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Internet Vulnerabilities & Criminal Activity Internet Forensics 12.1 April 26, 2010 Internet Forensics 12.1 April 26, 2010.

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Presentation on theme: "Internet Vulnerabilities & Criminal Activity Internet Forensics 12.1 April 26, 2010 Internet Forensics 12.1 April 26, 2010."— Presentation transcript:

1 Internet Vulnerabilities & Criminal Activity Internet Forensics 12.1 April 26, 2010 Internet Forensics 12.1 April 26, 2010

2 Internet Forensics & Computer Forensics  Computer Forensics  Computer off / power it off  Hard drive is imaged  Examination made of hard drive copy  No live capture of memory  Internet Forensics  Done while computer is on  May or may not examine memory  Network activity is captured and analyzed  Computer Forensics  Computer off / power it off  Hard drive is imaged  Examination made of hard drive copy  No live capture of memory  Internet Forensics  Done while computer is on  May or may not examine memory  Network activity is captured and analyzed

3 Malware Analysis  Goal - provide insight into attackers  Malware has two purposes  Steal information from victim computers  Commander victim computer’s resources for attacker’s use  Malware secondary features  Propagation  Locate & terminate security programs & competing malware  Hide itself from system administrators  Goal - provide insight into attackers  Malware has two purposes  Steal information from victim computers  Commander victim computer’s resources for attacker’s use  Malware secondary features  Propagation  Locate & terminate security programs & competing malware  Hide itself from system administrators

4 Malware Programs  Most derived from a small, stable base of existing code  Small changes to obfuscation scheme  Command & control credentials change  No need to change what works  Custom programmed malware unlikely to be identified by security software  Most derived from a small, stable base of existing code  Small changes to obfuscation scheme  Command & control credentials change  No need to change what works  Custom programmed malware unlikely to be identified by security software

5 Extracting Information  Author vs Attacker  More interested in the attacker  Information that can lead to attackers identity  How malware interacts with the Internet  What type of information is being targeted  Commonalities with previously analyzed software  Author vs Attacker  More interested in the attacker  Information that can lead to attackers identity  How malware interacts with the Internet  What type of information is being targeted  Commonalities with previously analyzed software

6 Malware Network Interactions  Receiving commands  Command & control site  Exfiltrate data  Drop site  Unique identifier (advertising fraud)  Receiving commands  Command & control site  Exfiltrate data  Drop site  Unique identifier (advertising fraud)

7 Identifying Advertising Revenue  Advertising fraud  Pay-per-view, pay-per-click, pay-per-install  To receive revenue, web site operator must be identified  Tracking number  May be found in malware  May be found in the URL for the advertisement  Extracted tracking number starting point to identifying recipient  Advertising fraud  Pay-per-view, pay-per-click, pay-per-install  To receive revenue, web site operator must be identified  Tracking number  May be found in malware  May be found in the URL for the advertisement  Extracted tracking number starting point to identifying recipient

8 Identifying Drop Sites  Malware that steals data will upload data to a specific site for later retrieval  Passwords, keystrokes, network traffic, documents  Data may be uploaded to drop site using:  HTTP  FTP  E-mail  Malware that steals data will upload data to a specific site for later retrieval  Passwords, keystrokes, network traffic, documents  Data may be uploaded to drop site using:  HTTP  FTP  E-mail

9 Identifying Drop Sites cont.  Drop site location  May be hard coded into malware  May be found by query to web site or IRC channel  Possible actions once drop site is located  Analyze traffic to site to help find attacker  Analyze data at drop site & inform victims and financial institutions  Shut down drop site  Will only work with a hard coded site  Drop site location  May be hard coded into malware  May be found by query to web site or IRC channel  Possible actions once drop site is located  Analyze traffic to site to help find attacker  Analyze data at drop site & inform victims and financial institutions  Shut down drop site  Will only work with a hard coded site

10 Forensic Examination  Computer is off  Image the hard drive on site  Transport computer to lab and image the hard drive  Examine image in a lab environment  Computer is on  Observe & document the following before shutting machine down  Running processes  Open ports  Memory  Use of encryption  Computer is off  Image the hard drive on site  Transport computer to lab and image the hard drive  Examine image in a lab environment  Computer is on  Observe & document the following before shutting machine down  Running processes  Open ports  Memory  Use of encryption

11 Examination of Malware  Malware files should be:  Located, recovered, neutralized to prevent accidental execution, analyzed  Antivirus testing  Can identify known malware  Information can be obtained from antivirus web site  Cannot identify network contact sites  Anti-virus sites not detailed or accurate enough for court  Malware files should be:  Located, recovered, neutralized to prevent accidental execution, analyzed  Antivirus testing  Can identify known malware  Information can be obtained from antivirus web site  Cannot identify network contact sites  Anti-virus sites not detailed or accurate enough for court

