1. INTERMISSION

2. LEGIONELLA, LEAD & LESSONS LEARNED Urban Water Institute 23 rd Annual Winter Conference August 25, 2016 2

3. Click to add title  Inauguration: Nov 9, 2015  Ran & Elected on Lead Issue  No Previous Office  Flint Demographics  Population: 99,000 (Max. 200,000)  Median Household Income: $24,679 (Michigan @ $49,087)  Poverty Rate: 41.5% (Michigan @ 16.2%)  Unemployment Rate: 12.5% - 8.5% (July - December 2015)  57% African-American (Michigan @ 14%)  Financial Emergency 2011-2014  Management by State Appointed Emergency Managers Mayor Karen Weaver City of Flint, MI 3

4. Click to add title INSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE & BUSINESS DRIVERS FOR FLINT, MI 4 Dr. Andrew Highsmith – UC Irvine Demolition Means Progress, 2015 Federal Housing Programs GM Plant Building & Closures Michigan Tax & Revenue Sharing

5. Click to add title Michigan Emergency Financial Management 5 An Emergency Manager (EM) is an official appointed by the Governor to take control of a local government under a financial emergency. The EM temporarily supplants the governing body and has authority to remove any of the unit’s elected officials. EMs have complete control over the local unit. The EM’s focus is financial performance. Public Act 101 (1988), PA 72 (1990), PA 4 (2011) (repealed by referendum 2012), PA 436 (2012) 1. Complete Control 2. One Focus - Financial FLINT HAD FIVE EMs OVER 40 MONTHS (Dec 2011 – April 2015)

6. Click to add title  Inauguration: Nov 9, 2015 U.S. Conference of Mayors Team Visit 3-months later (Feb 2, 2016) One-hour delay US EPA Administrator & Team Drop-in New York Times waiting in lobby Governor’s Office regarding press conference Did not yet have business cards Mayor Karen Weaver A Day In The Life Of 6

7. Click to add title 1883 System Built – Flint River Supply 1911 – Filtration Plant 1947-1955 – Capital Improvements Polyphosphate treatment included 1967 – 50-year Water Supply Contract with Detroit (DWSD) – Lake Huron Supply - WTP kept as backup April 25, 2014 – City Reverts to Flint River & Flint WTP December 27, 2014 - GM Engine Plant Switches Supply (Chlorides & Rust) Flint Water System 7

8. Click to add title 1883 System Built – Flint River Supply 1911 – Filtration Plant 1947-1955 – Capital Improvements Polyphosphate treatment included 1967 – 50-year Water Supply Contract with Detroit (DWSD) – Lake Huron Supply - WTP kept as backup April 25, 2014 – City Reverts to Flint River & Flint WTP December 27, 2014 - GM Engine Plant Switches Supply (Chlorides & Rust) October 16, 2015 City of Flint Reconnected to DWSD System Flint Water System 8

9. Click to add title Water Treatment Plant Design Capacity 36.0 MGD Average Daily Flow = 14.04 MG Distribution System Approximately 800 miles – mostly cast iron Most > 70 years old 7,258 valves Efficiency @ 63% (5-year average) Storage Existing = 57 MG (2 x Needed) Flint Water System 9

10. Click to add title CHANGE WATER SUPPLY BACTERIA-E. coli (LEGIONELLA) CHLORINATION BOOST DISINFECTION BYPRODUCTS (TTHMs) “RUSTY” WATER & LEAD “WHAT” Is Simple 10 “HOW” and “WHY” are Difficult

11. Click to add title 1963 Proposal – Profiteers Scandal 67 mile pipeline with Lake Huron Intake $285million pipeline cost – 85 MGD project KWA formed November 26, 2010 Genesee County, Sanillac County, City of Lapeer Flint’s EM & City Council approve March 25, 201 Michigan Treasury Department approves April 15, 2013 Flint’s share is $7 million/year for 28 years for 16 MGD ($196 million in payments) Flint fully guarantees bond payments – locked in to deal Karegondi Water Authority 11

12. Click to add titleLegionella 12 12 DEATHS Governor Snyder discloses outbreak January 13, 2016 2016 4 cases (8-16-16)

13. Click to add title VEOLIA Water Quality Report Total Trihalomethans (TTHM) 13 Veolia water quality study was a relatively quick overview resulting in an 11 page final report The report recommends a variety of improvements: Changes in water treatment processes Modifications of procedures and chemical dosing Technology adjustments Increased maintenance and capital programs Increased staff training Enhanced customer communications

