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The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI draft-yossigi-rpkimaxlen-00

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Presentation on theme: "The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI draft-yossigi-rpkimaxlen-00"— Presentation transcript:

1 The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI draft-yossigi-rpkimaxlen-00
Yossi Gilad, Sharon Goldberg, Kotikalapudi Sriram

2 When used properly, the RPKI defeats subprefix hijacks
RPKI valid AS 666 fails to attract traffic! Path: AS 111 /16 X RPKI invalid AS 666 Cyberbunker AS 34109 Path: AS 666 /24 AS 111 AS 111 ROA: AS 111 /16 RPKI RPKI /16

3 Loose maxlength  forged-origin subprefix hijack
this attack is highly effective because /24 is unannouced RPKI valid longest prefix match  AS 666 attracts all traffic for the subprefix! Path: AS 111 /16 RPKI valid AS 666 Cyberbunker AS 34109 Path: AS 666, AS111 /24 AS 111 AS 111 ROA: AS 111 /16 to maxlength 24 RPKI RPKI /16

4 Maxlength misconfigurations are common!
forged-origin subprefix hijack affects any ROA where maxlength m > prefixlen p, unless every subprefix of length m is announced in BGP 16% of the IP prefixes in ROAs have maxlength > prefixlen 89% of these are vulnerable to forged-origin subprefix hijacks Even large providers are vulnerable

5 https://github.com/yossigi/compress_roas
Recommendations As a best common practice: Operators should refrain from using maxlength in ROAs Each ROA should instead have explicit lists of prefixes authorized to be originated by a single AS Whenever possible, use minimal ROAs where each listed prefix is originated in BGP. The RPKI already support this. No extra ROAs needed. To reduce the number of RPKI filtering rules, we developed software that RPKI local caches can use to compresses lists of prefixes from ROAs back to (AS, prefix,maxlength) tuples See also our technical report:

6 Sometimes ROAs need to include unannounced prefixes
AS 222 gives traffic-scrubbing service to AS 111 during DDoS attacks Path: AS 111 /16 Path: AS 222 /17 /17 Scrubbing service AS 222 Scrubs traffic, relays to AS 111 AS 111 AS 111 /16

7 Sometimes ROAs need to include unannounced prefixes
Scrubbing would fail if there was only the ROA for announced pfx RPKI valid Path: AS 111 /16 RPKI invalid X Path: AS 222 /17 /17 Scrubbing service AS 222 RPKI invalid X AS 111 AS 111 RPKI /16 ROA: AS 111 /16

8 Sometimes ROAs need to include unannounced prefixes
Add a (non “minimal”) ROA for AS 222 that does not use maxlength RPKI valid RPKI valid Path: AS 111 /16 Path: AS 222 /17 /17 RPKI valid Scrubbing service AS 222 ROA: AS 222 /17 /17 AS 111 AS 111 RPKI /16 ROA: AS 111 /16


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