if the premises are true the conclusion must be true). P1. All men are mortal.P1. No pigs fly P2. Socrates is a man.P2. Porky is a pig C. Socrates is mortal.C. Porky doesn’t fly INDUCTIVE REASONING (if the premises are very likely the conclusion is very likely) P1. Every man in historyP1. There are no certified has eventually died.accounts of flying pigs. P2. Socrates is a man.P2. Porky is a pig. C. Socrates will almostC. It is unlikely that Porky can fly. certainly die. The principle of induction is that the basic regularities of the past will continue into the future.

46. Inductive forms of argument Deductively validity is not the only kind of support premises can provide for a conclusion. Sometimes the premises of an argument might give us a good reason to accept the conclusion as true, even though it is logically possible that the premises are true and the conclusion false. Definition: An argument is inductively strong or inductively valid if it is very unlikely that all the premises are true and the conclusion false.

47. 5. What is the difference between an inconsistent set of statements and a contradictory set of statements? If two statements are contradictory, must one of the two be true? If two statements are inconsistent, must one of the two be true?

48. EXAMPLE OF AN INCONSISTENT SET These 3 statements form an inconsistent set Fred is good at logic. Nobody who failed this test is good at logic. Fred failed this test. It is not logically possible that all statements in the set are true.

49. A set of sentences is said to be consistent if and only if there is at least one possible situation in which they are all true. So, the following set of sentences is consistent: Grass is green. It is not the case that the moon is green. Most humans have ten fingers. Grasshoppers have six legs and dogs have four. Earth is a cube.

50. The difference between a contradictory pair of sentences and an inconsistent pair. (From page 75 of ATS1835 Reader) The house is all green. The house is not all green. Contradictory The house is all green. The house is all blue. Inconsistent Test: If one is false is the other necessarily true?

52. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle Part 3 (Mind): 6. Explain how functionalism allows for the multiple realisation of mental states, and how this might be viewed as an advantage over the view that the mind is the brain. 7. Explain Searle’s Chinese Room argument and how it presents a challenge for strong AI and computationalism. Part 4 (Self): 8. Locke’s theory of personal identity seems to employ a memory criterion. But Derek Parfit believes that even an improved and more generalized psychological theory is problematic. What exactly is the fission problem and why does it seem to undermine any psychological view of personal identity? 9. Explain why Parfit thinks that the experiments involving patients whose corpus callosum has been severed present a problem for certain theories of the self. How does Parfit propose to avoid the problem? 10. Why does Williams think identity matters in personal identity? How does he motivate the idea in terms of our attitudes toward our future?

53. The Self 8. Locke’s theory of personal identity seems to employ a memory criterion. But Derek Parfit believes that even an improved and more generalized psychological theory is problematic. What exactly is the fission problem and why does it seem to undermine any psychological view of personal identity? 9. Explain why Parfit thinks that the experiments involving patients whose corpus callosum has been severed present a problem for certain theories of the self. How does Parfit propose to avoid the problem? 10. Why does Williams think identity matters in personal identity? How does he motivate the idea in terms of our attitudes toward our future? Parfit: Not persistence of identity but concern for survival. Williams: Not psychological continuity, but physical (bodily) continuity) Lewis: Connected time-stages of personal timelines ensure perdurance.

54. Teleportation Imagine a teleport machine that works as follows. It scans and records everything about your body, down to the atomic level. That information is then sent to the receiving teleport machine, which reconstructs your body exactly from a stock pile of raw material. The scanning process destroys all the original atoms of your body. Question: Is this really a way to travel? Would you use it?

55. Teleportation

56. Imagine the machine breaks down. An exact duplicate of you is created at the destination, but the original you is not destroyed. Or what if two copies of you were created at the other end? Again, the person / people at the other end are psychologically continuous with you, But are they really you? Most people answer no – this kind of machine is not a way to travel. It just creates a duplicate of you (like an identical twin). Perhaps it is bodily continuity that really matter then, rather than psychological continuity. (Williams)

57. A-body person B-body person A B This isn’t what I asked for! Swapping bodies The A-body person has all B’s memories. Yay! The B-body person has all A’s memories.

58. Parfit’s argument (1) Identity is a one-one relation that does not admit of degrees. (2) Psychological continuity need not be one- one and can come in degrees. (Fission and fusion cases) (3) What matters in survival is psychological continuity (whether your mental life continues on) Therefore: (C) What matters in survival is not identity. Lewis wants to accept all three premises, but reject the conclusion.

59. Lewis’s theory Suppose I am wondering whether I will survive a future event. What matters to me? Answer 1: Psychological continuity: whether my mental life ‘flows on’. My current mental states should have successors that are appropriately linked to my current state. Answer 2: Identity: I want there to be someone who is me after the event. Parfit argues that there are cases (eg fission) where these two answers will disagree. Lewis argues against this. Both answers are right and they can never disagree!

60. Temporal stages Lewis makes use of the idea that a person is a unified whole consisting of temporal stages or temporal parts. Think of a person as a four-dimensional object which is stretched out in time. At any particular time, only the temporal parts are present, never the whole person. This conception of identity through time should be distinguished from an endurantist conception, according to which the whole person is present at all the times that it exists.

61. Tensed Identity “You may feel certain that you count persons by identity and not tensed identity. But how can you be sure? Normal cases provide no evidence…. The problem cases provide no very solid evidence either. They are problem cases just because we cannot consistently say quite all the things we feel inclined to, We must strike the best compromise among our conflicting opinions. Something must give way: and why not the opinion that of course we count by identity, if that is what can be sacrificed with the least total damage?” Lewis, ‘Survival and Identity’, p. 227