14. Click to add title VEOLIA Water Quality Report Total Trihalomethans (TTHM) 14 “..Although the primary focus of this review was based on solving the TTHM problem, the public has also expressed its frustration over discolored water……” “Contact your engineer and initiate discussions with the State on the addition of a corrosion control chemical..…... A target dosage of 0.5 mg/L phosphate is suggested for improved corrosion control.”…. “…The review of water quality records during the time of Veolia’s study shows the water to be in compliance with State and Federal regulations, and, based on those standards, the water is considered to meet drinking water requirements.” -- March 12, 2015

15. Click to add title EM rush to change water supply MDEQ advice on Corrosion Control Treatment Requirement to City & misrepresentation to EPA MDEQ guidance on Sampling Procedures EPA failure to provide oversight MDEQ Prolonged reliance on flawed test results & dismissal of public and experts’ concerns City & MDEQ manipulation of test results Flint Lead Issues 15

17. Calculating Compliance for Lead & Copper Monitoring- EPA method Sample RankLead Value (mg/L) 10.000 2 30.002 40.005 5 60.006 7 80.010 9 (90 th %)0.015 100.020 Sort sample results in ascending order from lowest to highest value. Assign sample rank, starting with 1 for the lowest value. Compare 90 th percentile value to the action level of 0.015 mg/L for lead, if value is less than or equal to the action level you are in compliance. Do the same for copper, action level 1.3 mg/L.

18. Monitoring Results (ppb) 013510 013511 023513 023518 023620 023621 023622 023629 023742 0247 0247104 0258 0258 1359 13510 Calculation of Flint’s 90 Percentile Lead Level * Step 1. Determine which positions in ranked sample set to perform 90 percentile calculation - Rounding Method i = N X P i = 71 X 0.9 i = 63.9 i = 64 Step 2. Calculate 90 percentile value Position 64 value = 18ppb 18 ppb - ABOVE EPA Action Level of 15 ppb *EPA Lead and Copper Monitoring and Reporting Guidance for Public Water System – 2/2002 Source of data: Eastern Michigan University; Professor Chris Gardiner; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pql00zr700

19. Monitoring Results (ppb) 013510 013511 023513 023518 023620 023621 023622 023629 023742 0247 0247104 0258 0258 1359 13510 Calculation of Flint’s 90 Percentile Lead Level* [Consequences of Deleting 2 Samples] Step 1. Determine which positions in ranked sample set to perform 90 percentile calculation- Rounding Method i = N X P i = 69 X 0.9 i = 62.1 i = 62 Step 2. Calculate 90 percentile value Position 62 value = 11ppb 11 ppb BELOW EPA Action Level of 15 ppb *EPA Lead and Copper Monitoring and Reporting Guidance for Public Water System – 2/2002 Source of data: Eastern Michigan University; Professor Chris Gardiner; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pql00zr700

20. Click to add title 271 samples collected by residents 101 first draw samples are over 5 ppb 90 percentile lead value is 25.2 ppb Several samples exceeded 100 ppb Virginia Tech Water Monitoring 20 Similar (but different) issues occurred with the data on lead levels in blood samples

21. Click to add title Flint Water Advisory Task Force Final Report (March 2016) 21 Five Member Team Appointed by Governor Rick Snyder Two Physicians (Pediatricians) Two former State Legislators with Environmental, Public Health & Public Policy Backgrounds One National Water Expert with Financial & System Experience The Final Report includes a Timeline of approximately 500 Events As well as background information, analysis, findings (36) and recommendations (44) for seven organizations: Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ)Michigan Governor’s Office Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS)State-Appointed EMs Genesee County Health Department (GCHD)City of Flint U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

22. Click to add title Flint Water Advisory Task Force Final Report (March 2016) 22 Five Member Team Appointed by Governor Rick Snyder Two Physicians (Pediatricians) Two former State Legislators with Environmental, Public Health & Public Policy Backgrounds One National Water Expert with Financial & System Experience EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Flint water crisis is a story of government failure, intransigence, unpreparedness, delay, inaction, and environmental injustice.