12 Examination of Malware cont.  Study strings in the binary  Locates embedded text  Text may be packed to further obfuscate  Indicates malware has specific targets  Runtime Analysis  Run malware in an isolated environment  Use simulation of the Internet & targeted sites  Use network tools to observe malware’s behavior  Look for :  Method used to transfer data  Address where data is sent  Study strings in the binary  Locates embedded text  Text may be packed to further obfuscate  Indicates malware has specific targets  Runtime Analysis  Run malware in an isolated environment  Use simulation of the Internet & targeted sites  Use network tools to observe malware’s behavior  Look for :  Method used to transfer data  Address where data is sent

13 Examination of Malware cont.  Reverse Engineering  Converts file back to source code  Need some understanding of programming  Identify sites used for Command & Control (C&C)  Central point of communication between malware & attacker  C&C sites usually illegally hosted on compromised servers  Look for host name / IP number of C&C site  Attack will normally connect to C&C site using a proxy or other compromised host  Reverse Engineering  Converts file back to source code  Need some understanding of programming  Identify sites used for Command & Control (C&C)  Central point of communication between malware & attacker  C&C sites usually illegally hosted on compromised servers  Look for host name / IP number of C&C site  Attack will normally connect to C&C site using a proxy or other compromised host

14 Examination of Malware cont.  Identify C&C site continued  Malware identifies C&C site using IP address or DNS resource record  IP address more vulnerable as IP address can be shut down  DNS resource record can just be resolved to new IP number  Nature of DNS record can provide leads  Contact & payment details  Other DNS records with same contact information  Other IP addresses associated with DNS record  Attackers choice of type of host or network can provide information on attacker’s activities  Identify C&C site continued  Malware identifies C&C site using IP address or DNS resource record  IP address more vulnerable as IP address can be shut down  DNS resource record can just be resolved to new IP number  Nature of DNS record can provide leads  Contact & payment details  Other DNS records with same contact information  Other IP addresses associated with DNS record  Attackers choice of type of host or network can provide information on attacker’s activities

15 Extracting Incidental Artifacts  Can find other information stored in malware with investigative value  Use “strings” command  Messages or comments from the author or attacker  Metadata about the development environment  May be placed in malware to intentionally mislead investigators  May lead to author not attacker  Can find other information stored in malware with investigative value  Use “strings” command  Messages or comments from the author or attacker  Metadata about the development environment  May be placed in malware to intentionally mislead investigators  May lead to author not attacker

16 More to Learn from Malware  Two different malwares using the same C&C site may belong to the same attacker  Why not go after the author?  Prosecution requires:  Knowledge  Intent  Damages & monetary loss  Techniques used by malware authors point out weaknesses in network security  Two different malwares using the same C&C site may belong to the same attacker  Why not go after the author?  Prosecution requires:  Knowledge  Intent  Damages & monetary loss  Techniques used by malware authors point out weaknesses in network security

17 Attackers  Will balance cost, risk & potential profit  Sophistication is expensive  Will only employ sophisticated techniques when there is sufficient profit  Will use what ever techniques work  Understand social behavior  Security professionals have limited time / resources, work fixed hours  Infrastructure used for attack will eventually be shut down  Schedule attacks to maximize time till attack is noticed  Will balance cost, risk & potential profit  Sophistication is expensive  Will only employ sophisticated techniques when there is sufficient profit  Will use what ever techniques work  Understand social behavior  Security professionals have limited time / resources, work fixed hours  Infrastructure used for attack will eventually be shut down  Schedule attacks to maximize time till attack is noticed

18 Attackers cont.  Understand the culture of victims being targeted  E-mail, application icons, programs named to be as enticing as possible  Exploit jurisdictions & geography  Know the law enforcement difficulties working internationally  Use several proxies in different counties to route connections  Know which countries are weak on cyber enforcement  Understand the culture of victims being targeted  E-mail, application icons, programs named to be as enticing as possible  Exploit jurisdictions & geography  Know the law enforcement difficulties working internationally  Use several proxies in different counties to route connections  Know which countries are weak on cyber enforcement

19 Attackers cont.  Monetary thresholds & other crimes  Know that most countries have monetary limits on crimes pursued  Internet provides “protection” for attackers  Rules for juveniles different - attackers exploit this  Study & evade network defenses  Understand how firewalls & antivirus software works  Have learned how to circumvent security measures  Outbound connections to C&C and drop sites  Use ubiquitous HTTP protocol  Monetary thresholds & other crimes  Know that most countries have monetary limits on crimes pursued  Internet provides “protection” for attackers  Rules for juveniles different - attackers exploit this  Study & evade network defenses  Understand how firewalls & antivirus software works  Have learned how to circumvent security measures  Outbound connections to C&C and drop sites  Use ubiquitous HTTP protocol

20 Supporting Other Investigations  Malware code analysis may assist in other computer forensic investigations  Combating the “Malware on the Machine” defense  Defendants claim illegal materials on computer due to malware  Examine malware on the machine  Examine network traffic records  Could the malware have committed the crime  Is functionality present in the malware to commit the attack  Malware code analysis may assist in other computer forensic investigations  Combating the “Malware on the Machine” defense  Defendants claim illegal materials on computer due to malware  Examine malware on the machine  Examine network traffic records  Could the malware have committed the crime  Is functionality present in the malware to commit the attack


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