23. Click to add title Findings 5 – Recommendations 5 MDEQ bears primary responsibility for Flint water contamination MDEQ misinterpreted LCR and misapplied its requirements MDEQ failed to quickly move, with others, to investigate Legionellosis Implement a proactive, comprehensive culture change Strengthen SDWA enforcement Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 23

24. Click to add title Findings 6 – Recommendations 9 Lack of timely analysis and understanding od its own childhood blood data prolonged the Flint Water Crisis Coordination between MDEQ and MDHHS was inadequate Communication and coordination among local and state public health staff and leadership regarding Legionellosis cases in 2014- 2015 was inadequate Ensure that MDHHS is transparent and timely in reporting and analysis of aggregate data Take responsibility and leadership in coordinating health agencies Michigan Department of Health & Human Services 24

25. Click to add title Findings 3 – Recommendations 3 The rate of follow-up on children with elevated blood levels through January 206 was unacceptable Communication, coordination and cooperation with other agencies and the public were inadequate Presume that the risk of Legionella may remain elevated in the Flint water distribution system and take appropriate actions Genesee County Health Department 25

26. Click to add title Findings 6 – Recommendations 3 Flint’s lack of reinvestment in its water distribution system contributed to the drinking water crisis and ability to respond to water quality problems Flint Public Works personnel were ill-prepared to assume responsibility of full-time plant operation Flint relied on deeply flawed technical assistance and guidance from MDEQ Implement a programmatic approach to Flint WTP and distribution system operations, maintenance, asset management, CIP & training. City of Flint 26

27. Click to add title Findings 4 – Recommendations 3 EPA failed to properly exercise its authority prior to January 2016 EPA has accepted differing compliance LCR strategies EPA was hesitant and slow to insist on proper corrosion control measures in Flint Exercise more vigor in DDRESSING COMPLIANCE VIOLATIONS Clarify and strengthen the LCR U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 27

28. Click to add title Findings 6 – Recommendations 5 Ultimate accountability rests with the Governor – Culture change Official state public and communications have been inappropriate and unacceptable at times The Flint water crisis highlights the risk of over-reliance on a few staff in 1 or 2 departments for information Review budget requests for MDEQ to insure adequate funding is provided to drinking water. EPA audits indicate that Michigan’s program has one of the lowest levels of financial support in EPA Region V Michigan Governor’s Office 28

29. Click to add title Findings 5 – Recommendations 3 The role of the EMs in Flint places primary accountability with state government Ems, not local elected officials, made the decision to switch Flint’s water source Treasury officials, through the terms of financial assistance agreements, precluded return to Detroit WSD water Ensure proper support and expertise for Ems Change Michigan’s EM law and implementation to compensate for the loss of checks and balances State-Appointed Emergency Managers 29

30. Click to add title Resignations, Charges & Lawsuits 30 Resignations MDEQ Director Dan Wyant (12.29.15) MDEQ Spokesperson Brad Wurfel (12.29.15) EPA Regional Administrator Susan Hedman (1.21.16) Civil Lawsuits VEOLIA Environment SA (6.22.16) – professional negligence & fraud Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam (LAN) (6.22.16) – fraud McLaren Flint Hospital (2.2.16) 50+ Others

31. Click to add title Resignations, Charges & Lawsuits 31 Charges MDEQ Supervisor Stephen Busch (3 felonies & 2 misdemeanors) MDEQ Water Engineer Michael Prysby (4 felonies & 2 misdemeanors) City of Flint Water Quality Supervisor Michael Glasgow (1 felony & 1 misdemeanor) MDEQ Chief of the Office of Drinking Water Liane Shekter-Smith (1 felony & 1 misdemeanor) MDEQ Water Quality Analyst Adam Rosenthal (2 felonies & 2 misdemeanors) MDEQ LCR Compliance Specialist Patrick Cook (2 felonies & 1 misdemeanor) MDHHS Director Nancy Peeler (2 felonies & 1 misdemeanor) MDHHS Data Manager Lead Prevention Program Robert Scott (2 felonies & 1 misdemeanor) MDHHS State Epidemiologist Corinne Miller (2 felonies & 1 misdemeanor) Felony: 5 years and/or $10,000Misdemeanor: 1 year and/or $1,000

32. Click to add title Water Quality Impacts of Reduced Demand Funding of Both Water Utilities and Regulatory Agencies Clarity of Regulation and Adequacy of Oversight LCR movement onto Private Property Legal Restrictions to Actions Broader Unresolved Issues 32